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 Nietzsche is well known as the philosopher of the tragic view of life. Because we 
are part of the world of becoming the tragic view maintains that human beings are given 
over to certain limits that we cannot transcend. These include ourselves as finite beings, 
the recognition that noumenal knowledge is not possible and, because we are subject to 
the flux of existence, that life can be both painful and destructive. However, for 
Nietzsche the tragic view of life ought not result in humorless resignation and he appeals 
to ancient Greek tragedy to demonstrate how cheerfulness is possible in the face of 
pessimism. But Nietzsche is equally clear that comedy and laughter too are ways to 
embrace the truth of tragic wisdom. In this work which examines three key texts that span 
Nietzsche’s productive life—The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, and Thus Spoke 
 v
Zarathustra—I will argue that comedy and laughter are central to Nietzsche’s endeavor 
to surmount pessimism, bring intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) to Wissenschaft, and 
appreciate appearance where we become witness to the wonder and folly of the human 
being. Far from being a heuristic device used simply as a tool, the provocative laughter 
found in Nietzsche’s texts is the affirmation of amor fati that says “yes” to life, 
multiplicity, perspective, and tragic wisdom so that we may counter Schopenhauerian 
resignation. It is part of an authentic response of a subject in affirming being here as part 
of the world of becoming and, “living in Schein as goal.” In the end I will demonstrate 
that Nietzsche’s use of comedy and laughter is a herald that when sounded urges us to 
recognize the limits we are all subject to in order to return us to the humble, but noble, 
earthbound beings that we are. Set amidst all the serious issues that Nietzsche’s writings 
detail—the death of God, nihilism as the terminal sickness of the West, the will to power, 
the eternal return—comedy and laughter resound in his thinking so as to yoke the 
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NOTE ON TEXTS 
 
Because there are now numerous translations of Nietzsche’s texts into English, I will list 
not only the page number of the particular text I am referencing but also the aphorism 
and/or section number or the title of the aphorism if no number is given. The majority of 
my references are from the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press) editions of Nietzsche’s works that are themselves based on the now 
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“Genuine honesty, assuming that this is our virtue and we cannot get rid of it, we free 
spirits – well then, we will want to work on it with all the love and malice at our disposal, 
and not get tired of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue, the only one we have left: may its 
glory come to rest like a gilded, blue evening glow of mockery over this aging culture 
and its dull and dismal seriousness!” 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil~ 
 
 
I. The Play of Philosophy and Comedy 
 
 One might think it odd that comedy and philosophy share anything in common let 
alone be complimentary. The traditional image of philosophy and philosophers is one of 
deep thought by somber, pensive individuals who attempt to think through the greatest 
questions of humankind. This of course is true. Philosophy does attempt to give accounts 
of the most profound questions of human existence. Questions such as: What is the nature 
of reality? Are we free? How ought one live authentically? All of this lends a certain air 
of seriousness to philosophy that appears to efface anything comical or laughter 
provoking. Certainly this serious image of philosophy has held sway through the ages. 
However I argue that comedy and philosophy share a deep alliance even if not always 
apparent the same way philosophy and serious matters are aligned. More specifically, I 
argue that Friedrich Nietzsche understands, appreciates, and exploits this alliance 
between comedy and philosophy, an alliance that has until recently been almost 
 2
completely ignored. What then could possibly be the nature of philosophy and comedy? 
How do such apparently diverse phenomenon relate? 
 If one had to distill a single qualifying characteristic of this relationship, it would 
be, to quote Bernard Freydberg, one of measure.1 Philosophy and comedy take each 
other’s measure. How so? Philosophy and philosophers appear to be paradigms of 
restraint and measure, heeding the ancient oracle of Delphi whose advice was moderation 
in all things. Philosophical wisdom was attained in part from the knowledge that the 
appropriate measure was needed to live a good life in the philosophical sense or even in 
everyday, pragmatic affairs. It helped one to deal wisely with any given circumstance, 
whether political, social, familial or even concerning more mundane issues such as the 
appropriate consumption of food and drink. Moreover, thinking, which is the domain of 
philosophy, also requires a certain restraint at times. Socrates has traditionally been the 
personification of this since his wisdom lay in the recognition of his limits, that is, of his 
ignorance. This phenomenon is perhaps best understood in terms of Socrates’ daimon. 
Playing a key role in his pursuit of wisdom, his daimon, ironically, restrained him in 
certain contexts and never compelled him to do anything. In other words, pursuit and 
restraint are coupled together in the image of Socrates.2 So philosophy armed with 
measure appeared as most suited to a well lived life. Accordingly, this image of 
philosophy all but excludes and even requires one to, if not purge outright, at least 
dramatically temper any disruptive excess. It would seem that raucous laughter and 
comedy have no place within philosophic endeavors. 
                                                 
1 See Bernard Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy: Aristophanes, Logos, and Eros (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 196-200. 
2 Nietzsche of course challenges this view of Socrates, especially in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche views 
Socrates as a philosopher who is overly consumed and driven by dialectical reason and the quest for 
certainty. 
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 Comedy, on the other hand, embraces excess. Comedy attempts to point out, even 
ridicule, those moments when human beings have exceeded some measure that would 
otherwise call for restraint. In other words, comedy makes a spectacle out of the folly of 
human beings who have exceeded delimited boundaries. The spectacle itself in the form 
of comedy is a magnification of excess. Situations and people are exploited to show an 
excessive movement beyond conventional norms of behavior. Through comic, laughter 
provoking images we behold ourselves as the subject of great folly in order that this folly 
might be recognized, possibly corrected, and even celebrated in the sense that measure be 
restored. 
 What seems apparent at first glance, then, is that philosophy excludes comedy and 
comedy excludes philosophy. To put it more succinctly, philosophy excludes excess and 
comedy excludes seriousness. Nothing, though, is farther from the truth. What is true is 
that philosophy and comedy reciprocate one another in a timeless play, which is to say 
they are not mutually exclusive. This “play” however should not be considered frivolous 
but one worthy of the highest seriousness. Why? Because as finite human beings, from 
pauper to saint, we are all subject to both wonder and folly. 
 The question of the relationship of the play of philosophy and comedy, however, 
needs to be elaborated. There is a double layering that is composed of four relationships. 
First, it is possible, on the one hand, to approach an understanding of this play by simply 
taking the perspective of one of these phenomena and focusing it on the other. Thus one 
can maintain a foothold within philosophy and do an analysis of comedy. This could take 
the form of an historical analysis of comedy as seen from the perspective of philosophy, 
tracing the comments philosophers have made about comedy throughout philosophical 
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history in an attempt to discern its relative importance to each thinker. To give an 
historical overview I will present a short but cogent appraisal of this history below. It 
might also take the route of abstraction and attempt to distill the essence of comedy as 
well as its essential features. Second, it could also take the converse: from the side of 
comedy we can surely see how its sights have been set at times on what are considered 
the most serious of matters including philosophy and philosophers. One need only recall 
Aristophanes’ Clouds in which he has the usual earthbound Socrates swinging in a basket 
examining heavenly phenomena. This layer is one where both elements speak at or about 
one another. 
 There is, however, a deeper relationship between these two phenomena. It is one 
that does not make the other an object for inquiry but instead sees the other in itself, 
thereby disclosing the true play of philosophy and comedy. This relationship constitutes 
the more fundamental layer of this play. 
 Perhaps the best explanation of this deeper layer is given by John Sallis. In his 
Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art, Sallis acknowledges the first layer and its 
two relationships, which he calls “segments,” spoken of above. But he also says, “Yet 
comedy not only can address—and be addressed by—philosophy but also can inhere as a 
moment within philosophy;...and...it can also happen that philosophy belongs to 
comedy.”3 The two key words here are “inhere” and “belong.” What they disclose is a 
kinship between these two phenomena and not just a relationship in which a dichotomy 
takes place when one sees the other simply as an object to be analyzed. To be sure, much 
comedy harbors deep philosophical themes and truths. Yet philosophy itself can exceed 
                                                 
3 John Sallis, Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
126. 
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measure in and through its excess and thus become ripe for great laughter. What will 
becomes evident is that Nietzsche quite often has his sights set on what he views as 
dishonest thought in the history of philosophy. Better yet, it might be best characterized 
as hubristic thought, the kind of thought Nietzsche says fails to recognize the limits of 
science and our ties to the earth. He excavates this intellectual dishonesty, exposing the 
motives behind philosophical thought in order to show an agenda oriented toward 
protecting the one doing that thinking. To combat this excess Nietzsche rarely took the 
tact of the typical philosopher. He did not respond, for the most part, to his philosophical 
nemeses with lengthy, logically solid treatises. Instead as we shall see, to counter such 
hubristic thought, Nietzsche many times turns them into laughter provoking, comedic 
moments. Occurring not merely to ridicule, these laughter provoking moments erupt in a 
way that makes them teachable moments. What they teach more often than not is that 
some measure has been exceeded and thus needs restored—all this from the philosopher 
who philosophizes with a hammer and revels in transgression. We can begin to see then 
the distortion and inversion that begins to happen with this notion of measure when 
Nietzsche’s gaze falls upon it. 
 As we begin to orient ourselves to the upcoming discussion of Nietzsche, what is 
important to recognize is that comedy, laughter, and philosophy belong together because 
both serious and comedic matters are prominent elements in the constellation of the 
human being. It is in and through this play of the serious and comedic that human beings 




II. Comedy, Laughter, and the History of Philosophy 
 
 Why and how is comedy an important aspect of Nietzsche’s thought? Many 
philosophers before Nietzsche have commented on comedy. But comedy, although 
mentioned by philosophers, has always played second fiddle, or no fiddle, to tragedy. 
This is now simply unacceptable. Dennis Schmidt gives voice to this concern stating, “In 
the end, the full treatment of the relation of tragedy and philosophy...needs to address the 
place of comedy in that relation.”4 Just as philosophy and tragedy take each other’s 
measure, so too is comedy to be a measure of both and measured by both. For the most 
part, this is what has been absent in philosophical history. 
 Schmidt’s concern in On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life is 
how and why ancient Greek tragedy had been appropriated by great German thinkers 
from Immanuel Kant to Martin Heidegger (he begins, however, with Plato and Aristotle 
as a backdrop). What is it about Greek tragedy that is so crucial to philosophical thinking 
in the West? For Schmidt, tragic art is not simply a spectacle. In other words it is not 
something to watch or read on occasion for mere entertainment so that we soon forget it 
once the tragedy has concluded. Instead, “tragic art nourishes an ethical sensibility that is 
crucial for the formulation of an ethics and politics responsive to contemporary life.”5 
This is why tragic art is so important to the thinkers he examines including Nietzsche. Art 
allows for a disclosing of nature, a way of letting nature in its flux shine. Other methods, 
including science and philosophy and similar modes of reflection, simply can not grasp 
the appearing of nature the way art can. As Schmidt says, “Art lets physis shine in the 
                                                 
4 Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001), 19. 
5 Ibid., 3. 
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work. Art is a making that dwells near this origin of appearing and that is why art 
always—no matter how old—always has the feel of the new: it lives at the sources, the 
origins, of all appearing.”6 Tragedy, art, ethics, and thinking are so deeply intertwined 
that how we live, which is to say, how we disclose ourselves and our world, are 
profoundly shaped by it whether we are conscious of it or not. 
 Schmidt’s work, along with Sallis’s and Freydberg’s, presents a mirror that raises 
the same kind of questions I am interested in, although my focus is solely on Nietzsche. I 
want to bring these same concerns to bear on Nietzsche and the question of critical 
philosophy, ethics, comedy, and laughter. What is Nietzsche trying to disclose about 
comedy and the kind of laughter present in his writings that allows us not merely to 
function and “get by” in our lives but to come to grips and even affirm life here without 
illusions—illusions that are often times perpetrated by philosophers? As often is the case 
with philosophy, these kinds of questions serve to raise more questions than answers such 
as: “How are tragedy and comedy different?” “Is one art more primal than the other?” 
“Are there limits to comedy and the role of laughter?” Nonetheless, these are the kinds of 
questions to be addressed and there is no better place to begin than at the beginning, a 
beginning that still resonates with Nietzsche’s thought and hopefully ours. 
 Consider the first philosopher of the West, Thales. What is notable about Thales? 
When one reads the fragments concerning him, especially for the first time, what stands 
out? Of course there are many things that might top a list: his military prowess, the 
assertion that water (hudōr) is the first, eternal principle (archē) or the recognition that he 
is attempting a logos of physical nature that, for the first time breaks from purely 
                                                 
6 Dennis Schmidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the Word, Freedom, and 
History (Albany, SUNY Press, 2005), 186. 
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mythical accounts. Not withstanding the fruitfulness and importance of these insights and 
all the scholarly work done on them since, what still strikes one when reading Thales? I 
would assert that it is the comic images that leap from the page. 
 Take Thales the stargazer. The image we have of Thales, one handed down over 
millennia, was of a keen astronomer who spent much time looking at the heavens. At one 
point, his undivided attention at the stars caused him to fall into a well eliciting jeers 
(aposkōpsai) from a female Thracian servant.7 In other words, what we have at the very 
inception of philosophy in the West are its deep ties to laughter provoking images. 
Thales, in the very serious business of discerning a logos of the heavens has forgotten his 
earthboundness and in forgetting, indeed a forgetting of the kind of being he was, is 
returned to earth like a falling star eliciting laughter and jeers. I strongly suggest that this 
comic image is what stands out amidst the many serious philosophical enterprises of 
Thales. 
 In Plato’s dialogues, we clearly see the role of tragedy. The focus on tragedy is 
evidenced in perhaps his greatest work the Republic where Plato seeks justice both in the 
city and the souls of human beings. Part of this justice is the ebb and flow of poetry and 
tragedy in the polis and the souls of human beings. For example, at first the guardians 
must be “protected” from the influence of Homer’s poetry, specifically Achilles’ thinking 
of his own death.8 Here, tragedy and poetry ebbs, inasmuch as their influence recedes in 
order to ensure a healthy abundance of courage in the guardians. However, this same 
passage resurfaces again later in the dialogue, that is, flows back into those souls that 
                                                 
7 See Plato, Theaetetus, 174a. 
8 See Homer, Odyssey, 11:489-91. Indeed the very idea of fearless guardians, ready to battle real enemies in 
order to protect the polis but needing protection from poetry certainly is, to a degree, laughter provoking! 
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have made the liberating journey out of the cave.9 And although Plato is concerned with 
admitting both tragedies and comedies back into the city,10 nonetheless comparatively 
speaking comedy appears to play a limited role in the education of the guardians and 
hence in the constitution of the polis. 
 Aristotle comments on the origin and nature of comedy in his Poetics, asserting 
that whereas tragedy was rooted in the dithyramb, comedy was rooted in phallic songs.11 
However, unlike tragedy with its noble heroes, comedy “is an imitation of men worse 
than the average.”12 Hence Aristotle’s major fault line between these two genres rests on 
a certain level of excellence (aretē) that tragedy achieves and comedy does not—tragic 
heroes being noble and of high virtue (spoudaion) and comic characters engendering 
petty motivations and character (phaulon). Moreover, says Aristotle, comedy was not 
taken seriously until much later in history as compared to its tragic counterpart. This was 
due to its supposed improvised style and lack of definite form. To be sure, Aristotle 
values the mimēsis found in tragedy, comedy, and poetry alike, all of which aim at 
intellectual pleasure. Moreover, he does not explicitly state that comedy is inferior to 
tragedy, but he does appear to suggest that tragic mimēsis, which deals with fear, pain, 
and the suffering of noble heroes, does hold the upper hand over comedy’s dealing in the 
mimēsis of the ridiculous and those of inferior rank.13 
 Because Aristotle’s writings were appropriated first among Islamic thinkers 
before their European counterparts, many of these philosophers offered their own 
                                                 
9 See Plato, Republic, 386c and 516d. 
10 Ibid., 394d. I don’t subscribe to what has become the dogmatic assertion that Plato rejects poetry and 
wanted it banished from the polis. The work of John Sallis, Bernard Freydberg and others have 
conclusively shown this not to be the case. Indeed, this incorrect view of Plato and poetry is itself ripe for 
laughter. 
11 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449a10. 
12 Ibid., 1449a32. 
13 Ibid., 1449a32-37. 
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commentary on these writings. Among them was Avicenna who, in his Commentary of 
the Poetics of Aristotle, echoed Aristotle’s assertion that comedy was the imitation of the 
base although, “not of every thing evil; rather of that genus of evil which is immoral and 
is intended for ridicule and mocking.”14 The Arabic word for immoral, yustafhash, as the 
translator of this Avicenna text makes clear in a note, means also “exorbitant, indecent, or 
shameful.” If we focus on this first word then we see that for Avicenna comedy is an 
imitation of that which is exorbitant, that is, it is essentially an attempt to imitate that 
which is beyond a given limit. Because the commentary revolves around the ancients, in 
this case then the given limit might be the moral and ethical norms of the ancient Greeks. 
But to imitate that which lies outside of these limits presents a contradiction and tension 
in that imitation (mimēsis) requires an original from which to imitate. That which is 
exorbitant and stands outside cannot simply be imitated due to its status as something 
other, as something transgressing the very limit that provides the horizon of given social 
norms. This contradiction and tension, however, is a fruitful one. The attempt to imitate 
that which is other, that which has no original, can give us only the distorted, absurd art 
we call comedy. Comedic imitation can only twist and turn what is already given, in this 
case ethical deviation, so that appearance itself within limit becomes distorted and absurd 
so that its manifestation is indeed exorbitant. 
 Perhaps the greatest symbol of this exorbitant appearance is the comic mask that 
Avicenna goes on to describe as possessing three qualities. The first is ugliness, “because 
it is necessary to change from the natural shape to contempt.” Second is bad-temper, 
“because it is meant to portray a general lack of esteem towards someone.” Last is 
                                                 
14 Avicenna, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle: A Critical Study with an Annotated 
Translation of the Text by Ismail M. Dahiyat (Leiden Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1974), 82. 
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freedom, “from any sign of grief.” Hence the mocker’s mask was held up as a mirror 
image of that culture, one that was, “neither dispirited, sad, nor pained.”15 
 Avicenna concludes his commentary of Aristotle and comedy by speaking about 
origins. Because the comic imitation of that which is exorbitant lies outside all bounds, its 
cultural genesis appears less understood than tragedy. For Avicenna, it seems as though 
the mask of comedy somehow never betrayed the kind of delimited origin that the 
performance of tragedy supposedly has—“Comedy is, however, different [from tragedy]: 
not being a thing that requires the care of serious, virtuous and knowledgeable men, its 
provenance was overlooked and its origin and how it began were forgotten.”16 Even 
though an outsider to the ancient Greeks and born much later (as we all our today), 
Avicenna may well be reminding us that some of the most significant things, even though 
they may appear absurd, contemptible, and exorbitant, do nonetheless provide a ruling 
image that influenced who the ancient Greeks were 2,500 years ago and who we, as their 
heirs, are today. 
 Scholastic philosophers also commented on comedy and laughter. In St. 
Augustine’s The City of God, God’s covenant with Abraham harbors within it the play of 
concealing and unconcealing in terms of the old and new. When Isaac was born of the 
elderly Abraham and Sarah (100 and 90 years old respectively!) the covenant was 
revealed as the new born of the old. Moreover, this play of concealing and unconcealing 
in the old and new is expressed most aptly through Abraham’s laughter. Augustine draws 
the distinction between the laughter of exultation and the laughter of derision (scorn) 
stating, “The laughter of Abraham is the exultation of one who rejoices, not the scornful 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 83. 
16 Ibid. 
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laughter of one who mistrusts.”17 Abraham laughs not because he doubts, even though 
nature surely suggests reason for doubt (his and Sarah’s age), but because he believes. To 
mark this occasion they named their son Isaac whose name means “laughter.” As 
Augustine relates, “For his father [Abraham] had laughed when he was promised to him, 
in wondering delight...”18 From this we see that laughter is the phenomenon that rejoins 
one to wonder. For Abraham it is the wonder of belief and religious awe. In the domain 
of philosophy, laughter can release one into wonder itself—philosophy’s first principle 
from which it never leaves. 
 Near the conclusion to The City of God in the section titled, “Of the Temporary 
Punishments of this Life to Which the Human Condition is Subject,” Augustine makes a 
provocative statement about laughter and life. Its relevance not only has to do with 
laughter as a subject matter but also its reference to Zoroaster who is, of course, a key 
figure in Nietzsche’s thought. Augustine maintains what is certainly contrary to 
Nietzsche’s thinking about life asserting, “The very life we mortals lead is itself all 
punishment, for it is all temptation....Our infancy, indeed, introducing us to this life not 
with laughter but with tears, seems unconsciously to predict the ills we are to 
encounter.”19 But then Augustine cites a lone exception, maintaining that “Zoroaster 
alone is said to have laughed when he was born, and that unnatural omen portended no 
good to him.” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, as we will come to see, will reverse this. 
Zarathustra’s laughter is a key gesture that marks a turn towards the earth and the 
Übermensch. This new conception of Zarathustra, then, will act as a palimpsest on the 
                                                 
17 St. Augustine, The City of God, Vol. I-II, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1884), II/141. 
We will come to see that scornful laughter plays a role in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
18 Ibid., II/146. 
19 Ibid., II/440. 
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old historical Zoroaster bringing back to the fore provocative laughter that affirms even 
the most arduous life. 
 St. Thomas Aquinas also addresses laughter and folly in his writings. As far as 
defining comedy, Aquinas reiterates Aristotle’s claim about the nature of comedy. In his 
commentary on Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione Aquinas says that comedy 
concerns itself with, “speech about urbane things (sermo de rebus urbanis).”20 This 
distinction extends to the nature of the chorus as well, a key element in both tragedy and 
comedy. Commenting on Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas states that the chorus commented 
on the action of the play through song coupled with dancing.21 But the chorus of comedy 
is not identical to the chorus of tragedy, however similar their empirical make-up. 
Aquinas rests his distinction once again on “kinds.” The kind of low commentary the 
chorus of comedy chants makes it qualitatively different than the kind of serious chanting 
done by a tragic chorus.22 
 In the Second Part of the Second Part (Secunda Secundae Partis) of the Summa 
Theologica Aquinas addresses ridicule or derision (de derisione), a species of laughter. 
Ridicule for Aquinas falls under the purview of sin, and Question 75 with its two articles 
inquires into what kind of sin it is, namely, is it a sin distinct from others? And, is it a 
mortal sin? Aquinas answers in the affirmative to both questions. 
 In terms of the second question says Aquinas, ridicule arises when it is directed at 
the evil of another and depending on whether the evil is large or small determines the 
                                                 
20 St. Thomas Aquinas, “In libros de generatione” in the Supplementum to the Index thomisticus of the 
Opera omnia, ed. Roberto Busa (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980) 4:50. 
21 According to Liddell and Scott’s An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, the word “chorus” from the 
Greek Choros means “band of dancers and/or dancing ground.” 
22 Aquinas, “Sententia libri Politicorum” in the Supplementum to the Index thomisticus of the Opera omnia, 
4:270-71. 
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gravity of the sin. Directing ridicule at God, “is the most serious thing of all”23 while 
ridicule aimed at the just is also grave because, “it prevents men from acting well”24 
because the unjust desire what the just possess, namely honor. Aquinas also maintains 
that when the aim of ridicule moves from a small, venial sin to target the actual person 
then it becomes grave because the humanity of the person is held in “contempt and 
dishonor.”25 According to Aquinas it is a mortal sin because, “ridiculing or making fun of 
somebody is to belittle him to the point of dismissing his misfortunes and treating them 
as a joke. This later sort of derision is a mortal sin.”26 
 In the first article Aquinas delves into the nature of ridicule itself. Contrary to the 
objections raised in this article, ridicule is a special sin and, “is therefore something 
distinct.”27 Aquinas differentiates sins according to the harm the perpetrator intends to 
inflict on the other. Insults, detractions and whispers (I take “whispers” to mean gossip) 
all aim at different effects. Ridicule’s aim is to “make the other blush,”28 which makes it 
distinct from the other sins. 
 What is interesting is Aquinas’ focus on the physiological aspects of ridicule. In 
answer to the first objection, that asserts that there is no difference between ridicule, 
mockery, and defamation, Aquinas stresses that although mockery and ridicule have the 
same aims, unlike mockery, that is done by wrinkling the nose, “ridicule is registered by 
the mouth, that is to say through words and laughter.”29 This difference based in their 
respective physiological delivery does not represent different species of sin. However, 
                                                 
23 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Vol. XXXVIII (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1975), 199. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 197. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 193. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 193-95. 
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both mockery and ridicule differ from defamation the way blushing differs depending on 
the circumstance. As Aquinas states, “Blushing in confusion differs from losing face, 
since blushing in confusion is the fear of losing face.”30 As we will come to see, these 
notions of ridicule, scornful laughter, and blushing will have special significance as they 
occur in the history of philosophy including Nietzsche’s, especially concerning 
Zarathustra. 
 At Question 46 Aquinas broaches the nature of wisdom (sapientiae) and folly 
(stultitia). Once again the issue is folly’s status, that is, if it is opposed to wisdom or not, 
whether or not it is a sin, and if it is a species of lust. Aquinas answers in the affirmative 
to all three. For our purposes the article, “Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?” is most 
relevant. 
 Quoting Pope Saint Gregory I, Aquinas states that “the gift of wisdom [donum 
sapientiae] is given to ward off folly [contra stultitiam].”31 Here wisdom is described in 
terms of a gift, that is, as something that when it arrives, if it arrives, acts as a bulwark 
against the sin of folly. Thus Aquinas keeps faithful the notion that wisdom is not a 
mundane occurrence that happens for all but must be pursued and, if achieved, held in 
high esteem. 
 In addition, the attunement of the senses is also at play. One who suffers from 
folly appears to be dull, unmoved, pathetic and have diminished senses. As Aquinas 
states, “The fool is one who is not moved [non movetur] through dullness [stuporem].”32 
What is striking about Aquinas’ notion of folly is perhaps how his understanding has less 
to do with our more modern understanding of folly, which is something that is done 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 195. 
31 Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Vol. XXXV, 180-81. 
32 Ibid. 
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actively, that is, as something that we do or fail to do properly. For Aquinas, the human 
being that is endowed with sentience and thinking appears to be engaging in folly when 
they do nothing. In other words, to have these faculties that if used with a modicum of 
care predispose one to at least a certain measure of wisdom, whereas if not used relegates 
one to folly. “Folly implies a dull heart and blunted senses,”33 writes Aquinas. 
 Folly’s opposite, wisdom, savors (sapore) its status as that which can discern a 
multitude of things in terms of their nuance. For an Aristotelian, such as Aquinas, what is 
most savored by the wise is “discriminating taste about things and causes [rerum atque 
causarum].”34 Aquinas is focused on things and causes because by doing so we can 
generate knowledge and first principles. His use of “savor,” however, and the 
corresponding metaphorical tasting one does, stresses Aquinas’ approach as one fit for a 
human being. That is, we must use our senses first and through experience “taste” our 
way to the finer things. And this is only accomplished by the wise human being whose 
senses are “acute and penetrating.” Indeed, unlike the fool who remains dull and 
unmoved, the wise person’s attuned senses and spirit is moved by knowledge and 
principles to the unmoved mover or God. Nietzsche will think differently of folly. What 
we will find is that folly is something unavoidable for the human being and as such is 
connected to wisdom. In other words, many of the greatest achievements of human 
beings have their roots in error and not perfection. His Zarathustra states, “For the sake of 
folly, wisdom is mixed into all things!”35 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 181. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 132/“Before Sunrise.” 
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 For Hegel, comedy was to be elevated to a respected status at least coequal with 
tragedy and philosophy. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, who focuses mainly on 
Aristophanean comedy although he was intimately familiar with Shakespearean comedy 
as well, places comedy in the section on religion, that is, the section that just precedes 
Spirit’s pinnacle of Absolute Knowing. Here, Hegel tries to show how religion through 
language attempts to shore up the various elements of a people into a common whole, or 
a nation. Achieved through representation, language unites “self-consciousness and 
external existence” in the form of the epic, tragedy and comedy.36 
 Moreover Hegel believes that comedy differs from tragedy and exceeds it. 
Tragedy deals with individuals caught in a dualism, which is that of the hero who at one 
time knows but does not know, that is, between that which appears and reality itself. Thus 
the tension revolves around two equally justifiable positions—that of Fate (or the gods) 
and the tragic hero. Tragic heroes are not able to take full measure of this knowledge and 
thus are condemned to the tragic fate that awaits them.37 
 Comedy, on the other hand, synthesizes this duality into a higher form because it 
“has, therefore, above all, the aspect that actual self-consciousness exhibits itself as the 
fate of the gods.”38 Comedy allows for the actor to play a universal role and yet remain an 
individual person.39 How so? Hegel’s insight revolves around the notion of subjectivity 
and universality. Unlike tragedy, where the tragic subject (hero) perishes against fate, the 
comic hero is aware, at some level, of a universal moral code or good as it relates to an 
                                                 
36 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977), especially §727, §729. 
37 Ibid. §737. Hegel cites many examples such as Oedipus who, “...was able to unlock the riddle of the 
Sphinx,...[and is] sent to destruction through what the god revealed to [him].” 
38 Ibid., §744. 
39 Tom Rockmore, Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997), 170-71. 
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injustice of his own personal circumstance. The comic actor, however, as always focused 
on its own narrow quandaries, is inept in his seeking of justice. The comic hero 
perpetually fails, giving rise to comic resolutions and laughter provoking images. In this 
sense, comedy provides a counterweight to fate, or the gods, by depicting the human 
being in concreto, or in other words, “entangled in an actual existence.”40 If one were to 
couch this phenomenon in the abstract language that Hegel utilizes in Phenomenology of 
Spirit one would say that in inspired comedy the subject, although aware of some ethical 
wrong, is nonetheless fully engrossed in its own particularity thus he or she fails to 
account for the wider objective world including the intersubjective in which he or she is 
situated thus giving rise to comedic tension. Hegel asserts that when the mask of comedy 
is removed we see the Self “in its own nakedness and ordinariness.”41 Consequently 
comedy achieves an honor that even tragedy did not achieve for Hegel. Comedy reveals 
to self-consciousness that, “it is itself the Fate to which the secret is revealed, viz. the 
truth about the essential independence of Nature.”42 
 Elsewhere Hegel lauds comedy, specifically Aristophanean comedy, for its ability 
to disclose in its profound way the matters essential to the Athenian polis and by 
extension, I would argue, to any state.43 Moreover, the laughter at the heart of 
Aristophanean comedy provided a counterweight to, “reality itself in the madness of its 
ruin.” This “ruin” was what Aristophanes perceived as the dissolution of the naturally 
evolving state at the hands of such figures as the sophists, Euripides, and Socrates (who, 
                                                 
40 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §744. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., §745. 
43 For Hegel, these essential matters (what Hegel refers to as “essential spheres”) are the things that bind a 
people together as a state such as language, rules of governance, art, science etc. that promote the 
continuity of Bildung. 
 19
we will see, Nietzsche also views as a philosophical nemeses), that is, figures whose 
subjective reason and questioning posed a threat to the development of the objective 
state. This provokes Hegel to recognize Aristophanes’ serenity in the face of such tumult: 
“Of this kind of art an example is comedy as Aristophanes among the Greeks has handled 
it without anger, in pure and serene joviality, in relation to the most essential spheres in 
the world of his time.”44 Thus Hegel appears as the philosopher who, up to his time, 
conferred the utmost respect upon comedy by recognizing its deep affinity with human 
subjectivity and the relation to the external world. 
 Nonetheless for Hegel, comedy, like all other phenomena, falls under the 
umbrella of Absolute Spirit. What this ultimately entails is that it must be understood 
rationally and, as such, as moments of Spirit’s progression towards absolute knowing.45 
To be sure, Nietzsche’s view is diametrically opposed to codifying tragedy and comedy 
under the auspices of spirit and reason. Indeed, tragedy and comedy both exceed reason, 
marking out its limit. Instead of reason, both tragedy and comedy allow for the showing 
of what is terrible and absurd. Thus they arise from a place that is both pre-rational and 
pre-linguistic. One might call it chaos. In Nietzschean language it is Dionysian. 
 In 1900, the year of Nietzsche’s death, the French philosopher Henri Bergson 
attempted to distill the nature of comedy in his Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the 
Comic. For Bergson, on the one hand, laughter and comedy are something irreducible to 
a definition and thus represented “a living thing,” that is something “strictly human” 
                                                 
44 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics, Vol. I-II, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1975), 
511. 
45 Ibid., 1202. 
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possessing “a logic all its own.”46 Conversely, Bergson asserts that what is comic and 
laughter provoking is a social phenomenon and as such one “must determine the utility of 
its function.”47 Bergson proceeds to examine many comics and comedic devices in this 
work, most notably Molière’s. The main utility of comedy, says Bergson, is its ability to 
act as a corrective to the often rigid, normative structures of society. Comedy and 
laughter then are seen as a sort of societal “remedy” although Bergson does not use this 
word. But he is clear in stating that “Laughter is, above all, a corrective....By laughter, 
society avenges itself for the liberties taken within it.”48 
 Then there is postmodernism. I would argue that one proceed with some caution 
when speaking of Nietzsche and postmodern thought because this nexus is more complex 
than often presupposed. Nietzsche is reacting in large part to Kant, Hegel, and the 
tradition of German Idealism that came before him. He does so by often going back to the 
ancients in order for us not to copy, but to behold and use as a springboard towards the 
will to new knowledge. This locates Nietzsche on a historical fulcrum, one whose 
thought looks back while also blazing new perspectives. Thus I would be reticent to call 
Nietzsche, strictly speaking, a “postmodern philosopher” or even the “first postmodern 
philosopher”49 as if postmodern philosophy demanded this kind of strict hierarchy and 
historical positioning in the first place. 
                                                 
46 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay On The Meaning Of The Comic, trans. C. Brereton and F. Rothwell 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911), 2-3. 
47 Ibid., 7-8. 
48 Ibid., 197. 
49 It is true that many postmodern philosophers owe a great deal of debt to Nietzsche (Irigaray, Derrida, 
Foucault, Deleuze easily come to mind). And although one might discern many similarities between them 
there are, however, striking differences. One major example: whereas postmodernism understands the 
subject as something without a fixed nature (e.g., Deleuze and Guattari’s “haecceities/fuzzy aggregates” or 
the “discursive formations of subjects” for Foucault) Nietzsche, although calling into questioning 
traditional interpretations of the subject, nonetheless does not subscribe to a vacuous or “thin” notion of the 
subject. Instead Nietzsche interprets it in terms of intuition, instinct, drives (Trieb) that need “composed” 
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 Still, even though there are differences, there are many striking parallels between 
postmodern philosophy and Nietzsche’s thought. Moreover the role that laughter and 
comedy play in Nietzsche’s thought appears in many postmodern themes, especially 
multiplicity. Although multiplicity will be dealt with in more detail below, especially the 
chapter that deals with Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for now we can say that 
multiplicity is that which manifests itself as heterogeneity over homogeneity. To be sure, 
Michel Foucault dramatically links laughter to the motivation for writing The Order of 
Things, one of his earlier works of the “archeology” period. The first line reads: 
 This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, 
 as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the 
 thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the 
 ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the 
 wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and 
 threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and Other.50 
Occurring in the first line in The Order of Things we see that laughter, as response to a 
Chinese taxonomy listing in the literature of Jorge Luis Borges, provides the impetus for 
Foucault’s own project of thinking language at the limit. Although we shall examine 
Nietzsche and laughter through the lens of postmodernism in much more depth below, for 
now we can say a few words about this relationship. 
 The postmodern philosopher Gilles Deleuze, in Nietzsche & Philosophy, offers 
his evaluation of Nietzsche and comedy. Although comedy appears only once and 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the will as that which constitutes a perspective on the world. For a good discussion of Nietzsche’s 
relationship to postmodernism see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche On Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said 
(New York: Schocken Books, 2000). 
50 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), xv. 
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laughter three times in the body of the text, nonetheless Deleuze’s pronouncements on 
these are sweeping and encompass the most overarching themes in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. For example, laughter is connected to affirmation in the face of tragedy as 
well as the rejection of ressentiment. Deleuze states, “In relation to Zarathustra laughter, 
play and dance are affirmative powers of transmutation:...laughter transmutes suffering 
into joy,...laughter, roars of laughter, affirm multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity....”51 
Deleuze’s insights, along with Félix Guattari’s, will come to shape the last chapter on 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra where we will see that laughter is a key phenomenon 
if not the key phenomenon by which Zarathustra splinters previous monolithic moral 
structures. He shows that they are only a perspective among many while at the same time 
affirming his ties to the earth in the very presentation of the Übermensch type. 
Zarathustra’s laugh, we can say at least initially, makes manifest the non-delimitable fact 
of multiplicity. 
 The concern in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus is best characterized 
as a nontraditional, non-hierarchical metaphysics. In traditional metaphysics different 
elements are subordinated to one another in a relationship to an ultimate (usually 
transcendent) principle such as “God” or “pure reason.” But Deleuze and Guattari’s 
metaphysics is one that escapes those totalizing determinations that lie outside nature 
(phusis) that would otherwise determine it. It is as if their metaphysics were a house in 
which all changes and repairs that took place were done by using material from another 
part of the same house. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari’s project constitutes a radical 
materialism in which everything is subjected to the folds and contours of this dynamic 
                                                 
51 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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system that determine all knowledge, relationships, and power structures. To achieve this, 
Deleuze and Guattari describe reality in terms of assemblages that are formed through the 
dynamic interplay of the plane of consistency and the plane of organization, and their 
respective deterritorialization and reterritorialization. An assemblage is a natural event or 
happening and as such reality is seen in terms of becoming. There is no eternal Being that 
is separate from becoming. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari think being as 
becoming, that is, as the perpetual production of heterogeneity. One might simply say 
that the only thing that remains the same is change or that there is only becoming within 
pure immanence so that no unitary transcendent stands outside of this process dictating 
the process. 
 The engine of the interplay between the plane of consistency and the plane of 
organization consists in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of absolute deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. Here any assemblage in the form of an abstract machine that has 
become a concrete some-thing exists on the plane of organization with its own expression 
(the play of semiotics) and content (actual things). However, the existence on the plane of 
organization is never permanent in the way permanence was supposed in traditional 
metaphysics as that which stood outside nature, unchanged. To exist on the plane of 
organization is always to already undergo deterritorialization to the plane of consistency 
through, for example, lines of flight. This dynamic describes reality in terms of becoming 
in which the production of difference is the result.52 
 With this said, the kinship to Nietzsche is quite obvious. Deleuze and Guattari 
indeed owe a great deal of homage to him. The emphasis on becoming, difference, and 
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multiplicity have their roots in much of Nietzsche’s thought. To be sure there are many 
differences between Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, just as there are 
between Nietzsche and postmodernism in general. Nonetheless, in terms of comedy and 
provocative laughter, we will see how Nietzsche’s quest to either dismantle “the old 
idols” (recall Nietzsche’s hammer) or at least call into radical questioning philosophy is 
very similar to the project of Deleuze and Guattari’s dismantling of traditional 
metaphysics. To laugh and parody, to mimic comically as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra does, 
is to begin this de(con)struction. And this laughter of deconstruction must not be 
misinterpreted to mean that Zarathustra is ridiculing simply that which is different 
leading to more conformity. It is a laughter of deconstruction that ridicules the kind of 
philosophical stance that disavows difference and heterogeneity. 
 Today, many thinkers in contemporary Continental philosophy have disclosed 
how comedy and laughter play a pivotal role in philosophical thought and vice versa. 
Looking to retrieve and bring to light comic, laughter provoking moments in ancient 
thought that have been ignored or so sedimented by this same history with worn 
philosophical approaches, a few philosophers have begun to reverse this trend and mine 
this thought with a comedic eye. For example, Sallis in his Being and Logos: The Way of 
Platonic Dialogue, reads Plato’s Cratylus as essentially a comedy.53 The comedy 
concerns the very nature of logos in terms of its relation to its parts. Logos always 
harbors within it the potential to be false. In terms of the Cratylus, this potential is played 
out comically as both Hermogenes and Cratylus vie over whether names are natural or 
conventional, that is, whether there is a kinship between things and the names that name 
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them (Cratylus) or that names are merely arbitrary (Hermogenes). In Sallis’s words, 
“[T]his relation as it is brought to light through the unfolding of the comedy proves to be 
such that names both serve to make things manifest and, on the other hand, are in need of 
being limited by what they themselves first make manifest.”54 Socrates, who is the 
mediator between Cratylus and Hermogenes, leads both these characters to affirm the 
opposite of their originally stated position. In turn, the comedy that ensues revolves 
around the effort to derive names from original forms, that is, the interplay, the 
playfulness between these two elements. 
 Freydberg examines the role of comedy, laughter and philosophy in two 
influential works—The Play of the Platonic Dialogues and Aristophanes & Comedy: 
Aristophanes, Eros and Logos.55 In terms of Plato, Freydberg asserts that what beats at 
the heart of the serious issues within the Platonic dialogues is a playfulness that does not 
undermine or take away from the somber issues, but enhances them. Thus he says, 
“Playfulness in Plato is never frivolous or merely decorative, but always has 
philosophical content. Playfulness is aligned with measure; seriousness loosed from play 
also loses its genuine philosophical bearing.”56 
 Freydberg examines many dialogues to demonstrate the element of playfulness 
that is almost always at work in the dialogues. To cite one example, he notes that 
Socrates’ daimon has traditionally been understood to signify either his conscience or a 
sort of non-rational instinctive insight that serves reason and therefore is subservient to it. 
However Freydberg’s hermeneutical exegesis of the texts shows that daimonion, as 
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Socrates uses it, denotes one, a mythical mediator between human affairs and divine 
affairs such as Diotima’s use of it in her speech to Socrates in the Symposium. It is also 
used as an exclamation that signifies an excess or movement beyond what is appropriate 
in the human realm such as Socrates’ exclamation, “Ō daimonie” when he addresses the 
intense and irascible Thrasymachus at Republic 344d 6.57 Freydberg’s insight is that the 
daimonion, as used by Socrates, is a phenomenon that allows Socrates to realize the 
necessity of limit and self-questioning that opens up: 
 ...a space within which proper measure may be sought. In the act of entering this 
 space, the daimonion of Socrates discloses it in its playful character. The comedy 
 of an instinct which restrains and of a dark flash giving birth to the light of logos 
 is reflected in the counterimage of tragedy, the danger of hubris against which the 
 daimonion at play guards by provoking mindfulness of proper measure.58 
Indeed, as Freydberg shows, the daimonion constitutes that space where the tragic 
activity of philosophical thinking is always coupled with a necessary play. 
 And as we shall see in much more depth, Nietzsche himself is aware of Plato’s 
need for comedy as that which helped make his Greek existence something worth 
enduring amidst the tragic turmoil of that age. Nietzsche claims that it was the works of 
Aristophanes that Plato secretly found consolation in and not some other literature that 
espoused transcendent or other-worldy views. 
 What is important for this discussion is that, for Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and others 
in the philosophical tradition, we do not find comedy and laughter used in the sense that 
Nietzsche will use it in his philosophy. For Nietzsche, comedy is not just another 
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phenomenon to be analyzed, codified, and subsumed under some category within 
philosophy. Indeed, the philosophical enterprise itself for Nietzsche is and must be 
intertwined with humor. Moreover, philosophy (and surely philosophers!) can be the 
cause of great laughter as Nietzsche shows when he has his sights set on their often 
hermit-like behavior that betrays less than noble instincts. I will argue that this is what 
sets Nietzsche’s view of comedy apart from other thinkers. Comedy or that which is 
laughter provoking is one of the elements Nietzsche utilizes as part of his philosophy so 
as to call into question and even dissolve the totalizing edifices that have dominated the 
philosophic tradition. Even more to the point, the philosophical exercise itself, not 
withstanding its seriousness, is a source of provocative laughter so that for Nietzsche, 
philosophy, tragedy and comedy are kindred souls always at play. 
 
 
III. Taking the Stage: Nietzsche’s Set-Up 
 
 We have seen how philosophy and comedy play into one another, how comedy 
and laughter can be deeply philosophical in their own way, and how the serious affair of 
philosophy can at times be comic and laughter provoking. Furthermore, we overviewed 
the way comedy has appeared in the history of philosophy. Of course this is only a sketch 
and one could say much more. However, it was only recently that philosophy concerned 
itself with the play of the deeper layer mentioned above where both philosophy and 
comedy see one in the other. The restricted image of philosophy that has all but driven 
comedy and laughter from its space is exactly the image that I would like to challenge, 
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and do so through the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche who exploits this 
deep alliance allowing for laughter and the whole “comedy of existence” to be displayed 
within, and as part, of his philosophy. How then does Nietzsche appropriate the 
phenomena of laughter and comedy? What role does it play in his thought and why? 
 Nietzsche is the philosopher who attempted to articulate the importance of many 
phenomena that had become marginalized in the history of philosophy. For example: the 
role of music is featured prominently in his thought, especially the early works; madness 
is allowed a voice that had been, until Nietzsche, almost silenced by reason; and 
physiology, (and not just the mind) was given prominence. To the discerning reader, 
comedy and laughter come to play a significant role in his thought. Until now the role of 
comedy and laughter had no doubt been relegated to a secondary status compared to the 
more well known tragic dimensions of his thinking, and it is true that in terms of volume 
Nietzsche speaks much more about tragedy. Nonetheless, comedy is neither superficial 
for Nietzsche nor does it represent the impoverished flip side to tragedy. Instead, I argue, 
it plays just as an important role and ought to have the same measure accorded tragedy. 
Thus, although it may appear more latent in comparison to tragedy, comedy and laughter 
constitute, along with tragedy, the same archē that form the basis for Nietzsche’s thought. 
 To begin to appreciate comedy and laughter it is a necessary first step to 
articulate, at least in an initial way, three main concerns that will provide a thread 
throughout this dissertation. The first has to do with the nature of comedy and laughter 
itself. By this I simply mean that Nietzsche’s use of these phenomena are never limited to 
a single understanding. To put it another way, Nietzsche’s employment of comedy and 
laughter means different things at different times and almost always requires the reader to 
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engage in a nuanced hermeneutical rendering of the text. So we will see that not all 
laughter, for example, can simply be said to be the reaction to something amusing. In his 
writings laughter takes on various textures that are themselves part of the larger matrix of 
his thought. Like one who has become accustomed to enjoying the different courses of 
well prepared cuisine, the recognition of these comedic textures allows for a disclosing of 
what is essential in human existence. 
 Furthermore, comedy and laughter are not the same phenomenon hence they are 
not reciprocal. Comedies must contain laughter, which is to say they should be laughter 
provoking. However not all laughter is comedic. Thus one could say that where there is 
comedy there will be laughter, but where there is laughter there is not necessarily 
comedy. The provocative laughter Nietzsche often employs overflows any consignment 
to a single concept. Laughter then (if one were relegated to Aristotelian language) would 
be the genus and comedy would be a species of it. So for example, laughter can be 
scornful and indeed Nietzsche is scornful on many occasions and is himself the target of 
scornful laughter. Laughter can also manifest itself through discomfort, such as when one 
is embarrassed or nervous. It may occur at times as part of self-deprecating humor or to 
signify contempt, disinterestedness or ignorance, such as when Zarathustra first attempts 
to “go down” and speak to the townspeople in the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
There are then myriad examples that arise within his texts. Thus it remains to be seen in 
Nietzsche’s writings the many different varieties of laughter as well as how they serve his 
larger philosophical goals. To offer an initial remark on comedy that will be elaborated in 
the first chapter, comedy represents for Nietzsche an important philosophical function 
much the same way tragedy does, although its mode is different. 
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 Because Nietzsche’s use of laughter is varied careful attention will be focused on 
its role. Thus at times it may signal the rejection of some standard as in the laughing lion 
who indeed roars, but roars with laughter. Although this also will be examined in much 
more detail, we can provisionally state that the lion’s laughter is the rejection of the old 
morality founded on “thou shall” commandments. At other times Nietzsche’s 
employment of laughter is one of deep scorn as mentioned above. Many times 
Zarathustra is not understood, that is, his ideas are rejected because “there are not yet 
ears” ready for such ideas, because his arrival on the scene of history is premature. Other 
times laughter occurs as the initiation of a deep provocation. In this sense Nietzsche is 
attempting to provoke us out of what might be our own dogmatic slumber. On the surface 
it may appear at times as if Nietzsche’s use of laughter is there just to denigrate or mock. 
To many readers Nietzsche is abrasive (I always recall the looks on the faces of my 
undergraduate students who have read Nietzsche for the first time). However, the very 
occurrence of any tension in Nietzsche with another philosopher or philosophy almost 
always occurs under the guise of the utmost respect. Socrates, Jesus, even Richard 
Wagner are his nemeses but they are noble enemies always possessing some elements 
that Nietzsche admires, such as Socrates redemption through the art of music-making, 
Christ’s courage, and in the case of Wagner an example of genius and a close, albeit 
short, friendship.59 Nietzsche may target them for laughter but he does so in order to 
                                                 
59 For example, in the case of Christ, Nietzsche makes a clear distinction in The Anti-Christ between Christ 
and Christianity. He admires Christ’s courage. He finds noble qualities in the very praxis of Jesus’ life and 
at the time of his crucifixion. Christianity on the other hand represents a fateful turn, most notably at the 
hands of Paul, toward the kind of values that decay life. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce 
Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). As regards Wagner, Nietzsche refers to him as a rare genius. He even says of Wagner’s 
written works: “I know of no writings on aesthetics so illuminating as Wagner’s.” “Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 248/10. Even after the dissolution of their friendship Nietzsche said on being told the news of 
 31
engage them in the agōn of ideas and values. To be engaged with Nietzsche, to have 
Nietzsche laughing at you, is a sure sign of an abiding respect even though at the same 
time it is one that provokes us into hopefully rethinking a particular viewpoint from a 
different perspective from the one whom he is engaging. And this same respect is at play 
in the very heart of a noble ethics and the rejection of ressentiment. Simply put, 
Nietzsche will attempt to embrace even the scorners. And of course there are the times 
when laughter occurs in certain aphorisms simply because something appears to 
Nietzsche as being humorous. For example he finds Thomas Hobbes’s lack of reverence 
for laughter, itself, laughter provoking stating, “In spite of that philosopher who, being a 
true Englishman, tried to give laughter a bad reputation among all thoughtful people,...I 
would go so far as to allow myself a rank order of philosophers based on the rank of their 
laughter—right up to those who are capable of golden laughter.”60 This does not mean 
laughter is without depth. Even here there are layers to be peeled back, layers in which 
we almost always find ourselves staring not only into the abyss but many times a kind of 
funhouse mirror61 as well. 
 A second concern is that the occurrence of laughter and comedy in his writing 
should remain faithful to Nietzsche’s imperative that one ought to affirm life. To affirm 
life is a double calling. It is, on the one hand a call, not merely to recognize, but to hold in 
reverence, that is affirm life itself over and above any claims to otherworldly hopes. This 
includes, better yet must include, the affirmation of the harshest suffering such as that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wagner’s death that, “Wagner was by far the fullest human being I have known.” (letter to Franz Overbeck, 
February 1883.) 
60 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 174-75/Aphorism 294. 
61 This wonderful image of comedy and laughter as a funhouse mirror is used extensively by Bernard 
Freydberg in his Philosophy and Comedy. 
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envisaged by the great tragedies. On the other hand it is a call for a revaluation of all 
values. To affirm even the harshest suffering on earth as the highest calling is to call into 
radical questioning all previously ascribed values. In other words, to consent to this 
affirmation of life one must deify this suffering, and by doing so, it is as if one is always 
already engaged in the undermining of those values that see life as a problem. Laughter is 
exactly that phenomena that gathers, like a bridge, the shores of “no saying” valueless 
values (put succinctly, nihilism for Nietzsche) with the “yes saying” to life and the 
revaluation of all values so that we may cross that bridge in affirmation of the later. In the 
Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche says of this affirmation that it is a, “Saying yes to life, 
even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own 
inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types—that is what I called 
Dionysian, that is the bridge…”62 Thus laughter must be seen as a nexus to Dionysian 
affirmation. 
 The third concern has to do with Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment, which he 
treats most thoroughly in On the Genealogy of Morality. To be faithful to this idea, 
nowhere can laughter occur as an inauthentic reaction to a rival. Nietzschean laughter 
must always retain an authentic nobility that engages and negates but never externalizes 
and resents. Nietzsche is clear on the meaning of ressentiment as an antithesis to the 
affirmation of his tragic view of life when he states, “Whereas all noble morality grows 
out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to 
everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed.”63 The 
                                                 
62 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 228/Section 
5 of “What I Owe the Ancients.” 
63 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 20/First essay, 10. 
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act of laughing, of finding humor where others often times see only seriousness or 
external threats is, in part, a key to this “noble morality.” In other words, contrary to 
ressentiment laughter is, to a large extent, a “yes saying.” So Nietzsche’s view of laughter 
and comedy must be one that finds meaning only in its creative deed of staving off 
ressentiment. Both ressentiment and the affirmation of life work together by authentically 
engaging with existence that at times can be cruel. In turn this engagement centers around 
a coming to grips with this cruelty that in its very destruction harbors its own Dionysian 
rebirth. The human being is a bridge, a crossing, and in the very crossing resounds jollity 
and affirming laughter as the “eternal comedy of existence”64 perpetually unfolds. 
 Of course we shall see that there are many more concerns in any evaluation of 
comedy and laughter in the thought of Nietzsche. Nonetheless, I believe that the three 
outlined here are crucial because they delimit an overarching framework that his thought 










                                                 
64 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 29/Aphorism 1. 
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Chapter One: Nietzsche on Tragedy and Comedy—Two Masks/One God 
 
“The writer of comedy is of the higher species, and must do more good than the other, 
whether he wants to or not.” 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Letter to Peter Gast 1883~ 
 
 
I. Nietzsche’s Tragic View of Life 
 
 What is meant by the tragic view of life that Nietzsche very much embraces? How 
and why is life essentially tragic for Nietzsche? The reason these questions are relevant to 
the present study is that understanding this is a necessary first step if one is to 
subsequently focus on Nietzsche’s affirmation of life in light of the tragic outlook. This 
affirmation often times manifests itself through his view of comedy and laughter. What 
will begin to emerge is the close proximity that both tragedy and comedy often have to 
one another even though they are distinct phenomena. 
 The work that most directly sheds light on the tragic view of life is Nietzsche’s 
earliest published book, The Birth of Tragedy. However, because this dissertation will 
look thoroughly at this work as it relates to comedy, I propose another aphorism from a 
later work that encapsulates this view. “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” 
appears in Twilight of the Idols (1888) and, because it appears later in the Nietzsche 
corpus, one can avail oneself of its content in terms of how it relates to earlier works 
thereby providing a philosophical thread that winds its way through Nietzsche’s thinking. 
Accordingly, because of its importance to this study I recount it in full: 
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 The history of an error 
 The true world attainable for a man whom is wise, pious, virtuous, - he lives in 
 it, he is it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively coherent, simple, convincing. 
 Paraphrase of the proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.’) 
 The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man who is wise, pious, 
 virtuous (‘to the sinner who repents’). (Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more 
 subtle, less comprehensible, - it becomes female, it becomes Christian...) 
 The true world, unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but the very thought of it 
 a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (Basically the old sun but through fog 
 and scepticism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.) 
 The true world – unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained also 
 unknown. Consequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either: how could 
 we have obligations to something unknown?...(Gray morning. First yawn of 
 reason. Cockcrow of positivism.) 
 The ‘true world’ – an idea that is of no further use, not even as an obligation, - 
 now an obsolete, superfluous idea, consequently a refuted idea: let’s get rid of it! 
 (Bright day; breakfast; return of bons sens and cheerfulness; Plato blushes in 
 shame; pandemonium of all free spirits.) 
 The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps?...But no! 
 we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one! (Noon; moment of 
 shortest shadow; end of longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT 
 ZARATHUSTRA.)65 
                                                 
65 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 171. 
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It is clearly evident that Nietzsche is working through the history of philosophy in terms 
of the devolving meaning of truth, that is, of a supersensible “true world” set opposite of 
the sensible world. It is devolving because truth begins as the unconditioned or the 
transcendent and as such it is unchanging. However, this world has never really been 
knowable, only posited. Indeed, to be transcendent means to be beyond experience. In 
this sense, from the side of experience, it is a regulative fiction. Nietzsche traces this 
devolving meaning of truth, what he calls the “history of an error,” beginning with 
Plato’s ideas, then the otherworldly hopes of Christianity, through Kant’s noumenal (and 
therefore unknowable) thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) until skepticism of such knowledge 
begins to hold sway. 
 This passage from Twilight of the Idols encapsulates what is certainly a critique of 
science. It is a critique not only of science’s aims but also its method and limit, and the 
possibility of science at all. If there is to be a science then its form is also called into 
radical questioning. These concerns all intersect with the tragic view of knowledge 
Nietzsche is emphasizing. In the collection of essays that make up the book Nietzsche, 
Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, Babette Babich also recognizes this 
inversion stating in her superb essay, “The Culture of Science as Art”: 
 Nietzsche’s post-Kantian reflection on the possibility of knowledge and truth 
 includes an irrecusable emphasis on the ‘tragic’ limit of critique itself. Inverting 
 traditional readings of Kant’s critical program, Nietzsche argues that as an 
 articulation of the metaphysical or transcendental foundations of all science as of 
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 all mathematics, ‘it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science 
 rests.’66 
 In essence, Nietzsche’s tragic view is a new kind of knowledge that not only 
recognizes the limits of an otherwise unrestrained optimism but embraces these limits as 
well. It is a special kind of knowledge because it recognizes our limits as finite, 
earthbound beings who can never hope to transcend this status. It is the coming to grips 
with regulative fictions as regulative fictions by not forgetting that they are posited as 
such. This call to honesty (Redlichkeit), especially in its intellectual sense, is perhaps best 
stated by Nietzsche in The Gay Science and the same aphorism that Babich references 
above: 
 In science [der Wissenschaft], convictions have no right to citizenship, as one 
 says with good reason: only when they decide to step down [herabzusteigen] to 
 the modesty of a hypothesis, a tentative experimental standpoint, a regulative 
 fiction [regulativen Fiktion], may they be granted admission and even a certain 
 value in the realm of knowledge—though always with the restriction that they 
 remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust [die Polizei des 
 Misstrauens].67 
Here Nietzsche agrees with Kant who, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, states that knowledge claims cannot transcend “the realm of possible 
experience” even though transcendental ideas as regulative fictions are “nonetheless 
                                                 
66 Babette Babich, “The Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical 
Theory, ed. B. Babich and R. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 1. This quote of 
Nietzsche is from The Gay Science, aphorism 344. 
67 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 200/Aphorism 344. 
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indispensably necessary.”68 Nietzsche’s critique of other thinkers often revolves around 
their unwillingness to recognize that these illusions are just that, illusions, and Nietzsche 
sees himself as providing the necessary “police supervision” that would keep in check 
intellectual dishonesty run amok. 
 In addition, the impetus behind many knowledge claims that move beyond 
experience reveals on many occasions the self-serving motivation behind such attempts. 
And this is where Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant comes into sharp focus because although 
he agrees with Kant that illusions are necessary for life, nonetheless it is Kant’s rigorous 
adherence, in this case to ethical duty based on the categorical imperative, that betrays the 
fact that he, as one of the most insightful thinkers, is well aware of the illusions that are at 
play in philosophical thought. Again in The Twilight of the Idols he states that the 
philosopher’s: 
 [W]hole craft involves allowing only certain truths [gewisse Wahrheiten]: namely 
 the ones that their craft is publicly sanctioned [die öffentliche Sanktion] to offer, – 
 in Kantian terms, the truths of practical reason. They know what they have to 
 prove; when it comes to this, they are practical, – they recognize each other by 
 their agreement about ‘truths’. – ‘You should not lie’ – this means: beware 
 [hüten], my dear philosopher, of telling the truth...69 
This criticism is stinging, if for no other reason, because it targets the philosopher’s quest 
for and relationship to truth. Indeed the very nature of knowledge that reveals the tragic, 
truth and its presentation is called into question. But the criticisms leveled at Kant are 
also at times laughter provoking such as when he weaves certain kinds of Judeo-Christian 
                                                 
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1996), 617-619B, 670B, 673B. 
69 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 217/42. 
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imagery into his account of Kant’s call to selfless duty. For example, “Nothing ruins us 
more profoundly or inwardly than ‘impersonal’ duty, or any sacrifice in front of the 
Moloch of abstraction. – To think that people did not sense the mortal danger posed by 
Kant’s categorical imperative!”70 Or when he finds humor in the fact that the very system 
Kant created that was to be universally applicable to all minds in the practical sphere was 
to those very same minds incomprehensible; “Kant’s Joke. – Kant wanted to prove, in a 
way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right: that was the 
secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in favour of popular prejudice, but 
for scholars and not for the people.”71 In other words non-philosophers could not 
understand the very system that was supposed to articulate the moral law they were to 
follow! To be sure, the “joke” rests with Nietzsche in that Kant surely did not find his 
practical philosophy laughter provoking. It is Nietzsche who sees both the serious and 
humorous factor themselves into the presence of tragic knowledge. 
 However, what is perhaps more compelling is how one understands the 
consequences of such a view. One might phrase the question ethically and ask, “What 
ought one do in the face of such knowledge?” Although the end of the true world was 
always already underway from its beginning, nonetheless Nietzsche signals its finality 
when “bon sens” (good sense) returns and “Plato blushes in shame” unleashing the 
“pandemonium of all free spirits.” Free spirits then are those who reject outright not only 
the true world but also the illusory world that is coupled with it as well. In other words, 
Nietzsche’s task is both to break free from what has been traditionally called the 
                                                 
70 Ibid., The Anti-Christ, 10/11. Moloch refers to an ancient god of the Near East that parents occasionally 
sacrificed their children to. Thus a Moloch in literature refers to something that requires a costly sacrifice 
hence Nietzsche’s play on Kant’s categorical imperative where lived, embodied life is sacrificed on the 
altar of abstraction that supposedly provided the systematic framework to protect it. 
71 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 140/Aphorism 193. 
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intelligible/sensible distinction and also to exploit the distinction between a “common 
sense” view of the world and the philosopher’s view of the world. But secondly, 
understanding the ramifications of such a position allows for the true imperative of 
affirming instinctual knowledge over against the philosopher’s knowledge. Thus it is not 
simply a rejection of the true world (the intelligible realm) in favor of the illusory world 
(the apparent world),72 nor is it a simple inversion as if one could simply turn the 
hourglass before the last grain of sand slipped through, but a denial of both as understood 
in and through each other. For Nietzsche, it is only the sensible world as the sensible 
world that is of most significance. This means that the sensible world exists as the only 
truth and must be taken up on its own. In light of this inversion Sallis states, “what is now 
required is a discourse that would double the sensible—interpret it, as it were—without 
recourse to the intelligible. What is required is a discourse that would endure the loss of 
the intelligible...”73 Hence Nietzsche’s poetic claim, “Noon; moment of shortest shadow; 
end of longest error; high point of humanity.” The long arch of the true world as imaged 
by the sun has reached its zenith casting on the sun dial “the shortest shadow.”74 One 
might say, remaining faithful to Nietzsche’s imagery, that the sun as it moves on its 
vaulting path through the sky is now at noon, its zenith, and thus is ready to begin sinking 
into its horizon. The previous expansive shadow cast by the kind of metaphysics that 
Nietzsche is calling into question—that of God and science—struggles in its twilight. 
                                                 
72 Both Sallis (in Platonic Legacies, [Albany: SUNY, 2004]) and Babich (in “The Culture of Science as 
Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory) underscore this same point. 
73 John Sallis, Force of Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 33. In terms of 
Nietzsche’s text I offer a similar interpretation although with Sallis the stress is on the return to “wild 
nature and the elemental” and the need for a fundamental reorientation to ethics and politics. (25) 
74 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 171. 
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 However this horizon is one that the sun, with all its implications, no longer 
forms. At this “high point of humanity” the transition occurs, one hardly discernible, 
because like all transitions things are never perfectly demarcated especially if one is in 
the midst of the transition itself. Hence for Nietzsche, “INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA” 
(“Zarathustra begins”) or one might read it as Nietzsche has it at the end of the first 
edition of The Gay Science (1882) and before Thus Spoke Zarathustra whose first book 
appears a year later: “Incipit Tragoedia” (“The tragedy begins”).75 Zarathustra is the key 
figure that clears and occupies this tragic spacing in history. In this regard, it is 
humanity’s new undertaking as it must come to grips with and hopefully affirm its new 
reality absent of the intelligible/sensible distinction that held sway for so long. Sensible 
phenomena must be taken as they show themselves, that is, as they scheinen, hence 
Nietzsche’s words in The Birth of Tragedy that he repeats many times, “only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon [aesthetisches Phänomen] is being there [Dasein] and the world 
eternally justified [gerechtfertigt].”76 What however are the implications of such a view? 
 First, Nietzsche’s assertion that the true world (the world of reason or the 
intelligible world) no longer provides the foundation of our thinking, nor the justification 
of our being there is not an epistemological claim. In other words, Nietzsche is not 
rejecting this world based on epistemological grounds. He does not provide a lengthy 
epistemological argument in favor of sense knowledge as opposed to a priori knowledge 
(his early essay, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” is arguably an exception as 
he works through the many stages of sense experience and the language that we use to 
                                                 
75 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 195/Aphorism 342. See also Kathleen Higgins, Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s 
Gay Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 161-62. Higgins also points out the 
interchangeable nature of these two beginnings. 
76 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 33/Section 5. I translate Dasein as “being there” whereas Speirs uses “existence.” 
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signify it). Indeed Nietzsche states in Human, All Too Human that the metaphysical 
world, understood in its widest sense, is hardly to be disputed, that is, it surely exists.77 
Instead, Nietzsche’s interest is in understanding: first, in what motivated certain thinkers 
such as Plato and Kant to posit supersensible criteria and second, in how it is that the 
“true world” understood in its multitude of historical senses furthered life ascending 
values. In other words, what benefit does transcendent or noumenal knowledge mean 
existentially for life? 
 Nietzsche poignantly illustrates this concern again in Human, All Too Human 
when he states that, “[K]nowledge [of a metaphysical world] would be the most useless 
knowledge of all knowledge: more useless even than knowledge of the chemical 
composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck”78 Thus Nietzsche is 
stressing what I would call the existential invalidity of metaphysical knowledge and of 
course this invalidity is a far cry from the kind of validity concerned with logic or 
epistemological correspondence; life many times outstrips the metaphysical knowledge 
that would otherwise hope to “correct” it. What the positing of God or any transcendent 
criteria achieved, claims Nietzsche, is the allowance for a certain kind of life in which the 
purveyors of that particular life were protected and allowed to thrive within that 
discursive practice. But now this “true world,” which has reached its zenith, is about to 
sink like the sun, descending in terms of its hegemony, leaving only the sensible world 
and sensible phenomena as that which manifests itself to us as the only meaningful, 
existential criteria. 
                                                 
77 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 15/Section 9. 
78 Ibid. 
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 What, then, is a world given and justified only as an aesthetic phenomena? It is 
world in which we are immersed in that which appears to sense. It is a world of images. 
This is the meaning of an aesthetically justified life. It is a life in which appearances and 
images in their manifold semblance hold sway.79 For Nietzsche, the most powerful 
images, images that scheinen, come in the form of art. To be sure, art alone justifies even 
the most tremendous amount of suffering that allows us to surmount pessimism and 
embrace the tragic view of the world. But this is Nietzsche’s goal as Heidegger makes 
clear from what he says are notes from an initial sketch of The Birth of Tragedy, “My 
philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the further removed from true being, the purer, the 
more beautiful, the better it is. Living in Schein as goal.”80 
 The implications of such a view are immense and not only because they stress the 
importance of those things that have been least important in the history of philosophy. 
Hence, whereas until Nietzsche’s time (with some exceptions) “truth” was always 
stressed in its relationship to permanence and being, his stress is on change, becoming 
and the inevitable effect of having to take up a perspective among perspectives. In other 
words the “birds eye view” of truth is inverted. This new emphasis compels him to 
emphatically state, “for all life rests on semblance, art, deception, prismatic effects, the 
necessity of perspectivism and error.”81 And moreover, this acknowledgement of our 
finite condition within becoming and the resulting effects it will have on all science 
(Wissenschaft) although to many might be frightful, for Nietzsche it is far from a call to 
                                                 
79 Nietzsche claims, “A religion would be created if a man awakened belief in a mystical edifice that he 
built in a vacuum, i.e. if the belief met an extraordinary need. It is unlikely that this will ever happen again 
after the Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand I can imagine an entirely new kind of philosopher-
artist who would fill the gap with a work of art, with aesthetic value.” From Writings From The Early 
Notebooks, trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 105-06/19[39]. 
80 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. I-IV (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961), 1/233. This is John 
Sallis’ translation in Crossings, 3. 
81 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 9/Section 5 of the preface to the second edition. 
 44
resignation and despair. Thus his thinking in many ways echoes David Hume’s claim that 
we ought not despair but be happy within the narrow limits of our understanding. 
Nietzsche’s rejection of pessimism and the “true world” and the embracing of the tragic 
view is one we can celebrate through art, especially comedy, in which we image 
ourselves before ourselves in “bons sens and cheerfulness.”82 In the words of William 
Shakespeare, who Nietzsche very much appreciates, “All the world’s a stage, And all the 
men and women merely players.”83 
 Keeping all of this in mind as a backdrop is critical and it is precisely why in 
“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” and “On Truth and Lying in a Non-
Moral Sense” that Nietzsche’s critique of science is so poignant, not only because he 
critiques the very (supposed) grounds of science itself but because of what is at stake. As 
Babich has it, “The notion of ‘truth and lie’ is not a moral question but concerns the 
relation between art and knowledge as it is also the relation between ancient, tragic 
wisdom and modern nihilism.”84 Abandoned to ourselves, comedy as well as all inspired 
art, plays a crucial role in Nietzsche’s thought. They provide a relief against the backdrop 
of a philosophical history in question and they are a relief in their very expression by 
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II. Comedy as a Response to the Tragic View 
 
 In ancient Greece yearly festivals, in honor of Dionysus, were held in which both 
tragedies and comedies were performed. The Dionysia consisted of what were surely 
three soul-taxing tragedies buttressed at the end by a comedy. The plays were performed 
as part of a competition in which the winners were awarded a prize, usually a goat—
hence the etymology of the word “tragedy” which means “goat-song.” The word comedy 
also betrays its roots in Dionysian revelry and song. In fact, the word comedy from the 
Greek komodios means “singer in the revels.” What is evident from these etymological 
excavations is that tragedies and comedies, with their roots in Dionysian revelry, have 
close ties not only to the earth but to madness as Dionysus was the god (among other 
things) of chaos and ecstatic, non-rational experience. In the preface to the second edition 
to The Birth of Tragedy (1886) titled “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” Nietzsche affirms 
exactly this stating: 
 [W]here must the origins of tragedy have lain at that time? Perhaps in desire and 
 delight [Lust], in strength, in overbrimming health, in an excess of plentitude? In 
 this case what is the meaning (in physiological terms) of that madness 
 [Wahnsinn]—Dionysian madness—from which both the tragic and the comic arts 
 emerged?....it  was precisely madness which brought the greatest blessings 
 [die grössten Segnungen] to Hellas...85 
In this sense, that is, in the historical sense of ancient Greece, Dionysian madness was the 
fertile ground from which tragedy and comedy arose. If we equate this madness with 
darkness, as opposed to what will later be called “the light of reason” by many 
                                                 
85 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 7/Section 4 of the preface to the second edition. 
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Enlightenment thinkers, then madness as cruelty and lust was finally allowed a voice to 
resound out of this darkness in the form of art. These non-rational beginnings resonate 
quite well with Nietzsche’s view that many of the philosophical, moral, and scientific 
phenomena that the moderns inherited had “origins” that were much more shadowy and 
gray than the certainty of black and white transcendental absolutes.86 Indeed, Nietzsche’s 
view (along with that of his friend and colleague Jacob Burckhardt) of ancient Hellas as 
one that harbored a great measure of irrationality and madness was a direct challenge to 
the thinking of his day where Greece was seen as an exalted state due to its rationality 
and serene temperament.87 This dark origin of lust, cruelty, and madness played a double 
role in that it was the source of great suffering and pessimism and yet it was the fertile 
ground from which humankind could configure their beautiful semblances into art, which 
allowed them to live in the face of that abysmal knowledge. 
 What we are concerned with here then are a number of things. First and foremost 
is the manner in which comedy manifested itself out of these darker origins. To use the 
phrase, “the manner in which…” is another way of asking the more essential question 
pertinent to Nietzsche’s orientation: How do comedies “scheinen”? What is the particular 
manner in which comedies appear as shining images? And if they are inspired comedies, 
how is it that we become transfigured when we behold them? Secondly, what does the 
shining of comedic images accomplish for Nietzsche and us? Why are they important 
(always keeping in mind that they are as important as the shining of tragic images)? 
Finally, what does Nietzsche perceive as a threat to such comedic shinings? Is there a 
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saving power that can be found in the very threat that would allow the turning out of the 
threat from within the danger itself? In Nietzsche’s view, there is a danger present in the 
thought of Socrates and Plato’s thinking although they also harbor a saving power and 
Nietzsche is quick to expose this moment in the history of philosophy. But first there is a 
burst of laughter that erupts early in The Birth of Tragedy that heralds a beginning for 
these very questions. This is the laughter of the Dionysian reveler Silenus. 
 As we saw above in the first section of this chapter, Nietzsche’s overall view can 
be understood to be a tragic view. This tragic view, with its attendant loss of 
traditional/historical values, can result in pessimism. This was demonstrated in the 
section of a later work called “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable.” In The 
Birth of Tragedy pessimism is given a different configuration and a different voice. Here 
the pessimism that is to be overcome through art—preferably through tragedy and 
comedy—is given through myth, specifically the image of Silenus. This myth is 
important to Nietzsche because in this earlier work he is concerned with how the ancient 
Greeks were able to maintain a cheerfulness in the face of their sufferings. This was not 
so that us moderns could then copy the Greeks. Nietzsche of course does not want us to 
return to an origin in order to copy what has already manifested itself in time as he makes 
clear in the Untimely Meditations essay, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life.” Instead, the eternal return of chaos demands that we compose our own desires and 
will them into new forms. Thus it is to be used as an example that inspires us and drives 
on toward future goals under the guise of our own inspired creations. So, what does 
Nietzsche’s inclusion of the Silenus myth tell us not only about the Greeks but ourselves? 
And how does art, including comedy, help to overcome this unsettling image? 
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 A follower and reveler of Dionysus, Silenus was hunted by King Midas who was 
finally able to confront him. King Midas demanded that Silenus tell him what is best for 
human beings, that is, demanded that Silenus divulge his wisdom: 
 Stiff and unmoving, the daemon remains silent until, forced by the King to speak, 
 he finally breaks out in shrill laughter [gellem Lachen] and says: ‘Wretched, 
 ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force me to tell 
 you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear? The 
 very best thing is utterly beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be 
 [nicht zu sein], to be nothing [nichts zu sein]. However, the second best thing for 
 you is: to die soon.’88 
What is clearly evident is the deep alliance between pessimism and laughter. This 
particular laughter may not be comic to some. To the ears of modern readers, especially 
of the Judeo-Christian heritage, Silenus’s laughter may even seem insulting in the sense 
that to be nothing radically dismisses the possibility of otherworldly hopes. This might 
lead one to the kind of pessimism Nietzsche hopes to overcome. 
 But Silenus’s wisdom entails much more than this since it really lies in the space 
between two equally harsh options (not to mention the fact that the myth is of a time 
before Christianity). On the one hand, Silenus, as an immortal follower of Dionysus, is 
condemned to perpetual life. Death is not a possibility for Silenus. And to live forever 
means to be subject to the terrors and horrors of existence ad infinitum. On the other 
hand, as a worshipper of Dionysus, Silenus can lose himself only temporarily in drunken 
excess, escaping the pangs of his own existence to which, when the wine has worn off, he 
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is condemned to always return. Ironically then Silenus envies the “ephemeral race” of 
human beings who, as beings-toward-death, will at some point not be, and thus escaping 
the fate that Silenus cannot. However, from the side of finite mortal beings such as 
ourselves, our concern is also between two equally unappealing options. We can either 
hope to die soon—wishing to not be born is an absurdity itself since in the very wishing 
we already find ourselves born—or we must live a life full of pain and suffering, much 
the same way Shakespeare’s Hamlet weighs the “slings and arrows” of being and non-
being in his play of the same name.89 But living with the wish to die soon is to resign 
oneself to the very pessimism Nietzsche seeks to overcome. 
 What is also notable is that the herald to this wisdom, that is, the antecedent 
moment before anything is said by Silenus is a voice but one that sounds forth before 
language. It is the voice of “shrill laughter.” Why laughter as the initial response to one of 
the most serious questions that can be posed? Because the laughter here is one that 
provokes those who hear it, jarring them out of complacency. It also signals in its very 
provocation a knowledge that is at once both hard to hear yet truthful and wise. So 
Silenus’s wisdom is surely provocative in the deepest sense of the word (L. provocare 
“call forth, challenge,” from pro– “forth” + –vocare “to call”). It begins, before any 
explanations, conceptualizations, or any discourse whatsoever with shrill laughter that 
emerges from silence. To put it succinctly, laughter is what first emerges out of nothing. 
 If we draw the overarching inference from the wisdom that the myth of Silenus 
seeks to convey it is that human beings are given over to a certain measure, indeed a great 
measure, of opacity. We are never in full possession of absolute, transcendent knowledge, 
on the one hand, but we are not entirely nothing, on the other. This locates us against a 
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backdrop of abysmal nothingness as a dim light that clears the kind of space proper to a 
voice that resounds from this darkness—a mortal human voice. As beings-toward-death 
nothingness—one might refer to it as our diminishing finitude—is part of our 
constitution. Perhaps the voice is one that laughs before it speaks in recognition of its, 
that is of our, essential condition: a laughter that in its very eruption affirms this 
condition. We might also say that this very opacity is the measure of us but it is an 
opacity that the ancient Greeks embraced in their cheerfulness of the tragic view of life 
and one that Nietzsche also finds joyful, celebratory, and like Silenus’s first intimation, 
laughter provoking. 
 Similar to Silenus’s laughter that is antecedent to his language, Nietzsche also 
stresses the importance of another phenomenon that occurs before language: music. In 
section six of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche, who is speaking of the folk song of 
Archilochus, states that: 
 [I]n the poetry of folk song we see language straining to its limit to imitate 
 music [die musik nachzuahmen]...With this observation we have defined the only 
 possible relationship between music, word, and sound: the word, the image, the 
 concept seeks expression [Ausdruck] in a manner analogous to music and thereby 
 is subjected to the power [Gewalt] of music.90 
Nietzsche’s point is that music is something primordial with an origin that arises before 
concepts and linguistic constructions. Concepts and everyday language are already 
symbolic in the sense that words always carry along a significance regardless of how 
much meaning might be deferred. Moreover, in terms of images, they, too, are derivative. 
Nietzsche claims that the images of the lyric poet strain to imitate the music that is 
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primordial and antecedent to them. This derivative nature of language and images is 
crucial to Nietzsche’s view of art. If language, concepts and images are derivative of 
music, what then is music an expression of? Nietzsche, via Schopenhauer at one point, 
says that it is the will of the artist, specifically the lyric poet. However, Nietzsche is 
careful to point out that music “cannot possibly be Will” otherwise it would never appear 
because the will “is inherently un-aesthetic [der Wille ist das an sich Unästhetische].” 
Thus music only “appears as Will” and Nietzsche even goes so far as to say that “music 
itself, in its absolute sovereignty, has no need at all of images and concepts but merely 
tolerates them as an accompaniment.”91 This notion of music is important because it 
seems to be the only phenomenon that Nietzsche equates with the Dionysian itself, or at 
least its most primal expression, and thus with the tragic sense of life that he wants to 
affirm. 
 So, to confront the pessimism of Silenus, or the meaningless of the inverted 
world, the voice of Dionysus was allowed to speak or better yet, sing. How? On its own 
the Dionysian is destructive without the imposition of form. Thus it is only with its 
necessary coupling to another impulse that it can speak the language of tragedy and 
comedy. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche elucidates these two impulses that give rise to 
these two art forms, allowing us to affirm his tragic view of life. 
 For Nietzsche the two elements at play are the Apollinian and Dionysian. The 
Apollinian represents order and harmony. Apollo, Nietzsche says, as the sun god is the 
shining one (der Scheinende). As the shining one, the Apollinian impulse allows for 
images to image themselves, that is, allows for images to shine (scheinen) forth as they 
are. Taken on its own, the individual Apollinian images, such as the images found in 
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dreams that Nietzsche claims we take pleasure in, are part of a purely subjective 
experience. They are always some individual’s dreams and therefore these beautiful 
images are part of an individual subject or psyche. Hence, Nietzsche refers to this 
phenomenon as the principium individuationis. 
 It may also mean the kind of images one has while daydreaming. For example, 
Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech in which he brings to light the image of a 
multi-racial, peaceful coexistence where everyone has a voice that will be heard. In 
essence then, the Apollinian impulse allows for a parade of beautiful semblance to 
showcase itself doubly before the individual eye and the “I” as ego. However, in terms of 
tragedy the Apollinian plays another role, one that allows for other, more monstrous 
images to “burst forth from nature.” What bursts forth and attempts to overflow anything 
that would hope to contain it is the Dionysian. 
 Dionysus, unlike Apollo, is the god of intoxication and disorder, of wine and 
revelry, of sexual energy and rebirth. Nietzsche makes this connection of intoxication as 
an analogy of the Dionysian impulse in the first section. This impulse can be understood 
in two ways. First as what it is and second by what it does or, one might say, 
accomplishes. In terms of the first, one might find it problematic to denote it as an “is” at 
all. The Dionysian is surely not a thing and, as we shall see in a moment, it is only an 
image in a very unusual sense. Thus, as ineffable as it might be to try and posit an actual 
definition of the Dionysian, nonetheless I characterize it as that which is without form or 
any determinable qualities that signify it as a thing. Indeed it is that very impulse that 
attempts the transgression of form, whether it be the form that subjectivity takes on due to 
the particular discursive practices of the time or the illusions that constitute a particular 
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culture. One might say that the Dionysian, then, is the chaos that dwells behind 
appearances. That is why Nietzsche (and the ancient Greeks) set the Dionysian impulse 
over and against the Apollonian, which manifests itself in individuation. To be sure, 
Dionysian ecstasy requires one to be outside of oneself (ecstasy, from Greek ekstasis, ex-, 
“out,” and histanai, “to stand”) in what is essentially a loss of all form. Thus in the very 
experience of inspired art—and this experience is crucial because it cannot be taught or 
arrived at by way of science, dialectical reasoning or logic—when one is cast under the 
awe and wonder of it, the Dionysian accomplishes a displacement of the self in what 
Nietzsche calls nothing less than a “contradiction.” It is a contradiction in which, “The 
artist has already given up his subjectivity in the Dionysian process...Thus the ‘I’ of the 
lyric poet sounds out [tönt] from the deepest abyss of being [aus dem Abgrunde des 
Seins]; his ‘subjectivity’, as this concept is used by modern aestheticians, is imaginary.”92 
In other words what the Dionysian accomplishes is an ecstatic excess. It exceeds all of 
the qualifiers that would otherwise distinguish it as a “this” within the intuitions of space 
and time as well as all such applications of pure reason or the thinking ego that exists 
because it is aware of itself as an individual subject. 
 The meeting of these two impulses, what Nietzsche characterizes as a “duplicity” 
(Duplizität),93 allow for the expression of tragic art. The Apollonian impulse, through its 
yoking of the terrible Dionysian, generates the images that we call tragedy: images that 
transfigure ourselves by allowing us to confront the deep abysmal truths of existence. It is 
only by way of this special “yoking” that the Dionysian can be imaged at all and given 
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creative form. The necessary co-existence of these two impulses is made clear by 
Nietzsche who states, “And behold! Apollo could not live without Dionysos. The 
‘Titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ was ultimately just as much of a necessity as the Apolline!.”94 
However, tragedy is Nietzsche’s primary theme thus the question arises, “What is 
comedy’s role and how does comedy achieve the same ends?” 
 In The Birth of Tragedy, as the crucial section seven nears its close, the image of 
Silenus resurfaces as an unsettling image of pessimism that has yet to be surmounted. 
This time it appears in direct relation to the saving power of tragedy and comedy as 
understood through their correlates the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses. There is 
always a certain polemic that revolves around both the Apollonian and Dionysian. The 
tension between barbarity and culture, the individual and his/her destruction, and truth 
and illusion, is always present. In addition to these types of tension, Nietzsche observes 
that behind them lies a more fundamental existential imperative for the individual in the 
space between resignation and action. Nietzsche’s claim is that the individual in its daily 
life is immersed in the world of illusion and thus is veiled from the terrible truth of the 
Dionysian. Every subject is separate from all others and from all other phenomena, such 
as the state or society that constitute its particular horizon of existence. However, these 
appearances are illusory and temporary. Our fragility as individuals, even within vast 
civilizations, is evident with the most cursory glance at history. Perhaps best expressed in 
poetry, consider Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem, “Ozymandias” where the concluding lines 
state, “Nothing beside remains. Round the decay / Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and 
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bare / The lone and level sands stretch far away.”95 It is less a poem about the 
archaeological statue, the king or his empire. It is poem that discloses time in its fullness 
in and through the elemental stone that gives testament to it, eternity, and us as the finite 
beings subject to it. 
 With this knowledge how does one live, or better, how can one live in the face of 
all that is ephemeral and transient even though things appear as permanent? When one 
undergoes the experience of Dionysian tragedy, all particular, individual boundaries 
dissolve. In turn the human being experiences a unity with primordial nature that results 
in what Nietzsche refers to many times as “metaphysical solace.” It is the knowledge that 
behind the becoming and passing away of all appearances that constitute the good and 
bad of daily living is the indestructible, abysmal truth of the continually reborn 
Dionysian. Even though life is continually unstable it is still indestructible and hence 
joyful. 
 Through the dissolution of the conscious subject, the ecstatic experience of the 
Dionysian allows for a temporary reprieve from the terrors of existence. One is 
withdrawn out of daily life that can often be harsh and unrewarding. After seeing into the 
true nature of things, that is, after having glimpsed the Dionysian, one is tempted, 
Nietzsche claims, to remain lethargic: 
 The reason for this is that the ecstasy [Verzückung] of the Dionysian state, in 
 which the usual barriers and limits of existence are destroyed, contains, for as 
 long as it lasts, a lethargic element [lethargisches Element] in which all personal 
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 experiences from the past are submerged. This gulf of oblivion [Kluft der 
 Vergessenheit] separates the worlds of everyday life and Dionysiac experience.96 
Nietzsche’s concern is that once one has seen into and experienced the ecstasy of the 
Dionysian state, in which all the particular individual barriers of daily life are dissolved, 
one is tempted to remain in an inactive state of forgetfulness. Indeed the word lethargic, 
from lethe “forgetfulness” and argos “idle,” encapsulates just this dynamic. Why? 
Because on return to conscious daily life one becomes fully aware of the futility of 
action. How could an individual possibly transform the inequities of daily life, wherever 
and whatever they may be? How can a singular individual in a single lifetime, a moment, 
think they can be of any effect in the long arch of history, in which great nations rise and 
fall and countless multitudes of people although immersed in their historically situated 
struggles, perish and are forgotten? 
 A fruitful detour may allow us to shed some more light on this notion of lethargy 
when we look at it through an existential lens such as that found in one of Jean Paul 
Sartre’s works. In arguably the most famous passage in Nausea, Roquentin is sitting on a 
park bench stooped over. Underneath is a “black, knotty mass” of roots belonging to a 
chestnut tree. Suddenly this image of the tangled roots facilitates a receding of everything 
familiar, including the memory and language that would provide meaning. This is not a 
mere episode of forgetfulness on Roquentin’s part, the kind we are all subject to on 
occasion. Instead, Roquentin undergoes an epiphany about existence itself. This epiphany 
is ironic in the sense that an epiphany usually means that one has come to knowledge in a 
positive sense, that is, that one has gained something. But Roquentin’s new “knowledge” 
about the root and existence is of a very different kind: 
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 And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly 
 unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the 
 very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the 
 park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of 
 things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had 
 melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder—naked in a frightful, 
 obscene nakedness.97 
Roquentin suddenly realized that everything he believed constituted the existence of 
something, such as the root of the chestnut tree, is a veneer or a deceptive facade. He 
believes that essences or attributes that we attribute to a thing through language are not 
necessary to the constitution of a thing. Indeed they are not real, in other words, they are 
nothing. For Sartre things are only brute existence, are only there, always outstripping 
any formal, abstract essence. This is why Sartre, more than once, uses the word 
“obscene” to describe this aspect of existence. Things that Roquentin previously 
comprehended or perceived with the dignity of their attributes—attributes that had 
always proffered an “understanding” of some-thing—now only stand out in their 
nakedness as obscene. 
 As Roquentin continues to meditate about the previous meaning (the qualities, 
essences and attributes) attributed to the things around him—better yet of anything—he 
further concludes what does exist does so not out of necessity but contingency. What is 
here, including himself, is here by chance. Generally speaking, this presents a sharp 
reversal from the Western philosophical tradition. There is no necessary being standing 
outside of existence guaranteeing one’s existence. Instead, we are given over against a 
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radical darkness unsupported by an Aristotelian unmoved mover, God of the Scholastics, 
or the Cartesian idea of God, who is the guarantor of our reason. 
 The consequence of all this is that the gnarled root of the chestnut tree facilitated 
a new understanding of existence for Roquentin, which he concludes is the source of his 
nausea. When nausea overcomes him it really is the understanding that he is thrown into 
an existence without either the implication of a necessary Being, reason, or any 
antecedent or subsequent meaning whatsoever. In other words existence is, “the perfect 
free gift.”98 When confronted with the reality of the meaningless of existence, that we are 
only against the backdrop of nothingness, Roquentin nonetheless decides to embrace his 
existence. He can, in a sense, be the canvas in which he freely brings to presence 
meaning by the creation of his own essence as if to bring relief against vacuous 
nothingness the way an artist brings an image to shine in stone. This idea of destruction 
and nothingness is perhaps best expressed in Being and Nothingness where Sartre states, 
“It is necessary then to recognize that destruction is an essentially human thing and that it 
is man who destroys...But at the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that 
destruction supposes a pre-judicative comprehension of nothingness as such and a 
conduct in the face of nothingness.”99 Only through an acknowledgement of this play of 
destruction and nothingness is being-for-itself [être-pour-soi]100 able to authentically 
capitalize on its creativity and ability to impart meaning and create itself out of 
nothingness. 
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 This meaning takes the form of artistic enjoyment (near Nausea’s conclusion 
Roquentin starts to appreciate jazz) or creation. Although it is somewhat of a stretch to 
suggest that Sartre and Nietzsche’s projects are the same (Nietzsche’s Übermensch surely 
does not feel nausea101 for life), nonetheless Nietzsche views destruction and becoming in 
much the same way stating: 
 The desire for destruction, for change and becoming [Das Verlangen nach 
 Zerstörung, Wechsel, Werden] can be the expression of an overflowing energy 
 pregnant with the future (my term for this is as used above and elsewhere is 
 ‘Dionysian’); but it can also be the hatred of the ill-constituted, deprived, and 
 underprivileged one who destroys, and must destroy because what exists, indeed 
 all existence, all being [alles Sein], outrages and provokes him.102 
This difference ultimately lies in the fact that whereas Sartre’s focus is on consciousness, 
Nietzsche appropriates the image of Dionysus to illustrate this essentially 
destructive/creative impulse in terms of the need for art as the supreme aesthetic 
phenomena that justifies the world. 
 We can take Sartre’s account of Roquentin and his existential angst in Nausea and 
draw similar parallels to Nietzsche’s Silenus and King Midas in The Birth of Tragedy. 
Recall that Nietzsche is concerned about how one can avoid pessimism and remain 
cheerful—as the Greeks did—in the face of what is often times a painful, sometimes 
meaningless existence. Silenus is the very image of that pessimism. Recall that his 
wisdom to Midas was to, “not...have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the 
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second best thing for you is: to die soon.”103 Of course one who has been thrown into 
existence and finds oneself here cannot opt to not be born or opt, existentially speaking, 
to have stayed as nothing or as nothingness. The very asking of the question presupposes 
one is already here, otherwise who is doing the asking? And Sartre acknowledges this 
point when Roquentin thinks to himself, “to imagine nothingness you had to be there 
already.”104 Much in the manner of Midas and Roquentin, we are thus confronted with 
freely being here in all its angst with the overarching dilemma either of owning up to our 
existence and living authentically through our own creative deeds or of succumbing to 
pessimism, lethargy, or unfortunately, on some occasions, suicide. And the voice of this 
angst is nothing less than the shrill laughter of the wood god, Silenus. 
 However there does appear to be a notable and important difference between 
Sartre and Nietzsche concerning laughter and comedy. Nietzsche’s position is clear on 
his appreciation of comedy, for example those of Aristophanes, the tendency even for 
philosophers to appear comic at times, as well as his appreciation and use of laughter 
within philosophy itself. However, Sartre appears to see little value in comedy and 
laughter. Yet, if both Nietzsche and Sartre want us to live authentically and own up to our 
freedom and existence, especially through creative deeds, where then lies the difference? 
 For Nietzsche, the appearances that make up existence, even the same ones that 
Sartre details in his stories and plays, are often times humorous. For example Socrates, 
who is to a large extent a serious philosophic rival to Nietzsche, also appears comedic. 
Nietzsche uses these illustrations not merely to ridicule for the sake of ridicule. For 
Nietzsche, the comic elements that Aristophanes exposes (discussed in detail below) are 
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intertwined with the serious elements that help form the constellation and force of 
history. And what Nietzsche sees as “the problem of Socrates” is, to put it succinctly, the 
problem of dialectic run amok. 
 Additionally, Nietzsche on many occasions has Zarathustra laugh at the 
existential circumstances in which he often finds himself. Of course this laughter has 
many dimensions (also discussed in the section below on Thus Spoke Zarathustra) but 
the point is that, for Nietzsche, something such as Sartre’s “obscene nakedness” of 
existence at times demands laughter and comedy as a legitimate and even necessary 
response. 
 For Sartre, though, the knowledge of existence in all its absurdity harbors only the 
possibility of continued nausea as a counterpoint to taking up one’s freedom. In one 
instance when Roquentin is meditating on the park bench about all of the appearances 
around him that form the “paste” of existence he says: 
 Trees, night-blue pillars, the happy bubbling of a fountain, vital smells, little heat-
 mists floating in the cold air, a red-haired man digesting on a bench: all this 
 somnolence, all these meals digested together, had its comic side [un aspect 
 vaguement comique]....Comic...no: it didn’t go as far as that, nothing that exists 
 can be comic [rien de ce qui existe ne peut être comique].105 
This is why existence is often referred to by Sartre as a “bending” or “yielding.”106 To 
laugh and see humor in existence is to relinquish or “yield” one’s freedom by permeating 
the appearances that constitute existence with a comic essence. A concise illustration of 
this occurs near the novel’s conclusion when Roquentin is musing about what he is going 
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to do with the remainder of his existence. These include the mundane affairs of his 
finances and his daily agenda such as whether to see a movie or take a walk. Then he 
states: 
 I’d better think about something else, because I’m playing a comedy now [je suis 
 en train de me jouer la comédie]. I know very well that I don’t want to do 
 anything: to do something is to create existence—and there’s quite enough 
 existence as it is [et il y a bien assez d’existence comme ça].107 
For Sartre then, comedy does not appear able to break the surface of existence and expose 
any deeper profound meaning whereas for Nietzsche, existence is riddled with 
appearances that constitute comedic, laughter provoking moments that allow for deep 
Dionysian truths to shine forth. 
 Even though both philosophers, in their own respective ways, ask the subject to 
create meaning in his or her existence especially through art, for Sartre comedy and 
laughter play a diminished role. They succeed only in furthering nausea and lethargy 
when it comes to owning up to one’s freedom. When we look at Sartre’s body of work, 
especially his artistic endeavors such as novels and plays, one is hard pressed to identify 
any of them as strictly comedic. And although it is uncertain whether Sartre himself finds 
any of his plays to harbor comedic elements, sometimes they do elicit laughter. For 
example, No Exit is understood almost exclusively as a serious existential play. 
Nonetheless, the circle of sexual tension between Joseph, Inès, and Estelle appears 
laughter provoking as each character’s desire of the other is thwarted. Still, one can safely 
conclude that for Sartre existence is no laughing matter! 
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 Nietzsche prefers to use Shakespeare to elucidate the notion of lethargy and the 
Dionysian state of ecstasy. He asserts, “In this sense Dionysiac man is similar to Hamlet: 
both have gazed into the true essence of things, they have acquired knowledge [sie haben 
erkannt] and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the 
eternal essence of things.”108 “Knowledge,” in this sense, is not positive knowledge. It is 
not the kind of grounding knowledge one acquires and subsequently acts or builds on. It 
works, at least at this point, in the opposite direction. It is the knowledge of what is 
abysmal and without ground. 
 But something more emerges in what Nietzsche sees as the danger of being 
submerged in the lethargic, purely Dionysian experience. After experiencing the abysmal 
truth of the Dionysian and seeing the futility of all action, Nietzsche claims that the 
Dionysian man, much like his example of Hamlet, does at this point will one crucial act: 
he laughs: “[T]hey regard it as laughable [lächerlich] or shameful that they should be 
expected to set to rights a world so out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action requires 
one to be shrouded in a veil of illusion.”109 This laughter—one that is hardly comic—is 
the response of the individual who returns to the everyday now having seen and acquired 
the knowledge of Dionysian truth. In these terms laughter is symbolic of a deep futility, 
one that stultifies the action of a finite individual in the vast expanse of time. Thus we see 
that the Dionysian is not only dangerous, in itself, as something experienced. Indeed, to 
experience the Dionysian would be to undergo one’s own destruction either literally or in 
spirit.110 This kind of laughter, then, signals a certain danger in the sense that knowledge 
                                                 
108 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40/Section 7. 
109 Ibid. 
110 In the concluding paragraph of Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain (Der Zauberberg) Mann 
describes the fate of Hans Castorp, “life’s delicate child,” who has left the sanatorium in Davos Switzerland 
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of this kind presents a direct threat to action, to the very affirmation of life Nietzsche 
seeks. 
 Once again Nietzsche returns to the image of Silenus to illustrate the danger of the 
Dionysiac man’s newly acquired knowledge and the resulting wisdom claiming that, 
“...now he grasps the wisdom of the wood-god Silenus: he feels revulsion.”111 Like 
Silenus, who erupts in shrill laughter when forced to respond to King Midas about what 
was best for human beings (namely to be nothing or to have never been born), the 
Dionysiac man through his primordial experience grasps this wisdom in an immediate 
epiphany and he too laughs. It is at this moment, Nietzsche claims, that the will of the 
human being is in most danger; danger in the sense of resigning oneself to inaction and 
pessimism. However, this danger, this abysmal truth also harbors a saving power as well, 
in which comedy is to play an important role. In what I argue is the ultimate 
pronouncement in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche states: 
 Here, at this moment of supreme danger [höchsten Gefahr] for the will, art 
 approaches as a saving sorceress with the power to heal. Art alone can re-direct 
 those repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of existence [Absurde 
 des Daseins] into representations [Vorstellungen] with which man can live; these 
 representations are the sublime, whereby the terrible is tamed by artistic means, 
 and the comical [Komische], whereby disgust at absurdity [des Absurden] is 
 discharged by  artistic means.112 
                                                                                                                                                 
to fight in WW I this way: “Farewell—and if thou livest or diest! Thy prospects are poor.” The Magic 
Mountain, trans. H. T. Lowe–Porter (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 714. 
111 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40/Section 7. 
112 Ibid. Nietzsche also says something very similar in “The Dionysiac World View,” Section 3. 
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There are many striking things about this passage. Most notably is Nietzsche’s inclusion 
of comedy along with tragedy as means by which human beings can affirm life and avert 
the succumbing of the will to the “supreme danger” of pessimism. Until this point 
comedy is mentioned mostly in passing. Indeed a certain genre of comedy, the 
historically later development of New Attic Comedy, is even held responsible for the 
disintegration of tragedy. And this had its roots in the plays of Euripides (and Socrates as 
his mentor) characterized by its pedestrian take on the affairs of the Greeks.113 
 Nonetheless, one is also struck by this passage because of its inclusion of comedy 
along with tragedy as an artistic means to such an end even though, as mentioned above, 
comedy receives much less scrutiny. For Nietzsche, one must conclude that if comedy is 
the other art that achieves the same end as tragedy, then it can not be seen as the 
disadvantaged flip side of tragedy. This is not to say that Nietzsche does not prize tragedy 
above comedy (and the other arts) due to its serious subject matter and its deep ties with 
music. Tragedy’s origin lies in the pre-cultural realm (of nature) in which the impulses 
had yet to be yoked. The deepest expression of this state lied in the music of the Satyr 
chorus, which is for Nietzsche the key element in any tragedy. The Satyr chorus is the 
unique expression of the Dionsyian. It is only when cultural structures have manifested 
themselves and civilization is well established that comedy can subsequently ridicule the 
excessiveness that quite often marks it. Thus tragedy is the antecedent groundlessness in 
which human beings are situated, and because of its ontological priority, is privileged. 
Whereas comedy, through its ridicule and laughter, is the later phenomenon that rebukes 
                                                 
113 Nietzsche contrasts New Attic Comedy with the Old Attic Comedy of Aristophanes. New Attic Comedy 
lacked mythical depth, and the Satyr chorus so crucial to tragedy and music, all but vanished. Instead, it 
became ordinary, “Bourgeois mediocrity” identified mostly with Euripides who, Nietzsche believes, the 
poets of New Attic Comedy revered. If one had to single out the most crucial aspect that New Attic 
Comedy was missing it would be the Dionysian element. 
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those who attempt to transcend this tragic status. What is clear though, for Nietzsche, is 
that great comedy stakes out its own rights in the transformative possibility of art and vie 
for that that space that pessimism would otherwise haunt.. The question becomes: How 
does comedy achieve this? 
 If we delve into this most profound passage even further, Nietzsche explains that 
whereas tragic art discloses the terrible through representations of the sublime, comic art 
on the other hand discloses disgust at the absurd through its artistic means. The 
Apollonian and Dionysian are both in operation for each art. The Apollonian, like a 
buffer between us and the Dionysian, allows for these respective arts to shine. But what 
are the artistic means that comedy utilizes and what exactly does Nietzsche mean by the 
absurd? At this point he does not say and his writing turns back to tragedy. 
 Nonetheless, what is evident is the connection Nietzsche makes between comedy 
and the absurd. The German and English words for absurd are almost equivalent 
(German, adj. “absurd,” n. “Absurdes”). In its modern usage absurd means “dissonant, 
out of tune, foolish.” In ancient Greek there are two words used for absurd. The retrieval 
of the Greek significance is relevant because it is the great comic playwright 
Aristophanes that Nietzsche has foremost in mind in terms of the genius of comedy, just 
as he has the ancient Greek tragedians, most notably Aeschylus, foremost in mind in 
terms of tragedy. 
 The first word for absurd is atopos that, in its Greek sense, discloses a far more 
profound meaning than its derivative, modern counterpart which usually identifies silly 
behavior or bad manners incongruous within a given setting. Here atopos, especially in 
its adverbial form (atopōs, “absurdly”), means “out of place.” Not simply out of place in 
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the sense that “the vase seems out of place on the table,” but more significantly that the 
usual, expected flow of phenomena in nature has been disturbed, even usurped to the 
point that things and appearances are convoluted and confused. It is as if the illusions one 
is unconsciously immersed in, although thought of as permanent, begin to fracture and 
strain under the weight of something alien. In other words when familiarity withdraws 
one is left dwelling in the absurd. 
 To help illustrate this we can locate two examples, one in Plato’s Republic and the 
second in Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human. In Plato’s Republic, in the critical section 
seven on the “cave-like dwelling”114 (katageiō oikēsei spēlaiōdei), that in essence is an 
image that Socrates and his interlocutors have created in the likeness of their education, 
this education takes on, at least initially, an absurd hue. After Socrates has brought forth 
the image of the cave-like dwelling with all of its features, Glaucon says, “It’s a strange 
(atopon) image, and strange (atopous) prisoners you’re telling of.” Then, in what 
Freydberg asserts are the most profound words uttered in the philosophical tradition (and 
I agree), Socrates says, “They’re like us”115 (Homoious hēmin). Atopon literally means 
“no place” and most commentators translate atopon as “strange” in that Glaucon’s initial 
reaction to the image of education that he is in the midst of undergoing is something he 
does not or can not yet recognize. In this sense, for Glaucon (and Socrates to the extent 
that he recognizes his own ignorance and does not claim to know) the image is absurd, 
not only for the reason just mentioned but also because education brings us up out of the 
cave and onto the level where we always assume we are. Glaucon and all the prisoners 
already believe themselves to be on the outside of the cave because they do not recognize 
                                                 
114 Plato, Republic, 514a 3-4. 
115 Ibid., 515a 4-5. 
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their own ignorance. Hence for Glaucon, Socrates’ image appears, at least initially, as 
absurd because everything familiar has withdrawn. Education and absurdity then are not 
mutually exclusive but appear as close kin. 
 In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche writes that the origin of the comic lies in the 
disruption of the expected flow of phenomena, that is, in what is normally expected: 
 If one considers that man was for many hundreds of thousands of years an animal 
 in the highest degree (im höchsten Grade) accessible to fear and that everything 
 sudden and unexpected bade him prepare to fight and perhaps die; that even later 
 on, indeed, in social relationships all security depended on the expected and 
 traditional in opinion and action (Erwarteten auf dem Herkommen in Meinung 
 und Thätigkeit beruhte); then one cannot be surprised if whenever something 
 sudden and unexpected in word and deed happens without occasioning danger or 
 injury man becomes wanton, passes over into the opposite of fear: the anxious 
 crouching creature springs up, greatly expands—man laughs (der Mensch lacht). 
 This transition from momentary anxiety to short-lived exuberance is called the 
 comic (Komische).116 
Here, Nietzsche not only connects the comic to the “unexpected in word and deed” but 
also to our social development over time. The comic has its roots in this disruption of the 
expected flow of phenomena coupled with the temporary loss of fear, which is why he is 
careful to point out that comic exuberance is “short-lived.” 
 The second Greek word for absurd is paralogos. Here we can derive even more 
insight. Literally paralogos means that which is set apart from the logos; the logos being 
the account of something that discloses what that something is. Thus paralogos means 
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“beyond calculation, an unexpected event contrary to calculation.” Paralogos is what 
outstrips reason or what occurs beyond the perceived occurrence of natural events. 
Exceeding them both, what is absurd is not amenable to calculation, quantification, or a 
purely rational understanding of something. As mentioned it is something akin to 
madness. And since madness is related to darkness just as reason is said to relate to light, 
inspired comedies arise out of this darkness clearing their own space as semblances of the 
absurd and excess that we subsequently take joy in. 
 Depending on one’s perspective, “clearing their own space” might mean viewing 
inspired comedies in Deleuzian terms as an “assemblage” that deterritorializes itself 
within a culture, on a stage with the actors (literally their bodies) and production 
providing the content and the dialogue and gestures providing the expression. Or, if one 
were to remain strictly within the Nietzschean purview of The Birth of Tragedy, then one 
might say that it is the “Titanic struggle” of the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses that 
clears its own space; the Apollonian on the one hand yoking the Dionysian yet allowing it 
to discharge itself in absurd, comic semblances. Regardless of one’s perspective, what is 
important is that these comic representations that people take pleasure in show them a 
world—their world—in absurd inverted splendor. 
 Nietzsche hints at this very understanding when he says of comedy in an early 
lecture (1874-75) titled, “History of Greek Literature” that, “It is grandiose caricature, an 
inverted world [eine verkehrte Welt], that the poet shows, sense and nonsense, reality and 
impossibility in absurd confusion.”117 Thus the ancient sense of absurd is a hodgepodge, 
a whirlwind of opposites in crazy confusion, a world in which the standard order of 
                                                 
117 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1995), II/5, 161. My translation. 
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things has been turned upside down, that is, inverted so that nature and life appear as if 
turned inside out. 
 Still, what begins to emerge at this point is something that exceeds a comedy 
simpliciter. A deep connection between the inverted world of ancient comedy and the 
inverted world as understood in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” 
examined above in the first section of the present chapter, becomes clearly evident. An 
inspired comedy’s power to affect us does not lie solely within its own parameters, that 
is, within the production and execution of the play itself. Its images of excess, always 
faithful to its Dionysian origins, overflow, interfacing with the world and people they are 
attempting to ridicule. A comedy’s nonsense would make no sense if it did not reference 
in its absurd way the wider world in which it is situated. One might agree on the level of 
this as trivially true: we and our world are reflected in the amplified, ridiculous images of 
comedy. However, philosophically speaking for Nietzsche, the world in which human 
beings are situated (at least we moderns) is the world in which traditionally understood 
truths have become (or is becoming) “a fable.” This is not trivial. It is, however, 
laughingly awesome. 
 How? What is the connection between the laughter of inspired comedy and the 
ongoing event in which the true world becomes a fable? What is it like? How ought one 
characterize it, if that is even possible? It certainly is a serious matter, perhaps the most 
serious of matters in that all the old points of reference that formerly grounded 
understanding and the very meaning of things no longer hold sway. What is left in the 
wake of such an event except an astonishing mixture of nihilism and freedom? And yet I 
assert as I believe Nietzsche does, that this serious matter has at its heart, or ought to 
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have at its heart, a comic playfulness. Just like Schmidt’s convincing account, in On 
Germans and Other Greeks, that ancient tragedy ought to play a role in our ethical life 
today, inspired comedy too ought to have its place in the pantheon of human ethical 
endeavors as well because, although it celebrates our absurdity it nonetheless in a ironic 
way, allows us to live nobly. Similar to the Socratic ignorance at the heart of every 
human breast, comedy never leaves us unfettered from our folly. 
 So, if Nietzsche is correct that the essence of comedy lies in the artistic 
representations by which one lives with disgust at the absurd, then what could be more 
absurd than to be in the historical midst of an inversion of meaning (or what is sometimes 
referred to in the grandiose sense as the end of metaphysics)? What would be more 
absurd than not only to be witness to such an event, but to be here as part of the event? 
Indeed this inverted world, which is perhaps the most serious philosophical matter of our 
time, is the world of “sense and nonsense, reality and impossibility in absurd 
confusion.”118 One need look no farther than the 20th century and its events as a perfect 
example. 
 The Italian film La vita è bella (Life is Beautiful),119 directed by Roberto Benigni 
provides us with just such an example. The film is largely autobiographical based on 
Benigni’s own experiences and, in addition to directing, he plays the lead protagonist 
Guido. The film, which possesses both tragic and comic elements, explores the way in 
which the lead character undergoes the ordeal of fascism and National Socialism in Italy 
during the Second World War. Guido, a Jew, his spouse Dora, a non-Jew, and their small 
child Giosué are rounded up and sent to a concentration camp (Dora demands to go in 
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order to remain with her family). After being separated by gender, Guido makes it his 
daily task to protect his son as best he can from the obvious physical dangers but also 
from the knowledge of the terror being perpetrated. In essence, Guido is the guardian of 
his son’s own consciousness. He does so by giving the appearance that the horrific 
circumstance they are in the midst of is a game. In a sense, this makes him an Apollonian 
figure appearing to his son in comedic ways in order to shield him from the terror and 
absurdity that surround them. Giosué, a personification of innocence, is not merely 
protected by his father from physical harm but from mental or spiritual harm as well. 
What becomes evident is that this protection often manifests itself through the play of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian impulses, as well as a powerful mixture of tragedy and 
comedy. 
 The film opens with the following monologue delivered by Guido’s friend, a poet. 
It is an echo of Nietzsche’s philosophy discussed thus far: 
 This is a simple story... 
 but not an easy one to tell. 
 Like a fable, there is sorrow... 
 and, like a fable, it is full of wonder and happiness. 
 I sing what I see. Nothing gets by me. 
 “Here I am,” said I to chaos. 
 “I am your slave!” And he: “Good.” 
 “For what?” said I. 
 Free in the end, I am! What good is a caress when bliss... 
 this man came to possess? 
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 Here I am, ready. 
 The trains are gone, the brakes are gone. 
 And I can resist no more. Go, sweet Bacchus, take me. 
Striking is that Benigni refers to the story he is about to relate concerning the Holocaust 
as a fable. The qualities and images this fable shares with Nietzsche’s philosophical 
aphorism, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” resonate deeply. In the 
manner of the inversion of meaning in Nietzsche’s piece examined above, Benigni’s film 
showcases this inversion in terms of the Holocaust. Guido has a simple but fulfilling life 
in pre-war Italy. And like the Apollonian principium individuationis, Guido daydreams 
about love, family, and friendship. The horizon of his world in a small town in Italy 
appears settled, stable, even eternal. But the arrival of Fascism and National Socialism 
succeed in dissolving this world’s tranquility much the same way a film fades to black. 
As a result, Guido and his family’s whole horizon of meaning is not just replaced or 
succeeded with a different form—their world is inverted. The horizon of Apollonian 
semblances that constituted Guido and his family’s peaceful world has been effaced, and 
what emerges is a world in which certain human beings were considered to no longer 
possess the intrinsic dignities that were ascribed to them. Instead, certain peoples were 
seen as objects to be dehumanized, reified and unfortunately, murdered. This inversion 
that Guido and his family find themselves immersed in, an inversion envisaged by certain 
20th century political, social and philosophical forces, can be described only as nihilistic. 
Thus Guido and his family are swept along in a movement from meaning to nothingness. 
There is no form. “The trains are gone, the brakes are gone.” Not even their suffering has 
meaning. There is only madness. 
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 The poet continues; “I sing what I see.” Giving himself over to chaos and 
Bacchus, the poet does not present a logical account or narrative. He sings what he sees, 
that is, like the flowing notes of music, the succession of beautiful appearances that 
dissolve into the abysmal truth of the Dionysian are most profoundly experienced as 
music. Specifically, it is musical dissonance. Widely used by Richard Wagner, 
dissonance in music is music that appears to dissolve time (literally to, “differ in sound,” 
from dis- “apart” + sonare “to sound”). What the poet sings is the dissolution of the 
beautiful, successive appearances in time, of his time before the chaos of war, into the 
timeless truth of the Dionysian primal unity (das Ur-eine). In other words, the poet’s 
images sound apart from the type of subjective, conscious time in which daily life is 
constituted. 
 The importance of music for both tragedy and comedy cannot be overstated. Both 
utilized the chorus, that phenomenon that Nietzsche says was indicative of that 
primordial state of nature. However, Nietzsche is clear that the “origin” of tragedy is not 
in time, in the sense that it is neither a historical period for example, “the tragedies of 
Sophocles in 468 BCE” nor a production itself for example, “a performance of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet by the Pittsburgh Public Theater.” Although Nietzsche does not 
overtly utilize the genealogical method in The Birth of Tragedy, which will become so 
prominent in later writings, premonitions of this method begin to appear such as attested 
to above concerning the beginnings of tragedy that lie in desire, delight, and madness. 
Tragedy along with its correlate comedy were, Nietzsche argues, at least to a large part, 
what allowed the Greeks to live in the face of their cruel existence. This is why Nietzsche 
refers to both music and birth in his title. The origin—and this use of origin is only done 
 75
in a very qualified sense in that inspired tragedy and comedy does not refer to anything 
like a Platonic original—is a birth out of musical dissonance that allowed the individual 
to experience the very Dionysian force that would otherwise annihilate him or her. This is 
precisely why Schmidt characterizes musical dissonance as “music of passage”: 
 True music for Nietzsche—music which, like the tragic work of art to which it 
 gives birth, opens up the experience of suffering—is the music of passage. And 
 true music, which does not give comfort to such suffering, does not plaster over 
 the irreconcilability at work in time, is the music of dissonance.120 
 And much like the poet who sings, Nietzsche declares in section three of the 
preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy published years later that, “It ought 
to have sung, this ‘new soul,’ and not talked! What a pity it is that I did not dare to say 
what I had to say at that time as a poet.”121 In other words, Nietzsche is asserting that he 
should have let the Dionysian, which is essentially musical, present itself more in line 
with its essential nature:122 a dissonant nature possessing the Stimmung of incompleteness 
or the Unheimlich feeling of not being at home. To be sure, Nietzsche treats the 
phenomenon of the Dionysian in terms of musical dissonance as well stating: 
 [T]his difficult, primal phenomenon of Dionysiac art can be grasped in a uniquely 
 intelligible and direct way in the wonderful significance of musical dissonance 
 [musikalischen Dissonanz]; as indeed music generally is the only thing which, 
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 when set alongside the world, can illustrate [geben kann] what is meant by the 
 justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon.123 
Here we see a close kinship with the more modern understanding of the absurd as 
“dissonant” and “out of tune,” just as the Holocaust itself was dissonant and out of tune, 
especially taking into account the inherited European continent’s philosophical, 
scientific, and cultural legacy.124 But how are we to understand the Holocaust in terms of 
“an aesthetic phenomenon” let alone posing the question of whether or not it is 
“justifiable”? 
 If one were to take “aesthetic phenomenon” in a very narrow sense, a sense much 
more restricted than Nietzsche’s understanding, then “aesthetic” would be limited to 
something that appears to sense, that is, that the subject is able to experience. In this case 
“aesthetic” would be understood to meet the conditions set forth in the Critique of Pure 
Reason of Immanuel Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic (space as the form of outer 
intuition and time as the form of inner intuition). The Holocaust certainly was a 
phenomenon that appeared to the sense experience of those who endured it. As an 
historical event, it had its own time and space from which it unfolded. Those who had the 
direct experience of it, if they survived, have first and foremost their memory that keeps 
the event near. In posterity, we too are able to experience it even if our experience is 
removed and more distant. Many of us have seen the films and photos of the atrocities, 
visited museums or even concentration camps where the images are what hold us out into 
this event, which is to say, into this nihilistic nightmare so that we are surrounded by its 
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impact and possess its memory in this way. But is this the kind of aesthetic phenomenon 
and justification Nietzsche is referring to? 
 Nietzsche’s understanding of “aesthetic phenomenon” is qualitatively different. 
By stating that the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon, Nietzsche is 
asking, “How are we as human, all too human, to justify a world with a tremendous 
amount of suffering”? Nietzsche was not alive when the Holocaust unfolded. Nonetheless 
it would surely qualify as a supreme example of the kind of suffering human beings have 
endured. Nietzsche’s question is how do we come to terms with this kind of suffering? 
How do we own up to it authentically? Does this happen through rationality and science? 
Does one understand the full impact of the holocaust by quantifying it? For example, X 
amount of Jews perished. Is the full gravity of this event felt by undertaking a 
comprehensive list of the “science” that accounted for the many ways of suffering and 
death? A listing of all the kinds of technē used to commit these atrocities? Undoubtedly, 
seeing the Holocaust through a rational, scientific lens does play a role but it is a role that 
has a limited measure and thus only extends so far as that measure allows. A full coming 
to grips, if that is even possible, must be through an experience of art because it is 
precisely the Dionysian that can not be measured. It is the measure—an abysmal 
measure. Hence the Apollonian, Dionysian and our dissonant nature leads Schmidt to 
assert their connection to Nietzsche’s pronouncement on an aesthetically justified 
existence: 
 The dissonant nature that each of us is is too shattering to bear unadorned. But, 
 we find this same dissonance to be the source of our capacity to make art, to 
 create that which widens the realm of the bearable by means of a splendid 
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 illusion. The plasticity of such a dissonant nature, its capacity to see itself in a 
 transfiguring mirror, is owing to the same lively dissonance which makes art 
 necessary if life is to be justified: ‘It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
 existence and the world appears as justified.’ But this abysmal truth—this truth 
 without stable foundation, without a secure ground—would destroy us if it were 
 not for the Apollonian power of transfiguration which enables this elemental 
 Dionysian ground of the world to enter consciousness in measures that can, 
 almost, be grasped.125 
 Returning to the event of the Holocaust we see that it presents us with grotesque, 
macabre images. Nietzsche’s understanding of aesthetic phenomenon justifying the 
world, however, is done through the transfiguration of these terrible events through art, 
especially music, tragedy and comedy. Thus it is not the Holocaust itself in concreto that 
one would say is an aesthetic phenomenon in Nietzsche’s sense. It is the transfiguration 
of this event through an artistic representation of it that, in turn, transforms the spectator. 
This is why Nietzsche refers to an experience of tragedy as a primal contradiction—it 
transfigures our suffering into joy, our individualized ego into the primal unity of all 
things, and in terms of comedy, the absurd into provocative laughter. 
 Returning to Benigni’s film, what is perhaps the most astonishing aspect of 
Benigni’s film is the comic aspect of it that is situated at the heart of this horrific event. 
Guido, of course, becomes well aware of what is taking place. To help maintain his son’s 
innocence, Guido presents him with purely Apollonian images meant to veil the terrors at 
hand. Through mimetic representation of the guards, Guido mocks their movements and 
language. When the guards charge into the prisoner’s barracks and demand a translator, 
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Guido volunteers and proceeds to comically (mis)represent their words to his son and the 
other captives much to their quiet amusement. At one point Guido hides his son. Looking 
out at the camp courtyard from a sweatbox, Giosué watches his father mock the guards 
specifically and National Socialism generally; as he is being marched away he winks at 
his son and then engages in an exaggerated goosestep much to the subdued laughter of 
his child. Perhaps the most astonishing example of the comic workings of the Apollonian 
and Dionysian impulses occurs when Guido is carrying his son in his arms around the 
camp on a foggy night. Invoking Apollonian images, some even comic, Guido soothes 
his tired son: 
 Where are we here? 
 I might have taken the wrong way. 
 Good boy, sleep. Dream sweet dreams. 
 Maybe it’s only a dream! 
 We’re dreaming, Giosué. 
 Tomorrow morning Mommy will come wake us up... 
 and bring us two nice cups of milk and cookies. 
 First, we’ll eat. 
 Then I’ll make love to her two or three times... 
 if I can. 
These words provide the soothing veil of Apollonian images protecting his son from what 
is most terrible. Even Guido appears to calm himself as he speaks these words, 
“daydreaming” about better days to come as if he were enacting his own principium 
individuationis. It is at this point in the film, with his sleeping child in his arms, Guido 
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rounds a corner in the midst of the fog and sees an enormous pile of emaciated dead 
bodies, the gravity of what is taking place imaged grotesquely before him. The 
Apollonian semblances that Guido invokes dissolve, just as life has dissolved from the 
shrunken dark faces of these once unique voices, so that he comes face to face with the 
Dionysian. Only the innocence and survival of his child allows Guido to take comfort in 
the knowledge that joyful existence will always be reborn and come back from 
destruction. Shortly thereafter Guido is killed but Giosué and Dora survive having been 
shielded temporarily from the evil around him. 
 What will allow the young Giosué to bear what he will surely come to know as he 
matures? How could one bear this? Maybe silence is what is called for,...or that calls. But 
perhaps as Giosué looks back he will be able to live with the terror and knowledge of the 
absurd by recollecting his father’s comic appreciation of the event. In other words, there 
is hope that his spirit will not be destroyed, or to put it in the language of Dionysian 
danger discussed above, he will not remain lethargic. He will be able to act because of the 
comic representations of his father who showed that we are all an audience for one 
another. Just as Roberto Benigni’s real father had done years earlier, this is what Giosué’s 
father has hopefully accomplished for his son in the film. Indeed the closing lines of the 
film more than hint at this comic appreciation: 
 This is my story. 
 This is the sacrifice my father made. 
 This was his gift tome. 
 —We won! —Yes, We won! 
 A thousand points to laugh like crazy about! 
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 We came in first! We’re taking the tank home! 
 We won! 
For us, this art in the form of a tragic-comic film can purvey its provocative 
representations in order that we live in joy and be capable at times of laughing in the face 
of what is monstrous. The Holocaust is certainly not humorous, but through the eyes of 
comedy there reverberates moments of laughter that defy this human catastrophe. Far 
from being the permanently opposite sides of the same pole, tragedy and comedy can 
maintain close proximity to one another. Indeed the pole seems to bend and their 
boundaries can on occasion blur, just as the two masks of Dionysus play in their 
respective ways at the concealment/unconcealment of what is abysmal. 
 Returning to the notion of absurdity in its Greek sense, we can begin to see in the 
midst of this inversion the very movement and setting apart that which exceeds logos. 
Logos in its ancient sense was that which allowed something to be made manifest through 
speech. This meaning of logos126 that has now been layered and sedimented by 
succeeding philosophical epochs—an account in speech, something divine, ratio, ground, 
reason—has now begun to lose its hold and no longer possesses the authority at this late 
stage to make manifest what it would otherwise attempt to elucidate. What is left in this 
wake, what would this wake be at least initially if not atopos or paralogos? It is an event 
beyond calculation and reason, and even contrary to both. To be in the midst of this 
inverted world is to be in a whirlwind without ground; it is being in a world that can not 
be made manifest by appeal to the old hierarchy via more metaphysico. As such, things 
surely would appear strange, dissonant, and “out of place.” It would be a world of 
                                                 
126 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962), Section 7 for a thorough account of logos. 
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absurdity and even madness but also, I strongly suggest, fertile ground for humor and 
comedy as well as an ethical sensibility that nurtures these elements. 
 Recalling what Nietzsche says is the role of art, that it “can re-direct those 
repulsive thoughts about the...absurd nature of existence into representations with which 
man can live,”127 comedies are what allow for just this type of discharge. Great comic 
representations, like their tragic counterparts, allow human beings to comically behold 
themselves amidst the absurdity they are often immersed in. The representations in great 
and inspired comedies allow for a movement that distances us, perhaps only temporarily, 
from the very situations that give rise to the art forms and their representations in the first 
place even though we always find ourselves here, being with others as if shadows in a 
cave, and always entangled in some degree in our own absurdities. 
 If we return once again to the passage above from the critical section seven of The 
Birth of Tragedy, we see that Nietzsche is making one of his most profound points, 
namely that art is that phenomenon that allows human beings not merely to endure life, to 
“get through it,” but to affirm even the harshest suffering by saying “yes to life.” Art in 
its deepest sense, especially in the form of music, tragedy, and comedy, allows us to 
forego ressentiment: a ressentiment that aims not only at an individual or a collection of 
individuals but, as Nietzsche details in the first book of On the Genealogy of Morality, at 
life itself. “I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking 
away be my only negation!”128 he says in The Gay Science. The sublime and absurd 
mimetic representations of art rescue the subject from resignation. Instead of a defeated 
will, a resigned will, art showcases the will transfigured. It is the will “saved” and thus 
                                                 
127 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40/Section 7. 
128 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 157/Aphorism 276. 
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able to behold itself transformed. As Nietzsche states, the human being “is no longer an 
artist, he has become a work of art [Kunstwerk geworden].”129 
 But this raises an interesting question, then, about the seeming contradictory 
nature of tragedy and comedy and their relationship to Dionysian truth. If both, through 
their respective approaches, allow for a glimpse into the terrible Dionysian abyss, then in 
what way can the Dionysian be both comical and terrible at the same time? In other 
words, if we are to accept prima facie that tragedy is terrible and its experience allows a 
glimpse of the Dionysian, in what way is this same terribleness often laughter provoking? 
Does not the logical principle of non-contradiction invalidate this claim?130 What does 
Nietzsche see as comedic about what is also obviously terrible such as the Holocaust 
example above? Keeping in mind the fact that Dionysus is the patron of both tragedy and 
comedy, does this mean that the Dionysian suffers a rupture or, more to the point, suffers 
a schism? Does the original Duplizität of the Apollonian and Dionysian undergo a further 
split within the Dionysian itself? A tragi-comic split where the representations of tragedy 
and the representations of comedy seem to hover between the deep primordial truth of the 
Dionysian and their respective appearances as Schein? 
 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche does not elaborate on this possible bifurcation. 
However in an unpublished work titled “The Dionysiac World View,”131 he does 
recognize and attempts to adjudicate this issue when he states: 
                                                 
129 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 18/Section 1. 
130 In his Metaphysics Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction states that, “the same attribute cannot at the 
same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect” (1005b 19-20), and “that 
contradictory statements are not at the same time true.” (1011b 13-14) 
131 Nietzsche “The Dionysiac World View” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. “The Dionysiac 
World View” (1870) was a precursor to The Birth of Tragedy. Both contain much of the same text with 
some differences such as what is being elaborated here. 
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 The sublime and the comical [das Lächerliche] are a step beyond the world of 
 beautiful semblance, for a contradiction is felt [Widerspruch empfunden] in both 
 concepts. On the other hand, they are in no sense identical with truth; they cast a 
 veil [Umschleierung] over truth, which, although it is more transparent than 
 beauty, nevertheless remains a veil.132 
What actual tragic and comic presentations accomplish then is a play that occurs in what 
Nietzsche refers to as a “middle world” (Mittelwelt) between the beautiful Apollonian 
semblances and the monstrous truth of the Dionysian.133 It is the effect of intoxication by 
which one hovers between these realms. Nietzsche stresses that as a spectator to inspired 
tragic and comic art, we are witness, in the deepest sense of that word, to “Dionysiac man 
as he is played. He seeks to emulate his model in the emotional upheaval of the sublime 
or of laughter.”134 This play with intoxication and semblance that constitute the art form, 
“saved the Greeks from clear-sighted, prophetic ecstasy and revulsion at existence—
through the work of art which embodied tragic-comical thought.”135 
 In philosophy especially one is quite often tempted to focus solely on the logical 
validity of an argument, position or explanation, such as the one Nietzsche provides that 
considers the nature of the Dionysian as it relates to the two seemingly contradictory 
semblances of tragedy and comedy. Yet, in Nietzsche’s view, for something such as the 
Dionysian to be thought of as both sublime and comic, that is, as both tragic and laughter 
                                                 
132 Ibid., 130/Section 3. 
133 As difficult as it is to characterize something like “the Dionysian” nonetheless it is often described as 
monstrous (ungeheure–Nietzsche’s term in The Birth of Tragedy). John Sallis in Crossings: Nietzsche and 
the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) as well as Thomas Mann in Death in 
Venice use the term “monstrous” to describe this phenomenon and Dennis Schmidt in the “Nietzsche” 
section of his On Germans and Other Greeks rightly insists on the term monstrous over Walter 
Kaufmann’s translation of “powerful.” 
134 Nietzsche “The Dionysiac World View” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 130/Section 3. 
135 Ibid., 130-31/Section 3. 
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provoking is not a failing of logic, that is, of failing in this case to apply the principle of 
non-contradiction. Nor is it a failure of rationality or a short-sightedness on Nietzsche’s 
part. It is the vagaries of life outstripping rational and logical approaches that would 
otherwise attempt to understand and correct it.136 As Nietzsche will come to say in the 
roundelay section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “The world is deep, / And deeper than the 
grasp of day. / Deep is its pain –, / Joy – deeper still than misery.”137 The “grasp of day,” 
that is, daylight, the sun, the light of reason that would potentially disclose what 
something is no longer provides the measure. Indeed these things are measured by that 
which is both deeply painful and joyful yet beyond measure. In a word—Dionysian. 
 So we see that this supposed bifurcation at the heart of the Dionysian is really the 
expression of the human being’s essential condition. The condition is one’s desire to 
come to grips with suffering and a harsh existence by being called back to the primal 
unity of the Dionysian through the sublime or comic arts that justify life. Yet in the very 
undergoing of this event, one’s very individuation, like the god himself, is torn asunder. 
So, it is as if this pole of the Dionysian is not constituted by opposites, that is, two 
extremes occupying separate ends of the same pole, but instead the pole itself is not 
fixed. It is flexible in the sense that tragedy and comedy in their autonomous ways allow 
this Dionysian pole to bend so that its ends touch or at least come into close proximity 
with each other within the nature of the Dionysian itself. The Apollonian impulse in the 
form of tragedy and comedy allow for a play within the middle world between the 
                                                 
136 In terms of the principle of non-contradiction Babich asserts that “Nietzsche’s reflection on art and truth 
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Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, 2-3. 
137 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 184/“The Other Dance Song.” 
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terrible truth of the Dionsyian and the veil that allows us to affirm this truth and thus live 
in the face of it. 
 In The Birth of Tragedy the transformed will, through the saving power of art, is 
saved from pessimism. As we saw above Nietzsche’s overall view is characterized as a 
tragic view, that is, a view in which we have only a narrow perspective on the world and 
all absolutes or meta positions are called into radical questioning. And one of Nietzsche’s 
goals is to affirm life through the sublimity of tragedy or the comic discharge of the 
absurd in the face of this tragic view which facilitated Nietzsche’s break from the 
pessimism of Schopenhauer. But Nietzsche also saw the danger to this affirmation in 
another, opposite extreme. This is characterized by the overly optimistic outlook of the 
Apollonian impulse that leaves the realm of art and locates itself in the satisfied, blinding 
optimism of science and that which can be made intelligible. In The Birth of Tragedy this 
impulse is exemplified by a singular figure named Socrates. 
 
 
III. The Threat to Dionysian Affirmation: A New Daimon 
 
 Philosophers seek the truth. How “truth” is defined is surely a contentious issue 
among these seekers. Nonetheless it is widely held that Socrates was one of truth’s 
greatest devotees. Socrates always sought the best logos that accounted for what 
something was. For example the question, “What is piety?” is examined in the 
Euthyphro. Socrates implores Euthyphro to tell him, not an instance or act of piety, but 
what piety is in itself. Likewise the question at the heart of the Symposium, in which the 
 87
interlocutors partake in excessive wine drinking (although Socrates is the only one that 
maintains his sobriety), is “What is love (eros)?” The question turns within the room as it 
is addressed by each interlocutor and then turns “upward” with Socrates’ account of 
disembodied love as it was told to him by Diotima. The great comic playwright 
Aristophanes is also an interlocutor in this dialogue. His participation is humorous for a 
number of reasons, including his first attempt at an account in logos, which he postpones 
due to having the hiccups! It is only near the end of this dialogue when “beautiful bodied 
Alcibiades” raucously enters that a descent from disembodied love to images and the 
earth is restored. 
 For Nietzsche, Socrates is emblematic of something fateful in the history of the 
West. This fate essentially revolves around the notion of instinct and its discharge. 
Nietzsche argues that, prior to Socrates, most notably in the works of the great tragedians 
such as Aeschylus, the instincts were given an outlet. These instincts included both those 
of the individual and culture as a whole. Because the word “instinct” has been 
appropriated by many academic disciplines, perhaps it is best if we always keep in mind 
Nietzsche’s characterization and use the term “Dionysian.” For Nietzsche, Socrates 
represents the turn away from the primordial experience of the Dionysian, especially as 
experienced through tragic-comic art, towards only that which can be made intelligible. 
To be sure, Nietzsche is clear about the peril the Dionysian faced in terms of this new 
agōn stating, “This is the new opposition: the Dionysiac versus the Socratic, and the work 
of art that once was Greek tragedy was destroyed by it.”138 To once again appropriate 
Nietzsche’s characterization, we ought to say that the Dionysian impulse was all but 
vanquished from the tragic-comic stage and Greek life in overwhelming favor of the 
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Apollonian impulse, an impulse that, in its disproportion, furthered a certain naiveté 
about life in general and science in particular. Hence forth Dionysian monstrousness was 
no longer merely veiled by Apollonian illusion but dominated by it. There are multiple 
consequences of this turn by Socrates to the intelligible and the reverberations are still 
felt today. But for Nietzsche, as much as tragedy’s apparent downfall is itself tragic, it 
also presents us with those laughter provoking elements that, for instance, Aristophanes 
magnified with his unsurpassed comedic genius. 
 But caution is in order here. Nietzsche is often characterized as a Dionysian 
philosopher, that is, as a philosopher who “demolishes” older worn systems in favor of 
the “rebirth” or the will to new knowledge. This characterization certainly rings true and 
is even carried on by certain postmodernist philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. Both emphasize the destruction and rebirth through the process of their absolute 
deterritorialization model, and Michel Foucault’s notion of discursive practices which are 
the genesis of new knowledge and power relationships. However, to say that Nietzsche is 
“anti” Apollonian is false. Nietzsche’s appreciation of the Apollonian is rooted in its very 
necessity. Such is Nietzsche’s pronouncement, “And behold! Apollo could not live 
without Dionysos. The ‘Titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ was ultimately just as much of a necessity 
as the Apolline!”139 
 We must always keep in mind two important things concerning Nietzsche’s view 
of the Apollonian. First, as it was explained above, the Apollonian is what allows us to 
live in the face of Dionysian terror. The Apollonian veil that shrouds the Dionysian is a 
necessary shroud lest we resign ourselves to inaction and lethargy. In essence, we can 
characterize the Apollonian as the very illusions that give rise to motion and hence 
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action. Second, Nietzsche himself is very clear about the necessity of the Apollonian and 
its yoking to the Dionysian. The Apollonian illusion, in the form of tragedy and comedy, 
is the veil that human beings cast over the Dionysian in the form of beautiful semblance 
(all inspired art in general), allowing for the very discharge of the terrible truths of that 
deity. To use Nietzsche’s words, “the power of the epic-Apolline is so extraordinary that, 
thanks to the delight in semblance and release through semblance which it imparts, it 
casts a spell over even the most terrifying things before our very eyes.”140 All in all, it is 
too simplistic to say that Nietzsche is exclusively Dionysian and Socrates is exclusively 
Apollonian. 
 But what then of Nietzsche’s criticism of Socrates? This criticism that levels the 
charge that the Socratic pursuit of truth is Apollonian in nature and thus dangerous to the 
instincts. In what way is the Apollonian in its Socratic form a danger for Nietzsche, 
always keeping in mind though, Nietzsche’s assertion that the Apollonian is a necessity 
for life as well? 
 Socrates, too, revels in his own Apollonian illusions. These illusions revolve 
around the idea that beauty and the purely intelligible share a kindred relationship. 
Nietzsche’s reading of Socrates and Plato, a reading that surely can be challenged, is one 
in which images, the mimetic or those things that appear on the lower part of the divided 
line, as it appears at the end of Book Six of the Republic, are held in a sort of contempt. 
For Nietzsche, Socrates represents a new aesthetics that replaces the kind of aesthetics 
that the world (more specifically the Greek world) up until this time justified it. Instead of 
an aesthetics in which the Apollonian and Dionysian were engaged in a fruitful and 
perpetual agōn, each needing the other, the overbearing dialectical frenzy of Socrates 
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banished the Dionysian from the Greek stage and wider culture. For Nietzsche, the result 
was a new monstrousness, one that replaced the abysmal monstrousness of the Dionysian. 
Nietzsche refers to this new phenomenon as “aesthetic Socratism” that he characterizes in 
the following way: 
 We can therefore now get closer to the nature of aesthetic Socratism 
 [aesthetischen Sokratismus], whose supreme law runs roughly like this: ‘In order 
 to be beautiful [schön], everything must be reasonable [verständig]’—a 
 sentence formed in parallel to Socrates’ dictum that ‘Only he who knows 
 [Wissende] is virtuous.’141 
For Nietzsche, aesthetic Socratism signifies a paradigm shift away from the beauty and 
freedom of shining images as they appear, to Socratic beauty that is only beautiful when 
it comes under the teleological pull of dialectic and reason. In essence, for something to 
be beautiful it must first be given form and structure by its participation in the intelligible 
eidē. Individual instances of beauty as that which appears to us, that which shines, plays 
second fiddle to the form (eidos) they participate in. A conventional reading of Plato and 
Socrates even asserts that tragedies and comedies are a copy of a copy (the mimēsis of 
others and nature) and thus even more removed from not only the forms, but from images 
as they are themselves. 
 What does this mean in terms of Nietzsche’s focus on instinct and, moreover, as 
something fateful for all of Western thinking? What could it have to do with anything 
comic? Until Socrates, great tragedies allowed the Dionysian impulse an outlet. The 
barbaric was indeed allowed to expel itself. What was monstrous shined forth in and 
through the Apollonian. With the advent of Socrates and his “tools,” such as dialectic and 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 62/Section 12. 
 91
elenchus, the Dionysian all but disappeared into its own abyss. What dialectic, for 
example, does in and through its very practice is distance oneself from the original 
manifestation of shining images. When one thinks dialectically one traverses the divided 
line away from an image that is manifest in space and time to the non-temporal form. 
Thus both the Apollonian and Dionysian achieve their own respective respite from time 
but in two wholly different ways. Whereas the Dionysian is allowed a voice in and 
through music, dissonance, and tragic-comic art that dissolves individualism and 
reconciles the spectator back to primal unity (das Ur-eine), the Apollonian moves in a 
wholly different direction. How? To reiterate, dialectic and elenchus are deliberative and 
as such they function as a movement of thought. As a consequence, thought, through its 
movement, tends to withdraw us from our existential condition. This requirement of 
something so strongly reflective undermines instinct that, by definition, seeks no reason 
to act but simply acts on a quick, intuitive insight. In essence, this perversion of instinct 
allows for one, a devaluing of sensory perception and two, an exiling and forgetting of 
the Dionysian oblivion that lies at the heart of all human beings. In Daybreak Nietzsche 
speaks to this devaluing when he says in aphorism 43, “The many forces that now have to 
come together in the thinker”: 
 To abstract oneself from sensory perception (Sich dem sinnlichen Anschauen zu 
 entfremden), to exalt oneself to contemplation of abstraction—that was at one 
 time actually felt as exaltation (Erhebung gefühlt worden): we can no longer quite 
 enter into this feeling. To revel in pallid images of words and things, to sport with 
 such invisible, inaudible, impalpable beings, was, out of contempt for the 
 sensorily tangible (Verachtung der sinnlich tastbaren), seductive and evil world, 
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 felt as a life in another higher world. ‘These abstracta are certainly not seductive, 
 but they can offer us guidance!’—with that one lifted oneself upwards. It is not 
 the content of these sportings of spirituality, it is they themselves which 
 constituted ‘the higher life’ in the prehistoric ages of science. Hence Plato’s 
 admiration for dialectics (Bewunderung der Dialektik) and his enthusiastic belief 
 that dialectics necessarily pertained to the good, unsensory man (guten 
 entsinnlichten Menschen).142 
 Moreover, the movement to purely Apollonian images constitutes for Nietzsche a 
surely pleasurable experience but one that dwells in untruth (what Nietzsche refers to in 
The Birth of Tragedy as the “naive in art”143). This impulse devoid of its Dionysian 
counterpart, distances us and removes us from what is otherwise terrible. For Nietzsche 
this harbors its own danger to the extent that we today, with our overwhelming allegiance 
to science and technology, have forgotten that the Apollonian is pure illusion. In other 
words, we believe the illusions to be real. And when we forget that illusion is illusion we 
dwell in naive optimism. 
 Nietzsche is clear about this movement to purely Apollonian form, begun with 
Socrates, when he states early in The Birth of Tragedy that, “the image of Apollo must 
also contain that delicate line [zarte Linie] which the dream-image may not overstep if its 
effect is not to become pathological, so that, in the worst case, the semblance [der Schein] 
would deceive us as if it were crude reality.”144 For Nietzsche this effect has become 
pathological to the point that the play of imagination and the freedom of the image in the 
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form of art to shine has been coerced into another kind of monstrosity so that “art 
becomes overgrown [überwächst] with philosophical thought which forces it to cling 
tightly to the trunk of dialectics. The Apolline tendency has  disguised itself as logical 
schematism [logischen Schematismus].”145 Dialectic is akin to a powerful opiate that not 
only removes us from the pain of existence but crowns us with the good feeling that we 
have arrived at all that truly counts—disembodied intelligible knowledge absent of any 
sensible shining. 
 Nietzsche’s mention of dialectics surely means that he has Plato and Socrates in 
mind and even Hegel. And although he does not explicitly refer to Kant in this passage, 
nonetheless the reference to “logical schematism” indicates this crucial function as found 
in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The emphasis on the logical schematism is what 
allows meaning or sense to be given to the pure concepts of the understanding. Indeed, 
the schematism is the nexus that bridges both sense and understanding. However, the 
logical schematism is a function of the imagination that is antecedent to any meaning in 
that it is the very fertile operation that is generative of any significance whatsoever and is 
itself without ground.146 Kant says of the imagination that it, “is a blind but indispensable 
function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which 
we are conscious only very rarely.”147 Likewise, the schematism which itself is driven by 
the imagination is accorded the same profound depth. Kant says of it that, “This 
schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their 
mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true 
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stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves.”148 
Kant, who is at pains to put metaphysics on a secure footing, to lay bare the mechanisms 
and functions by which the human being can say with certainty that true knowledge has 
been attained betrays the fact that there lies within the “depths of the human soul” 
something that is unaccountable, something abysmal and without ground from which all 
being arises. This, what I would call a dark poetic source, is what led Heidegger to 
declare that Kant “recoiled [zurück] in the face of this unknown root.”149 Far from a 
secure foundation, the linchpin of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (indeed his other two 
Critiques as well!) is something we are conscious of “only rarely” and that we “hardly 
ever divine from nature.” 
 Nietzsche’s assertion above, recast in terms of the Apollonian and Dionysian 
impulses, highlights the fact that, since the excision of the Dionysian, the overwhelming 
tendency has been the emphasis on the purely uninstinctual Apollonian which has cast a 
veil of naive illusion over life. The illusion that science, dialectic, reason or the 
intelligible are symptoms of a certain type of life denies pessimism and the truth as 
Nietzsche says in the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy. These things 
however, in the end, answer to something much more fundamental. Hence Nietzsche is 
clear that, “all those things which we now call culture, education, civilization must some 
day appear before the judge Dionysos whom no man can deceive.”150 
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 For Nietzsche the consequence of such an Apollonian drive exemplified by 
Socrates has not only inverted “the wisdom of instinct” and turned it against itself but he 
does so under the assumption that existence can and needs to be corrected: 
 ‘Only by instinct’: the phrase goes to the heart and centre of the Socratic 
 tendency. With these words Socratism condemns existing [bestehende] art and 
 existing ethics in equal measure; wherever it directs its probing gaze, it sees a lack 
 of insight and the power of delusion [Macht des Wahns], and it concludes from 
 this lack that what exists is inwardly wrong and objectionable. Socrates believed 
 that he was obliged to correct [corrigieren] existence...”151 
At the heart of this “correction” was the belief that existence is ultimately understandable 
and comprehensible. Unlike the Dionysian counterpart, which is truly without ground and 
thus abysmal, Nietzsche’s claim is that Socrates and Plato work in the opposite direction 
and revel in the Apollonian serenity that results from tracing “the thread of 
causality...into the deepest abysses of being.”152 This tracing to first cause or that which is 
in-itself (the eidē) represented the highest participation in truth for Socrates and Plato. 
Indeed, dialectical thinking that strives for understanding the form of something was not 
merely a whimsical mental exercise for Socrates. Nietzsche is quite clear that it was 
meant to correct and even justify existence; an existence that for Nietzsche, needed no 
correcting and the very assumption that one sees a problem with life is “in-itself” a sign 
of delusion and decay. This leads Nietzsche to state in a public lecture given in 1870 at 
Basel University about Socratism, “For the infinitely more profound Germanic 
consciousness, Socratism appears [erscheint] as an altogether inverted world [verkehrte 
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Welt].”153 Much like the inverted world of comedy that exploits the absurdity on display 
within it, Socratism too is an accurate manifestation of the inverted world exhibited in 
“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” but with the ominous consequence of 
arriving at its own limit. 
 Consider how many times in the Platonic dialogues that dialectic led to the 
successful correction of existence. Half the time? A quarter of the time? Quite the 
contrary, in almost every case the eidē themselves were unattainable. Was a new and just 
republic founded by Glaucon and Adeimantus after the dialogue of the same name was 
written by Plato? Better still, did Plato help found a new republic when he went to 
Syracuse? Was the form of piety found by Socrates and Euthyphro so that Euthyphro may 
have acted wisely proffering a correction to existence? Or might we say that dialectic, 
although useful, has limits and its usefulness could be in the recognition of limits. Might 
not the “music-making” Socrates, which is to say the redeemed Socrates that Nietzsche 
appreciates, have been “redeeming” himself all along in the Phaedo (perhaps in all of the 
dialogues?) when he says what is in my view the crucial passage after all of the 
arguments for the immortality of the soul are explored and after telling the myth of the 
earth: 
 No sensible man would insist (diischurisasthai) that these things are as I have 
 described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is 
 a noble one (kalos gar ho kindunos)—that this, or something like this, is true 
 about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, 
 and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I 
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 have been prolonging my tale (mēkunō ton muthon). That is the reason why a man 
 should be of good cheer (tharrein chrē) about his own soul,...154 
Keeping in mind Nietzsche’s penchant for risk taking it would appear here that Socrates’ 
very nobility lies not with his actual arguments about whether the soul is immortal or not, 
which is to say their logical construct, but instead with the logos and the myth itself. The 
telling of stories at the limit of logic “as if they were an incantation” is the noble act and 
one whose result is cheerfulness. 
 The same goes for the Socratic-Apolline legacy of science. Nietzsche argues that 
although science (Wissenschaft) appears to move us closer to truth, in essence science 
ends up delimiting its own function. The accounts of science are no doubt impressive and 
scientific advances have alleviated many human ills (and one must also keep in mind that 
Nietzsche is not “anti-science”), but this impressiveness stems in part from the more and 
more refined explanations of things, and hair-splitting distinctions. In the end, science 
reaches its limit and the secrets to existence remain concealed from our type of being—a 
human, all too human being. In Nietzsche’s words: 
 At present, however, science, spurred on by its powerful delusion [kräftigen 
 Wahne], is hurrying unstoppably to its limits, where the optimism hidden in the 
 essence of logic will founder and break up….logic curls up around itself at these 
 limits and finally bites its own tail, then a new form of knowledge breaks through, 
 tragic knowledge [die tragische Erkenntniss], which, simply to be endured, needs 
 art for shelter and as a cure [als Schutz und Heilmittel die Kunst braucht].155 
                                                 
154 Plato, Phaedo, 114d. 
155 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 75/Section 15. I slightly modified the last line of this translation using 
“shelter” instead of “protection” for Schutz and “cure” instead of “medicine” for Heilmittel. 
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As the optimism of science flounders, as our belief in science begins to flounder, we 
come to realize in the deepest sense that we need images of a different kind, we need 
images of art as well as thinkers who think not merely analytically but poetically. In “The 
Culture of Science as Art” Babich writes accordingly: 
 What Nietzsche, speaking of ‘Kant’s tragic problem,’ names ‘the tragic conflict’ 
 is the insight that human society and culture cannot exist without art, i.e., without 
 the untruth or illusion of art,....It is as an artist that Nietzsche proposes a creative 
 recollection of the ‘poetic’ foundational task of the philosopher as ‘physician of 
 culture.’156 
The physician of culture’s “poetic foundational task” is to think science and art together 
so that science’s unrestrained optimism can be kept in check and so that both science and 
art serve life. At its best science merely stares at the abyss, unable to account for it 
according to its own measure. Unable to account for its own ground it is not able to grasp 
the illusions, that is, the errors that arise from it even though it assumes it does. Nietzsche 
recognizes this prejudice of science when he states: 
 We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live—by positing 
 (der Annahme) bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and 
 content; without these articles of faith (diese Glaubensartikel) no one could 
 endure living! But that does not prove them. Life is not an argument (Das Leben 
 ist kein Argument); the conditions of life might include error.157 
Indeed the images that science gives us are images of “measure,” that is, some kind of 
metric that quantifies and explains the world in increasing detail, whereas art revels in 
                                                 
156 Babich, “The Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, 7. 
157 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 117/Aphorism 121. 
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beauty and being-here within the transitory nature of time.158 Thus science at the limit 
needs a relief or medicine in the form of art to be able to endure tragic knowledge. Art 
allows the abyss, the Dionysian, to show itself in its unfathomable depths. This may be 
why many human beings, rather than remain idle, gather themselves in theatres and 
music halls to experience the actual shining and play of images that tragedy and comedy 
present. For unlike science and logic, whose domain is ultimately of the intelligible, the 
enjoyment of comedy lies in the demand of sense, that is, the aesthetic ability to see and 
hear the spectacle “in a manifest accord”159 as Sallis says in the last chapter of his book 
Stone. 
 The Dionysian affirmation of life through the shining of beautiful Apollonian 
images impels us as Beings in the world to move, to gather and to live and laugh with the 
knowledge of the tragic. Indeed the demand of sense and the need of images overflows 
the poetic text, even a great poetic text. Thus lies the difference between what is said to 
us in the form of a text and what shines for us—for our sense—in the space of a theater 
or even in the life of intersubjectivity. This distinction is drawn by Sallis in the context of 
the Shakespearean comedy A Winter’s Tale160 and he concludes by interrupting his own 
reading so as to gather at the place of shining: “But now time has come to interrupt the 
poetry, to release the shining from the play, turning it out and putting the text aside, going 
off to the theatre.”161 This notion of going off to the theatre where images both tragic and 
                                                 
158 Babich, quoting Nietzsche from his early notebooks (Kritische Studienausgabe 7, 558) states, “The man 
of science calculates the numbers of the laws of nature; the man of art gazes at them. In the one case, 
conformity to law; in the other, beauty.” “The Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of 
Knowledge, and Critical Theory, 13. 
159 John Sallis, Stone (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 118. 
160 There is some debate amongst scholars of Shakespeare as to the classification of A Winter’s Tale. I have 
seen it most often listed as a comedy; however it is sometimes categorized as tragi-comedy and even a 
romance. 
161 Sallis, Stone, 147. 
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comic shine is not lost on Freydberg who, in The Thought of John Sallis, notes something 
very similar to Nietzsche’s conclusion in The Birth of Tragedy where Nietzsche implores 
us to act on the sounding call of both gods at the limit of science and logic: “But now 
follow me to the tragedy and sacrifice along with me in the temple of both deities!”162 
 At this point one may conclude that Nietzsche’s thought itself must fall into its 
own sort of pessimism as it sees itself left behind in the wake of this Socratic-Apolline 
impulse as it gains momentum in the West. However, as we shall see, Nietzsche not only 
refuses pessimism and its attendant ressentiment because of the role art such as tragedy 
and comedy come to play, he also comes to appreciate a comic image of Socrates as well. 
This comic image that revolves around the contradiction of instinct turned against itself, 
that is, instinct in a struggle with itself, surely is ripe for laughter. Nietzsche is clear about 
his appreciation of Aristophanes who brings this laughter to fruition in the form of comic 
images. 
 Moreover Nietzsche sees a Socrates who, at the end of his life, redeems himself in 
the image of the “music-making Socrates.” Nietzsche’s claim is that science at its limit 
needs art, especially in the form of music, “for shelter [Schutz] and as cure 
[Heilmittel].”163 This epiphany occurs to the condemned Socrates as he awaits the return 
of the ship from Delos. This shining image is of a Socrates redeemed; a Socrates who 
welcomes back the Dionysian through his composition of Aesopian fables into a hymn to 
Apollo. Here, Nietzsche facilitates his own inversion. He inverts the classic image of the 
theoretical Socrates on his death-bed that the new Greek youth esteemed—an image of 
                                                 
162 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 116/Section 25 and Bernard Freydberg, The Thought of John Sallis: 
Phenomenology, Plato, Imagination (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 205. 
163 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 75/Section 15, my translation. 
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Socrates “liberated from fear of death by reasons and knowledge”164—into an image of a 
cheerful Socrates who makes music, refuses ressentiment, and demands that others be 
cheerful as well. Although one of the abiding characteristics about Socrates has always 
been his cheerfulness, the cheerfulness here is no longer simply conditioned by 
Apollonian dialectic. It is a cheerfulness that harmonizes both impulses. Freydberg 
reminds us of this Socratic cheerfulness and its ties to Nietzsche’s thought when he 
states: 
 [O]ne must quickly call to mind the most pronounced of Socratic traits: his 
 cheerfulness. Being given over to darkness and ignorance is the furthest thing 
 from being the cause of gloom and helplessness. Rather, it produces a playfulness, 
 even comedy in the dialogues....Nietzsche will say some two millennia later: ‘The 
 certain prospect of death should fill every life with a precious and fragrant drop of 
 cheerfulness.’165 
We might say that in the very waning hours of his life a cheerful Socrates made his 
acquaintance with that chaotic, dark force that he originally sought to vanquish...and to 
which the hemlock returned him. 
 
 
IV. Socrates, Aristophanes, and Plato’s Pillow 
 
 For Nietzsche, there was one person who was able to recognize the internal 
contradiction of Socrates in its full significance indeed its abundant comedic significance. 
                                                 
164 Ibid., 73/Section 15. 
165 Freydberg, The Thought of John Sallis, 67. 
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This person was the comic playwright Aristophanes. Remarkable is the fact that 
Nietzsche does not identify him among the myriad of philosophers and philosophical 
schools that evolved after Socrates that countered Socratic/Platonic thought. To be sure, 
Nietzsche is (generally speaking) cautious of philosophical thought post-Socrates. 
Instead, Nietzsche argues in Section Thirteen of The Birth of Tragedy that it was only 
Aristophanes who was acutely aware of the negative influence Socrates, along with 
Euripides, was exerting on Athenian society. This Socratic influence is described as a 
“dubious enlightenment [zweifelhaften Aufklärung]” where “physical and spiritual 
energies were atrophying progressively.”166 Whereas Socrates inverted instinct and 
turned it against itself, Aristophanes acts on instinct and inverts the image of Socrates 
into a comic laughter-provoking opposite. Socrates is no longer the truth seeker. Instead 
he becomes the very essence of those he opposed. He becomes a Sophist: 
 It is in this tone, half outraged, half scornful, that Aristophanic comedy [die 
 aristophanische Komödie] usually spoke of these men [Euripides and Socrates], 
 to the consternation of those moderns who would gladly have abandoned 
 Euripides, but who could not get over their surprise that Socrates should figure in 
 Aristophanes’ plays as the first and leading Sophist, as the mirror and 
 quintessence [der Spiegel und Inbegriff] of everything the Sophists were trying 
 to do; the only comfort they could find was in pillorying Aristophanes himself as 
 a dissolute, mendacious Alcibiades of poetry.167 
For Nietzsche, Aristophanes is a sort of last hero in that he is able to diagnose a declining 
Athens, parodying it by way of comic representations. This of course extends to Socrates 
                                                 
166 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 64-65/Section 13. 
167 Ibid., 65/Section 13. 
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who, in Clouds, is comically portrayed as he was not. In other words, keeping faithful to 
the notion of inversion, the image of the historical Socrates is inverted and portrayed as 
its opposite. Of course the result is a comic romp that ridicules Socrates in particular and 
philosophy in general. This ridicule however is far from scorn and disparagement. As 
Freydberg states, “In Aristophanes, the most severe ridicule and laughter is united with 
the greatest respect and honor.”168 There are many examples from this text that illustrate 
this, but the following two present the most compelling instances. 
 First, the conventional reading of Plato (and for the most part, Nietzsche’s reading 
of Plato is conventional) is that he, through the figure of Socrates, always sought the truth 
and what constituted the truth was the strongest logos. Socrates demanded from his 
interlocutors, as well as himself, that the strongest logos was one that accounted for the 
form (eidos) of whatever phenomena was being examined—piety in the Euthyphro, love 
in the Symposium, justice in the Republic and so forth. The focus was on a movement 
away from the temporal, changing world of becoming to the unchanging realm of being 
and the forms. Socrates’ dialectical lens was usually focused almost exclusively on the 
intelligible section of the divided line as well as the visible section only as it related and 
is informed by the intelligible. Far from his interest was knowledge of the natural world 
(although he had nothing against such knowledge or those who pursued it).169 However, 
the entrance of Socrates in Clouds has him treading the air in a basket high up in the 
clouds examining just those types of natural phenomena that the historical Socrates took 
no interest in, namely “meteorological things (meteōra pragmata).”170 
                                                 
168 Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 44. 
169 See Plato, Apology 19c. 
170 Aristophanes, Clouds lines, 223-234. 
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 But Aristophanes’ comic portrayal of Socrates moves even deeper than the 
inversion of the subject matter of Socrates’ interest. To effect proper knowledge of 
meteorological things, Socrates says to Strepsiades, “I had to suspend my mind, to 
commingle my rarefied thought with its kindred air. If I had been on the ground and from 
down there contemplated what’s up here, I would have made no discoveries at all.”171 In 
terms of the divided line recall that Plato and Socrates strove to understand the highest 
participation in truth of something. This occurred in the top division of the line, the 
intelligible, at the level of thinking and mathematics (dianoia and ta mathēmatica) and 
ultimately intellection and the forms (noeisis and eidē). This, of course, was farthest 
removed from the actual phenomena of sense and opinion. When one moved in thought 
from empirically real things to intelligible things, one focused all the powers of thought 
on the forms. In a sense, the historical Socrates suspended interest in actual things so as 
to “commingle” with the intelligible forms. In other words, the historical Socrates sought 
to dwell near the form of a thing, which entailed a deferral of interest in the visible 
world.172 
 The comic genius of Aristophanes inverts this dynamic. Instead we have a 
Socrates in Clouds who has physically suspended himself in the air to be nearer the 
natural phenomena he wants to study. Moreover Aristophanes’ comic finesse of the word 
“suspend” nudges the inversion and the comedy farther. To suspend, in Greek, is 
                                                 
171 Ibid., lines 229-234. 
172 It must be noted that the thinking of John Sallis and Bernard Freydberg challenge this conventional view 
of Plato/Socrates that deemphasizes the supposed supremacy of the “eternal forms” and in turn emphasizes 
(in a way that perhaps would cause Nietzsche to reevaluate?) the role of sight: “[T]his word [eidos] is 
derived from a verb (eidō) the most straightforward meaning of which is ‘see.’ Thus, the root meaning of 
‘eidos’ is: that which is seen, the seen, that which presents itself to a seeing, that which shows itself so as to 
be manifest to a seeing,” (Sallis, Being and Logos, 152, also 383), and “[T]he Greek eidos (plural eidē) 
preserves the sense of seeing (horaō). Eidenai, the perfect tense of horaō, is a word with no intrinsic 
connection to any ‘essence’ from any world.” (Freydberg, The Play of the Platonic Dialogues, 41). 
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kremannumi, which means “to be hung up” as in “to hang up one’s shield.” Hence it 
refers to the hanging up of a physical object. Aristophanes, however, plays on the absurd 
yet comic notion of Socrates suspending his mind as if it is even possible to suspend a 
non-physical entity such as a mind. To be sure, this is more than just a problematic 
analogy. Aristophanes is at play with language that is to say giving his own comic 
account in logos to showcase an inverted Socrates, a figure engaging in the kinds of 
things that the historical Socrates did not. 
 The second example concerns the very nature of Socrates’ work at the Thinkery 
(phrontistērion) versus the “work” of the historical Socrates. This comic polemic 
revolves around the seeking of truth. Again, Socrates sought the best logos. The best 
logos constituted the strongest logos that accounted for the essence or form of something. 
However, in the Clouds we have again another comic inversion perpetrated by 
Aristophanes. 
 When Strepsiades enters the Thinkery, Socrates asks him why he has come. 
Strepsiades’ response is that he is “anxious to learn public speaking” so that he can evade 
his creditors and their lawful collections. What Aristophanes has Socrates do in this 
comic jaunt is precisely what the historical Socrates never did, that is, teaching 
Strepsiades (or anybody else for that matter) how to make the weaker argument appear 
stronger in this case so as to foil his creditors. Moreover as we know, Socrates never 
accepted any monetary compensation for his philosophical endeavors. Instead he freely 
engaged in philosophy in the agora. In the Thinkery, though, Socrates, like the Sophists 
he distinguished himself from, received payment for instruction in how to speak well and 
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be persuasive even if it meant disregard for truth.173 In essence, Aristophanes presents us 
with an inverted image of Socrates that was counter-instinctual to the contemporaries of 
Socrates in Athens as well as to us today as heirs of his teaching. Perhaps this is why, as 
Nietzsche argues in the quote above, the moderns of that time found “comfort...in 
pillorying Aristophanes.” As Athens began to embrace the dialectical reasoning of 
Socrates and the supposed optimism it brought, Aristophanes was challenging them 
through the shining images of his comic representations. The images were so perverse in 
their portrayal as compared to the historical Socrates that one’s instinct was surely alerted 
to the fact that something was unheimlich about Athens in the time of Socrates compared 
to its recent past and the kind of tragedies performed at its Dionysia. 
 Indeed this perversion of instinct is extended directly to Plato the author of the 
dialogues in which Socrates featured so prominently. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche 
asserts the following: 
 [N]othing I know has given me a better vision [mehr hat träumen lassen] of 
 Plato’s secrecy and Sphinx nature than that happily preserved petit fait: under the 
 pillow of his deathbed they did not find a “Bible” or anything Egyptian, 
 Pythagorean, or Platonic—but instead, Aristophanes. How would even a Plato 
 have endured life [Leben ausgehalten]—a Greek life that he said No to—without 
 an Aristophanes!174 
What Nietzsche discerns here is the necessity of Aristophanes and his comedies for Plato. 
A necessity that takes the form of a fundamental need for the kind of Dionysian comic 
                                                 
173 See Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 19. 
174 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 30/Aphorism 28. 
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celebration that revels in our earthbound human condition. This deep tie between comedy 
and philosophy is best rendered by Freydberg in Philosophy and Comedy: 
 [T]he comedies of Aristophanes serve to remind human beings of those matters 
 that are most fundamental to the quality of their humanity. However, unlike the 
 Platonic dialogues, which address these concerns through question and answer, 
 the comedies of Aristophanes—like the works of his colleagues in the tragic art—
 bring these concerns to their audience through the vicarious experiences they 
 provide.175 
Thus laughter provoking comedies provide for the kind of measure that reminds us that, 
for as far reaching as philosophical logos may take us, Platonic logos no exception, we 
are one and all bound to the earth and its shining images. 
 However, I argue that there is another interesting and revealing detail about this 
particular passage from Beyond Good and Evil that constitutes much more than mere 
semantics. Some translations, such as Judith Norman’s above, translate “mehr hat 
träumen lassen” as “has given me a better vision.” Others, such as Walter Kaufmann and 
the internet based, The Nietzsche Channel, translate the same as, “has caused me to 
meditate.” But the word träumen denotes very strong ties to “dreaming,” or “day-dream.” 
Thus although translations that utilize “vision” or “meditate” are in no way inappropriate, 
Nietzsche’s use of träumen, given all the implications with the Apollonian impulse so 
crucial to his thought, might best be rendered along the lines of “day-dream” such as 
Marianne Cowan’s translation “has made me day-dream more...”176 With this in mind we 
realize that Nietzsche is appropriating his very own Apollonian image: the soothing 
                                                 
175 Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 18. 
176 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington D.C.: Regnery 
Gateway, 1955), 35. 
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illusion of a Plato in need of earthly comedy. Perhaps this illusion temporarily veils 
Nietzsche from what he views as the destructive threat that Platonism and dialectical 
thinking has perpetrated on philosophical thinking. 
 In the last analysis, Aristophanes trained his comic eye on Socrates to present us 
with his comic images of a Socrates in excess. For it was only “Aristophanes’ sure 
instinct,” claims Nietzsche, that “certainly grasped things correctly.”177 And so does 
Nietzsche train his eye on Socrates who he sees taking the theoretical standpoint in the 
form of dialectical reasoning to an unhealthy excess but then redeems himself in the 
image of the music-making Socrates by letting the Dionysian impulse presence itself in 
the form of poetry and music. When we take Nietzsche’s full characterization of 
Socrates, it appears as an image of eros, abundance, and fullness of life. Indeed, just as 
Nietzsche hoped for a rebirth of tragic art including its comic aspects for contemporary 
and future life, he locates this very possibility in the image of Socrates who undergoes his 
very own Dionysian rebirth. 
 
 
V. Conclusion: From The Birth of Tragedy to The Gay Science 
 
 This first section in Nietzsche’s early work, The Birth of Tragedy, provided a 
stage from which his view of comedy and laughter was projected. Foremost of these was 
the way in which comedy related to tragedy as well as how both are expressions of 
Dionysian groundlessness (Abgrund). This was a necessary first step because Nietzsche 
                                                 
177 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 83/Section 17. 
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seemed to be concerned almost entirely with tragedy and its role whereas comedy and 
laughter appear less significant. 
 But we have seen that Nietzsche’s view of tragedy encompasses much more than 
a play. The tragic view of the world that claims we cannot transcend our human, all too 
human, status that structures Nietzsche’s philosophy. It lays bare the choice that human 
beings must make in the face of tragic knowledge: we can either succumb to pessimism 
and resignation or we can choose to affirm life. If we choose the later, then comedy as 
well as tragedy becomes part of that ethical disposition. Comedy, though, is not only a 
response or a reaction to tragic knowledge, it is also a reflection—in what can only be a 
reflection—of the Dionysian abyss into which we all stare at some point. 
 We have also seen that comedy’s indispensability to the affirmation of life is 
constituted by the manner in which comic images scheinen. To put it another way, it is 
the way comic images shine forth as contrasted with images of tragedy. Comic images, as 
Nietzsche says, save the will from destruction. They allow a transformation of the will by 
the way in which disgust at absurdity is discharged through their particular artistic means. 
Effective comedy shines forth as a vicarious image of our own experiences. It mirrors life 
and the absurdities and struggles within it, although the mirror is more of a “funhouse 
mirror.”178 Often times in the face of absurdity, comedy, like tragedy, lets us live and 
even flourish despite the Dionysian abyss that every human being at one time or another 
must confront. 
 Moreover comedy, in both a literal and figurative sense, allows for movement. 
Just like the tragic hero who has glimpsed the abyss and gained the kind of proprietary 
knowledge inherent to it, one is tempted to remain lethargic and idle. This is why both 
                                                 
178 Bernard Freydberg makes this point many times in Philosophy and Comedy. 
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Hamlet and Silenus laugh. They recognize the futility of action. Their laughter is not 
laughter directed outward and aimed at something such as the kind of trivial laughter that 
happens when one sees another slip on a banana peel. This laughter signifies the 
knowledge of futility and the “supreme danger of the will” as one teeters on the precipice 
of resignation and despair. It is a laughter that at one time bursts outward yet its source 
lies inward in that it comes from a soul that has gained the kind of monstrous knowledge 
belonging to the god Dionysus. 
 But we also saw what Nietzsche perceived as a threat to the Dionysian impulse 
and its two creative domains of tragedy and comedy. The Apollonian impulse that has 
become estranged from its Dionysian adversary presents its own danger to the will in the 
form of excessive optimism. Here the Apollonian no longer works in tandem with the 
Dionysian so as to allow the Dionysian impulse to be given an outlet through beautiful 
Apollonian images. Instead, as an isolated impulse, the Apollonian proclaims that all can 
be known through science and logic. Science and logic, especially in the form of 
dialectical reasoning, leads one to the serenity of intelligible knowledge as if one could 
remove oneself from the confines of space, time and history. For Nietzsche, this drive to 
theoretical reasoning is manifest in the person of Socrates. Embracing the purely 
Apollonian illusion, Socrates accepted the illusion as real. As a consequence, ancient 
Athens and Western culture have inherited this framework best seen today as the 
unchallenged ascendancy of science and technological thinking. It excludes instinct and 
the kind of creativity that allows us to own up to tragic knowledge and live cheerfully in 
the face of that knowledge. 
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 Nietzsche, however, refuses to react to Socrates by way of ressentiment just as 
Socrates refused the model of ressentiment against those who condemned him to death. 
Instead, within Socrates’ exclusively theoretical image, Nietzsche locates a saving power. 
This is the music-making Socrates that emerges in the final days before his death. 
Socrates needed to make music, which is another way of saying needed to let the 
boundless Dionysian manifest itself. Socrates’ music making consisted in setting to verse 
the Aesopian fables that he knew. But what is also clear is that Socrates’ impulse to make 
music arose from his dreams and his wanting to understand the meaning of them. 
Socrates states, “The dreams were something like this: the same dream (enupnion) often 
came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: 
‘Socrates’ it said, ‘make music (mousikēn poiei) and cultivate (ergazou) it.’”179 Notable is 
the relationship between the Apollonian dream images and their call to make music—a 
Dionysian phenomena. The very boundaries between the two appear to blur.180 What is 
clear though, is that Socrates does not analyze or explain music. Nor does he interpret or 
categorize music. He does not seek its form through dialectic. He brings his music out of 
nothing...he creates it and cultivates it. Nietzsche’s insight of Socrates’ redemption is 
similar to the insight he provides concerning Plato. Plato needed comedy, Aristophanic 
comedy in particular, to affirm his “Greek life” if not to merely make it bearable. 
 Moreover, we also saw how instinct and intuition were truly served by 
Aristophanes, the great comic playwright. Nietzsche claims Aristophanes was most 
                                                 
179 Plato, Phaedo, 60d-61b. 
180 In addition to this distinction, Nietzsche locates another distinction in The Gay Science between our 
modern view of life and the ancients’ view: “We no longer fully understand how the ancients experienced 
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attuned to this radical shift in the life of Athens at the time, away from instinct to the 
domineering methods of science and logic, which was personified in the person of 
Socrates. Aristophanes’ Clouds presented us with a comic image of Socrates that 
presented him as a Sophist, which is to say, presented us with Socrates as he was not 
challenging the audiences and our own instinct. The laughter provoking moments that 
ensue are deeply connected to the most serious philosophical issues. And these issues, for 
Nietzsche, are nothing short of what he sees as the very rebirth of the Dionysian spirit 
through art, including comedy. 
 Let it be said, then, that Nietzsche avows comedy as much as tragedy and music 
as a creative Dionysian means by which we can affirm life and forego pessimism and 
ressentiment. At the conclusion of the preface to the second edition of The Birth of 
Tragedy, the opposition between those pessimists who seek metaphysical comfort, 
especially in Christian dogma, and those who would affirm life is startlingly clear. 
Moreover, the distinction turns on the very notion of one’s ability to laugh: 
 But it is very probable that it will end like this, that you will end like this, namely, 
 ‘comforted’[getröstet], as it is written, despite all your training of yourselves for 
 what is grave and terrifying, ‘metaphysically comforted’, ending, in short, as 
 Romantics end, namely as Christians...No, you should first learn the art of 
 comfort in this world, you should learn to laugh [lachen], my young friends, if 
 you are really determined to remain pessimists. Perhaps then, as men who laugh 
 [als Lachende], you will some day send all attempts at metaphysical solace to 
 Hell—with metaphysics the first to go!181 
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Nietzsche follows this pronouncement and ends the preface to the second edition of The 
Birth of Tragedy (1886) with an extended quote from his recently written Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, which has Zarathustra extolling the virtue of laughter. The insights that 
Nietzsche provided in The Birth of Tragedy also allow us to broach his further use and 
appreciation of comedy and laughter in later works especially The Gay Science and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. 
 Thus we take our departure and move to The Gay Science where we will see that, 
far from abhorring science, Nietzsche harbors a deep, albeit cautious, appreciation of it. 
But it is a science that is far from the serene, detached eye of a rational observer: the kind 
of hermit-like observer that is shut off from life: “What? Do we really want to demote 
existence in this way to an exercise in arithmetic and an indoor diversion for 
mathematicians? Above all, one shouldn’t want to strip it of its ambiguous character.”182 
For Nietzsche, science (Wissenschaft) must be a praxis where all aspects of the human 
being—social, political, ethical, natural science—are brought together in a grand arena of 
knowledge that seeks to enhance life, both in meaning and value. As we shall see, these 
endeavors can be laughter provoking and, if intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) is lacking, 
then even ripe for that other kind of laughter: a derisive laughter that seeks to humble and 
challenge. Thus Nietzsche seeks a “fröhliche Wissenschaft”—a joyful science that never 
forgets the chaos that it is always attempting to order and more importantly never forgets 
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Chapter Two: The Gay Science or The Humorous Knowledge of Free Spirits 
 
“And let each day be a loss to us on which we did not dance once! And let each truth be 
false to us which was not greeted by one laugh!” 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra~ 
 
 
I. Beginning, Inscription, Laughter 
 
 How does Nietzsche begin what was the second and final edition of The Gay 
Science?183 There is a new preface that appears before the first edition’s introductory 
poems, “Joke, Cunning, and Revenge—Prelude in German Rhymes.” In short order the 
new preface will announce a specific kind of comedic device that animates much of The 
Gay Science as well as Thus Spoke Zarathustra—parody. But even before this proper 
beginning, we have a call to cheerfulness and laughter in the form of a short epigram: 
 The Gay Science 
 (‘La gaya scienza’) 
 This house [Haus] is my own and here I dwell [wohne], 
 I’ve never aped nothing from no one 
 and—laugh [lachte] at each master, mark me well, 
 who at himself has not poked fun [ausgelacht]. 
  Over my front door [Hausthür]. 
                                                 
183 The first edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft was published in 1882. A later, final edition was 
published in 1887 that included a preface, fifth book (“We Fearless Ones”), and an appendix of poems 
(“Songs of Prince Vogelfrei”). 
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An epigram of course is a short introductory statement located at the beginning of a text. 
The word epigram, from the Greek epigraphein, means to “write on, inscribe.” It is a 
writing into in the sense of a bringing forth or a disclosing of what is to follow in the 
main body of the text. What does Nietzsche’s epigram attempt to bring forth? Laughter 
and cheerfulness. These two elements are the centerpiece of the kind of knowledge or 
science that Nietzsche envisions for the future, but also for those free spirits in the present 
who have the ears and the stomach—quite literally the physiology—for it. 
 In Ecce Homo Nietzsche writes that the “concept of a gaya scienza, [is] that unity 
of singer, knight, and free spirit that is distinctive of the wonderful early culture of 
Provence...”184 He also signals in section one of the preface to the second edition that, 
“‘Gay Science’: this signifies the saturnalia of a mind that has patiently resisted a terrible, 
long pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without yielding, but also without hope—and 
is now all of a sudden attacked by hope, by hope for health, by the intoxication of 
recovery.”185 With this we see that gay science will in one sense embrace the 
characteristics and values of troubadours. These characteristics include music and a 
nobility arising from the fact that as troubadours they were semi-nomadic and thus 
wandered, as Nietzsche did most of his life, from place to place. They created their own 
free verse that often celebrated the unrestrained, uncloistered life of a free spirit that had 
recourse ultimately to themselves. In short, they were their own masters. This is reflected 
in the line that states, “I’ve never aped nothing from no one” or one could read, “I am not 
an image of anyone. I am a free spirit.” 
                                                 
184 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, 123/The Gay Science. 
185 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3/Aphorism 1 of the preface to the 2nd ed. A translator’s note in this 
edition states that saturnalia refers to a “Roman winter festival at which usual bonds of social order were 
thrown off, social roles were reversed, etc.” For Nietzsche, this reversal of custom that happened once a 
year is now to become an inspiration and experiment in how to live for the future. 
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 This recourse to “homelessness” both literally and figuratively is also echoed 
years later. Book five “We Fearless Ones,” which was added when the second edition of 
The Gay Science was published in 1887, echoes the free wandering nomadism of the 
preface. Here Nietzsche reiterates his admiration for the Unheimlich and the homeless 
who experience it most fully: 
 [I]t is to them in particular that I commend my secret wisdom [geheime 
 Weisheit] and gaya scienza...We children of the future—how could we be at home 
 in this today! We are unfavorably disposed towards all ideals that might make one 
 feel at home in this fragile, broken time of transition [zerbrochnen 
 Uebergangszeit];...we homeless ones, are something that breaks up the ice and 
 other all too thin ‘realities’ [Realitäten].186 
To be homeless then in its greatest significance is to dwell in that time of history where 
all previous values are being called into question thus elevating existence itself to a 
question. If we can imagine someone, such as Nietzsche, who had no permanent address, 
no permanent home then it might be possible to experience the angst and foreboding that 
might accompany such an impermanence. However, this existential angst at the loss of all 
previous values, of not being at home in a familiar world, also harbors its own creativity 
that arises out of freedom and the will to transgression, “[W]e are delighted by all who 
love, as we do, danger, war, and adventure; who refuse to compromise, to be captured, to 
reconcile, to be castrated; we consider ourselves conquerors; we contemplate the 
necessity for new orders as well as for a new slavery.”187 
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 So the use of homelessness and gaya scienza by Nietzsche is reflected in much the 
same way as the free-spirited troubadours. His philosophy will not mimic any others, 
including Schopenhauer whose philosophy of pessimism Nietzsche departed from in The 
Birth of Tragedy. It will not appeal to transcendent originals such as Platonic forms and, 
in the realm of ethics and morality it will not appeal to rigid “Thou shalt...” type of 
commandments or binding imperatives. Nietzsche, in aphorism 324 in The Gay Science 
titled, “In media vita,” which translates as “In mid-life,” says that for him life was not 
something that was lived in order to fulfill any antecedent criteria, moral or otherwise. He 
characterizes it instead as an “experiment for the knowledge-seeker,” which is a way of 
saying that lived experience, especially lived bodily experience is to be oriented towards 
new, future goals. Furthermore, it is characterized by a peculiar mixture, almost an 
alchemy even of gaiety, laughter, war and transgression; “‘Life as a means to 
knowledge’—with this principle in one’s heart, one can not only live bravely but also live 
gaily and laugh gaily! And who would know how to laugh and live well who did not first 
have a good understanding of war and victory?”188 This notion of war and victory has 
less to do with the kind of war between states but is more a metaphor of the kind of war 
that one wages with oneself, better yet, within oneself. “Gay science” will seek to reverse 
old prejudices that came to dominate serious thinking until Nietzsche’s time. Well aware 
of his own agenda of transgression Nietzsche states of those who hold this prejudice that: 
 The lovely human beast seems to lose its good mood [die gute Laune] when it 
 thinks well; it becomes ‘serious’! And ‘where laughter and gaiety [Lachen und 
 Fröhlichkeit] are found, thinking is good for nothing’—that is the prejudice of 
                                                 
188 Ibid., 181/Aphorism 324. 
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 this serious beast against all ‘gay science’. Well then, let us prove it a 
 prejudice!189 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy will not only refuse to imitate others, it will essentially 
deconstruct—destruct—all previous values and as we shall see, laughter, comedy and 
humor will play a significant role in this effort to turn homogeneity inside out so that 
heterogeneity can flourish. 
 In terms of “saturnalia of mind,” we see once again a kind of inversion whose 
locus is reflected both in actual history as well as physiology. Nietzsche seems to want to 
equate gay science with a newly reborn physiology and health and a rebirth of values that 
reject the “terrible, long pressure” of previous millennia and their dominant systems of 
morality. Thus what becomes readily apparent in the preface to the second edition (and 
even in the “Prelude in Rhymes” of the first edition) is largely constituted by Nietzsche’s 
views of the body, health and sickness, indeed his own health and sickness, and its 
relationship to cheerfulness, joy, lightheartedness, laughter, and humor. He even goes so 
far as to extend this need for cheerfulness and good physical health and those able to 
diagnose such health to all of humanity to a, “philosophical physician in the exceptional 
sense of the term—someone who has set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the 
total health of a people, time, race or of humanity.”190 
 Because Nietzsche rejects the Cartesian distinction between the soul and the body 
(for Nietzsche the body and soul are not separate and the body is always privileged191) 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 182-83/Aphorism 327. 
190 Ibid., 6/Aphorism 2 of the preface to the 2nd ed. 
191 When Nietzsche speaks of the soul he regularly speaks of it in close connection with the body. For 
example he states, “We philosophers are not free to separate soul from body as the common people do; we 
are even less free to separate soul from spirit,” and “Deciding what is health even for your body depends on 
your goal, your horizon, your powers, your impulses, your mistakes and above all on the ideals and 
phantasms of your soul.” Ibid., 6/Aphorism 3 of the preface to the 2nd ed., and 116/Aphorism 120. 
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the philosopher can not help but to translate his physical state, especially that of ill-
health, into either a healthy life affirming philosophy in which pain is transfigured into 
strength, or the opposite in which the philosopher’s weakness is translated into what he 
understands as dismal thought. Nietzsche carries the distinction farther by examining 
what motivates philosophers of ill health: 
 The former [philosopher’s of weakness] need their philosophy [hat seine 
 Philosophie nöthig], be it as prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or 
 self-alienation; for the latter [philosopher’s of strength], it is only a beautiful 
 luxury [ein schöner Luxus], in the best case the voluptuousness of a 
 triumphant gratitude that eventually has to inscribe itself [schreiben] in cosmic 
 capital letters on the heaven of concepts.192 
The conclusion drawn by Nietzsche is that philosophers of ill-health (and for Nietzsche 
this has been the majority in history) seek to find reasons for their illness or physical 
incapacity. Consequently they end up inscribing this weakness into their philosophies, or 
in Nietzsche’s words, it is their “distress that philosophizes.” The reason ultimately stems 
from some type of guilt that leads them to think, “I am of ill-health therefore I must be 
guilty of some sort of transcendent infraction in the form of sin.” Hence they need their 
philosophy to consequently find a reason for what they perceive as a painful existence. 
Whereas, for Nietzsche, existence needs no justification. One of the results of the 
connection between ill health and philosophy is a stifling seriousness that squashes 
humor. 
 On the other hand the philosopher of strength, indeed the philosopher who draws 
strength from their most severe pain, is the one who philosophizes, Nietzsche claims, 
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with a gratitude and pride. “Only great pain is the liberator of the spirit,”193 says 
Nietzsche. Thus the lived body, in a sense, becomes a beautiful experiment in which 
inchoate physical states as well as pain are not given a raison d’être in “religious 
cravings” or any other transcendent referent. The body and its attendant states become the 
very substance of a creative, life affirming philosophy. Nietzsche even goes so far as to 
assert, “this art of transfiguration just is philosophy.”194 Indeed the hermeneutical lens 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy demands could show “great pain” to mean the type of 
spiritual pain one undergoes because of the effacement of all the older values that gave 
meaning and purpose to European culture for centuries. 
 Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s understanding of physiological states and the role they 
play in our philosophizing allow him to maintain that: 
 The unconscious disguise [unbewusste Verkleidung] of physiological needs under 
 the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual goes frighteningly far—and I 
 have asked myself often enough whether, on a grand scale, philosophy has been 
 no more than an interpretation of the body [Auslegung des Leibes] and a 
 misunderstanding of the body [Missverständniss des Leibes].195 
One at this point might ask, “In what way then does laughter, humor, comedy or their 
lack play a role in terms of Nietzsche’s take on our physiological states, most notably 
pain and ill-health?” I believe there are two perspectives from which Nietzsche broaches 
this issue. 
 First, in a negative sense, those who suffer from sickness both in terms of life and 
physical health most often are less, if at all, humorous, at least in Nietzsche’s view. They 
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do not see humor in an existence that is painful especially when the reason for that pain 
often lies in what they see as their own sin and guilt. Simply put, life is no laughing 
matter to them. As a consequence, the philosophies of these types of thinkers tend to see 
life as a problem or as something that conceals the truth behind it and therefore 
something they must strive to understand. But echoing Heraclitus, Nietzsche states that, 
“One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind 
riddles and iridescent uncertainties.”196 For Nietzsche, the resulting “wisdom” of these 
philosophies that seek truth behind appearance is sullen and hardly joyful. Alas, these 
philosophers come on the scene much too late in history when the instincts have already 
atrophied and thus life itself becomes an object of reflection and analysis instead of a life 
in which instinct provides its own vital kinesis. The supposed wisdom of these 
philosophers—and Nietzsche sees this lineage stretching at least from Socrates to 
Hegel—is a philosophy of life descending values. 
 Second, in a positive sense, when we are in an agōn with our own physiology and 
we triumph over pain can we then find the source for a rebirth; one that ought to be 
characterized by cheerfulness! The resulting philosophies of such a stance—and for 
Nietzsche these are rare types—engender life ascending values. Philosophy is not used as 
a crutch or a vehicle of explanation that seeks to justify life or find reasons as to why one 
exists, that is, as to the meaning of existence. Philosophy becomes something contingent, 
airy, always playing second fiddle to creative life itself that Nietzsche says, “means 
constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame, and also all that wounds us; 
we simply can do no other.”197 This idea of the transfiguration of pain into philosophy 
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and the transforming of ourselves into light and flame is the creation of ourselves into 
works of art. And what lies at the heart of this art as an essential property? Humor and 
laughter: 
 [I]f we convalescents still need art, it is another kind of art [eine andere kunst]—a 
 mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a 
 bright flame, blazes into an unclouded sky! Above all: an art for artists, only for 
 artists! In addition we will know better what is first and foremost needed for that: 
 cheerfulness [die Heiterkeit]—any cheerfulness [jede Heiterkeit], my friends!198 
We may say that this art that Nietzsche has in mind is a cheerful play with appearance 
from which he gives many examples, a few of which are examined below. This notion of 
transfiguring “ourselves into light and flame,” that is, into “works of art” involves a play 
of memory and forgetting of being, “good at not knowing!,” as well as a call to let the 
ascendancy of appearance scheinen forth without the need to seek truth behind the 
appearance. Unlike the world of being, beautiful appearances disclose themselves to us in 
time. As such, they are impermanent. Yet this impermanence of becoming is exactly what 
Nietzsche would have us affirm, we finite beings of “light and flame” saying “yes” to 
indestructible life. 
 Nietzsche extends his deep appreciation of appearance as it relates to truth farther 
by stating that, “Perhaps truth is a woman who has grounds for not showing her grounds? 
Perhaps her name is—to speak Greek—Baubo?”199 The most notable thing about the 
witch Baubo was her ability to make the goddess Demeter laugh by raising her skirt and 
exposing herself. This laughter was not a response to some mundane occurrence but was 
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set amidst Demeter’s own tragedy; the tragedy of the abduction of her daughter 
Persephone into the underworld by Hades. Nietzsche’s appropriation of this myth once 
again highlights that it is radiant appearance as truth especially in its playful sense that 
can in part help constitute a joyful, humorous life. With echoes from The Birth of 
Tragedy, he proceeds to specify that what is needed to live well, to overcome pessimism 
as the Greeks did. One must remember, “to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin; 
to worship appearance, to believe in shapes, tones, words—in the whole Olympus of 
appearance!”200 
 Hence we see that what is inscribed at the outset of this text is the need for 
laughter if we are going to be artists and masters. But we must always remember that by 
“master,” Nietzsche has in mind more than its denotative meaning. It is a term that has 
many layers and folds. At times master can refer to a singular person, and Nietzsche’s 
criticisms often take the form of humor that find their target in specific individuals. It can 
also signify the totality of a historical figure’s thought, what Nietzsche refers to as 
“master moralities.” But I believe Nietzsche is ultimately asking us to be able to laugh at 
ourselves. Master moralities are nothing without the multitude of believers who make 
them up. Therefore, Nietzsche is asking that, at times, we find humor in our investment in 
these historical movements, even when we may believe them to be universal for all time 
(this in itself is ripe for laughter!). In a sense Nietzsche is calling on us to master 
ourselves, often through humorous examination, by interpreting our own prejudices. For 
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who is not the ultimate master of oneself if not our self? Who is ultimately responsible 
for one’s own mastery if not one’s self? 
 So laughter is Nietzsche’s first salvo that signals a danger to the old philosophical 
order. However, he is quite aware that the danger works in another direction and in 
another way. This is the danger that results from the collapse of previously held values. 
One might say that it is the danger of nihilism or the “straying as though through an 
infinite nothing?”201 What Nietzsche is attempting to inscribe in this epigram that will 
come to shape the tone and texture of The Gay Science, then, is the necessity of 
cheerfulness that is not only outwardly directed but at times inwardly directed. From 
Nietzsche’s perspective, if one finds oneself in the midst of a tragic age, as we have come 
to understand it, one need not only initiate a reevaluation of all values to compensate for 
such a loss. One also needs cheerfulness in the form of laughter and the ability to frame 
existential situations in a comic light that are otherwise of the utmost seriousness: a 
comic light that helps detoxify this toxic, transitional time of history. Thus the inscription 
of laughter and humor that is characteristic of The Gay Science is more than literal, that 
is, more than words written on a page; the very inscription of cheerfulness in the text 
works at the same time in and through its very lightheartedness to move the text outward 
into the world of lived experience. Like a hot-air balloon that inflates, rises, and lifts, 
Nietzsche’s humor all but abandons the text and gives us a new purview on our own 
existential circumstances. 
 Such laughter, however, perches Nietzsche on a very precarious tightrope. This 
tightrope stretched over the abyss of nihilism and the loss of all previously held values 
appears to be hardly an occasion for laughter. Nonetheless, laughter, humor and 
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cheerfulness are what Nietzsche prescribes if we are to overcome the abyss and move 
from “man to overman.” In what is very metaphorical language, Nietzsche states in the 
preface to the second edition that in The Gay Science, “one is constantly reminded of 
winter’s nearness as well as of the triumph over winter that is coming, must come, 
perhaps has already come...”202 Here I take winter to be a symbol of tragic, Dionysian 
wisdom dawning on humankind. This is why the laughter that Nietzsche recommends is 
provocative because it calls out to us. 
 Returning once again to the epigram that inaugurates cheerfulness and laughter 
into, as well as outside, the text, we see that there is a final play at work in this 
inscription. This revolves around the notion of home. The epigram reads, “This house is 
my own and here I dwell” and concludes with, “Over my front door.” How does 
Nietzsche understand “house” here? Is it Nietzsche’s literal house and literal front door? 
This is unlikely since Nietzsche was nomadic in the sense that he wandered according to 
the changing climate and its affect on his health. For me, home has the possibility of two 
things. First, home can refer to existence itself. It is one who is thrown into the world, in 
a word, into one’s home and so finds oneself here. The dwelling is a dwelling here on 
earth where one is tasked with becoming what one is by taking up one’s own authentic 
possibilities in the midst of, and in full recognition of, tragic knowledge. 
 The second possibility is that home refers to the body. The body is the 
phenomenon through, and in which all our perceptions occur and Nietzsche is 
preeminently aware of the need for a healthy body and therefore a healthy spirit. To be 
sure, these two are hardly distinct, antithetical terms and Nietzsche is constantly striving 
to show that pain and health can not help but work together in a strange alchemy of 
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significance. The body and the suffering that often times accompany it, as it did in 
Nietzsche’s case for most of his life, require a translation into philosophy, indeed, a 
cheerful philosophy of affirmation. Both of these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. 
To be sure, finding oneself here in the world means also to realize oneself as an 
embodied being. 
 There is one last important element that appears at the beginning as well as the 
end of both editions of The Gay Science. These anchoring points will come to further 
characterize this book as a work that is well aware of the danger it presents, but is also as 
a harbinger of comedic and laughter provoking moments that erupt from this danger that 
keeps one in good health. At the end of the first section of the preface Nietzsche states, 
“Incipit tragoedia,” or “the tragedy begins.” The same is true of the conclusion of the 
first edition where Nietzsche writes “Incipit tragoedia” and then proceeds to announce 
the first appearance of Zarathustra in his corpus and the need for “going under” 
(Untergang). This notion of incipit tragoedia is echoed once again in aphorism 382 (the 
last section before the epilogue) in the second edition where it is stated, “it is perhaps 
only with it [a spirit that plays naively] that the great seriousness really emerges; that the 
real question mark is posed for the first time; that the destiny of the soul changes; the 
hand of the clock moves forward; the tragedy begins.”203 Nietzsche is clear that attempts 
to grasp and even shape what he sees as the most transformative philosophical issues of 
his time—the problem of nihilism—is necessarily linked to a playfulness and innocence. 
Indeed, it is only with a playful spirit that one can begin to grasp the tragic view of life. 
 Kathleen Higgins interprets Nietzsche’s use of incipit tragoedia in a number of 
ways. The first is to reflect on the historical dimensions of Nietzsche’s thought as it 
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relates to actual Greek tragedy. She skillfully relates Nietzsche’s insights about tragedy 
and its beginnings in the chorus to the subsequent development of the actual tragic hero 
who arrives on the Greek stage later, and who propagates only the already achieved 
mystical, transformed state of the spectator. For Higgins, the notion of incipit tragoedia, 
coupled with Nietzsche’s introduction of Zarathustra, functions very similar to the tragic 
hero of ancient Greek theater who arrives on the stage as a later historical development 
well after the tragic chorus. Thus, whereas the tragic hero continues the transformational 
process of tragedy that allowed the Greeks to live cheerfully in the midst of their tragic 
age, Zarathustra arrives on the scene of later history (Nietzsche’s own time) to continue 
the same type of insights. As Higgins states: 
 When the hero Zarathustra appears at the end of The Gay Science, I think that 
 Nietzsche expects that the rest of the book has served the function of the chorus. 
 ....By the book’s end, Nietzsche hopes, we are capable of entering Zarathustra’s 
 perspective and seeing his achievement in a transfigured light.204 
The Gay Science and its attempts at lightheartedness in the midst of what Nietzsche 
believes is the imminent, if not already collapsed, order of all older values functions as a 
tragic chorus that prepares the way for his tragic hero, Zarathustra. 
 Higgins also considers another historical perspective in terms of religious 
development. Zoroastrianism not only predates Christianity, but many of the most 
fundamental concepts found in Zoroastrianism, such as monotheism and the moral ideals 
of good and evil from this ancient Persian religion, were later appropriated by the Judeo-
Christian tradition. Nietzsche by turn cleverly appropriates the historical Zarathustra to 
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his own Zarathustra, a later literary creation, to be the free spirit who brings into radical 
questioning religious historical development. In Higgins’s words: 
 Zoroastrianism’s influence on Judaism and Christianity allow Nietzsche to 
 address his own tradition by means of his retelling of the Zarathustra story. “The 
 tragedy” that “begins” with the historical Zarathustra includes the Judeo-Christian 
 developments that follow him....What Zarathustra accomplished with his primal 
 distinction, Nietzsche’s comments suggest, is the initial move toward 
 perspectivism.205 
It is a humorous yet serious account of the historical Zarathustra with Nietzsche’s later, 
literary creation. The cleft between them is nothing less than the move to perspectivism 
that he desires. Higgins’s insights continue as she skillfully lays bare much of the comic 
twists and turns of the German language found in The Gay Science. Moreover, she 
continues her analysis on what she identifies as the main issue at hand—perspectivism 
and “the enterprise of reconsideration, of identifying errors.”206 What Higgins concludes 
is that The Gay Science, as well as the entrance of Zarathustra onto the “stage” of 
Nietzsche’s thought, initiates a new type of thinking—light, free-spirited, unencumbered 
by the past—that careful readers will see as a comic relief to the previous tradition, while 
also maintaining the requisite seriousness. 
 While I agree with Higgins and consider her study a major contribution (as well 
as a joy to read), my perspective diverges on one critical point. Whereas Higgins sees The 
Gay Science as playing the role of the tragic chorus and Nietzsche’s introduction of 
Zarathustra at its conclusion as a metaphor for the tragic hero who appears later and thus 
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all is contained in the text, my interpretation takes a more comprehensive turn and 
expands outward. Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and his Zarathustra initiate an often times 
playful, humorous perspective that operate as an eruption, one that bursts forth in an age 
of moralities that are winding down. Similar to the play of inscription seen above, the 
writing in The Gay Science and the figure of Zarathustra overflow the text; they are 
eruptions out of the text into philosophical history. In other words, these texts are not just 
to be read and subsequently left behind but enacted. Nietzsche’s fröhliche Wissenschaft 
not only brings to the stage Zarathustra, perspectivism, and constant revision, but the 
work itself is a playful account of the kind of humorous, lightheartedness, and free-
spiritedness—the comedy performed at the end of the tragedies207— needed to overcome 
tragic knowledge. The kind of cheerful science Nietzsche advocates pulls away the veil 
of comfort provided by metaphysical illusions so that life reasserts its own free, 
instinctive, kinetic force in the wake of tragic knowledge. 
 To conclude, consider Nietzsche’s last line of the first aphorism of the preface to 
the second edition after his announcement of “Incipit tragoedia.” It reads, “Beware! 
Something utterly wicked and mischievous is being announced here: incipit parodia, no 
doubt.”208 “Incipit parodia” means “the parody begins.” To parody something means to 
mock and imitate it in order to trivialize, hence its use as a comedic device. Parody from 
the Greek paroidia, from para- “beside or parallel to as in mocking” and oide- “song, 
ode,” stays faithful in much the same way to the meaning of both tragedy and comedy 
that also harbor “oide-” as part of their etymology. Hence we see Nietzsche’s 
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appreciation of framing these important issues of philosophy in terms of art, music, and 
song as evidenced by the root meanings of all three terms. This recalls his reflection in 
“An Attempt at Self-Criticism” that The Birth of Tragedy “ought to have sung” and not 
spoken.209 Thus it is reasonable to conclude that with The Gay Science and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra we will see these later works “singing” in the way that he had wished The 
Birth of Tragedy to have sung. And by use of imitation, Nietzsche will bring to an image 
or an appearance in a mocking manner those philosophical targets he wants to “sound 
out” in terms of their hollowness. There will be no recourse to some original form or 
logical formulation. There will be only an aesthetic will-towards-truth as appearances 
play out into the freely open. This strategy of parody will help begin to relieve the 
pressure of millennia so that subsequent thinking can return, “with merrier senses, joyful 
with a more dangerous second innocence, more childlike, and at the same time a hundred 
times subtler than one had ever been before.”210 
 
 
II. Becoming Interesting to Ourselves—Laughter and Perspective 
 
 Nietzsche’s release from the pressure of ill health in 1882, however temporary, 
reinvigorated his spirit and consequently his thinking. The “gaya scienza” also relieves 
the kind of heaviness that he believes has kept its pressure on philosophical thinking for 
millennia, keeping it from being the type of thinking that ought to be joyful and 
lighthearted; a thinking worthy of philosophy in that it sings and dances on the precipice 
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of multiple perspectives. In the first aphorism titled, “The teachers of the purpose of 
existence” laughter comes to prominence in its relationship to truth and perspective, and 
reason and unreason, or one might say in its relationship to appearance. 
 The preservation of the human race, Nietzsche says in this laughter filled 
aphorism, “constitutes the essence of our species and herd.”211 This instinct to preserve 
the human race creates, in a sense, a vacuum. The vacuum is the need for a reason or 
purpose as to why we exist, otherwise existence would operate on an essentially base 
level of mere survival. Hence Nietzsche refers to man and this need to know why he 
exists as someone who “became interesting to ourselves,” and who has over time become 
“a fantastic animal.”212 This vacuum opens the door to various individuals who have 
come along and filled this void with reasons as to why we exist, that is, to the purpose of 
our being here. Nietzsche observes that in the long run, even those who appear most 
harmful, may be just as beneficial or useful to “the amazing economy of the preservation 
of the species” as those who appear as good. It is all a matter of perspective and the way 
in which one views history and life. Or one might say that it is the perspective one has, 
knowingly or not, within the time of which one lives providing the horizon of meaning 
for that period. 
 This gives rise to a tension between the individual and the species. Is it possible 
for an individual to genuinely harm the species anymore? Nietzsche claims that at this 
time in history, what we might call modernity, an individual may pursue what they think 
is their own good or bad desires. They may be rewarded or blamed according to the 
prevailing normative moral codes but nonetheless they are still a “promoter and 
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benefactor of humanity.” One of Nietzsche’s insights in this aphorism is that the 
individual, regardless of its “good or bad” desires, is always subsumed beneath the 
species whether the individual is conscious of it or not. One individual relegated to its 
own perspective, its own “fly—and frog-like wretchedness,” cannot possibly have a 
birds-eye view of history and existence let alone discern its purpose. Even the most 
brilliant individuals have failed at recognizing this supposed perspective Nietzsche 
himself claims to have recognized. And this is just what he believes is worthy of a great 
deal of laughter: 
 To laugh [lachen] at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh from the 
 whole truth [aus der ganzen Wahrheit heraus zu lachen]—for that, not even the 
 best have had enough sense of truth, and the most gifted have had far too little 
 genius! Perhaps even laughter [das Lachen] still has a future—when the 
 proposition ‘The species is everything, an individual is always nothing’ has 
 become part of humanity and this ultimate liberation and irresponsibility is 
 accessible to everyone at all times. Perhaps laughter [das Lachen] will then have 
 formed an alliance with wisdom [Weisheit verbündet]; perhaps only ‘gay science’ 
 will remain. At present, things are still quite different; at present, the comedy of 
 existence [Komödie des Daseins] has not yet ‘become conscious’ of itself; at 
 present we still live in an age of tragedy, in the age of moralities and religions.213 
So, one of the things Nietzsche finds so laughter provoking is that we do not often see 
ourselves as laughter provoking. We are not yet capable of laughing at ourselves because 
he does not believe we possess the perspective needed—from that of “the whole truth”—
to see ourselves as worthy of laughter (even this apparent contradiction of a “perspective” 
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on the “whole truth” is humorous, but then again Nietzsche revels in laughter, 
contradiction and the play of appearances). We are always acting within the confines of 
our given historical reality and its attendant moral and ethical systems. We believe the 
appearance of these systems due to their various advocates to be universal and applicable 
to all times. It seems as if there will always be, Nietzsche believes, the kind of teachers 
who promote a meaning that lies behind appearance and who “from time to time decree: 
‘There is something one is absolutely forbidden henceforth to laugh at.’”214 
 Yet Nietzsche is saying that, as necessary as these systems including their errors 
may be, if one were to take up the perspective he supposedly has we would find that all 
of these systems and the meta-positions they engender are really only appearances on the 
stage of history and so within time. Rarely has anyone achieved the perspective (once 
again Nietzsche believes himself to be an exception) that the individual is always in 
service to the species and acting under the guise of good and bad or good and evil as he 
will have it in On the Genealogy of Morality. This lack of conscious awareness on the 
part of the subject—let alone whole peoples—is what Nietzsche finds so laughter 
provoking. It may appear to individual subjects, especially in Nietzsche’s and our 
contemporary era of self-assertion, that we are promoting our own destiny independent of 
any forces and that we are ends in ourselves, yet the reality is we and all of our systems 
both good and bad are one and all in service to the species. It is exactly these moral and 
ethical systems that are promoted by the teachers of the purpose of existence and beheld 
by their followers so that it appears as though existence has behind it some eternal truth 
to which people and whole cultures can take comfort in that Nietzsche finds additionally 
amusing: “All ethical systems hitherto have been so foolish and contrary to nature that 
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humanity would have perished from every one had it gained power over humanity—all 
the same!”215 
 Recall that measure and self-forgetting are defining characteristics of comedy and 
provocative laughter. The notion of self-forgetting exhibited by the teachers of the 
purpose of existence above was called “lack of conscious awareness.” What accounts for 
the most serious transgression of measure and hence becomes open season for 
Nietzsche’s laughter is the failure—whether intentional or not—to recognize limit and to 
take into account the measureless. Just as great comic characters, to some degree or 
another, engage in self-forgetting so to do the people of various professions who surround 
us. A brief detour to On the Genealogy of Morality has Nietzsche offering us a similar 
account to that of the teachers of the purpose of existence in The Gay Science. 
 Just as he finds the teachers of the purpose of existence laughter provoking so too 
does he find comedic value in ascetic ideals and those who seek them. In the third essay 
in On the Genealogy of Morality, “What do ascetic ideals mean?” an example of this self-
forgetting is given in terms of different people in different spheres of life. These include 
artists, historians, philosophers, and most of all priests. All of these require that some 
kind of meaning be given to life, that is, that they always display an impulse to find an 
ultimate truth that comforts them (and in the case of the priest comforts their believers). 
This always entails in some way the withdrawing from real life, the rejection of the world 
of becoming, and the failure to affirm our suffering. But for Nietzsche life needs no 
explaining, it needs no grand meaning, and the impulse to do so, to ask, “Why are we 
here?” especially under the pretext of suffering is nihilism. The important correlate to this 
though is Nietzsche’s beseeching us to love our fate or in his words, “amor fati.” What is 
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valorized here is the affirmation of the very chaos that sends others searching for 
meaning elsewhere. This is precisely why Nietzsche says in Ecce Homo, “My formula for 
greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different.”216 Perhaps Babich 
has it most succinctly when she says, “amor fati is the benediction of the Dionysian.”217 
In other words, what is to be loved, what is necessary, is the chaos that eternally returns. 
 Nietzsche provides only one way to counter the ascetic ideal and the impulse 
behind it—comedy, “[T]he ascetic ideal has, for the present, even in the most spiritual 
sphere, only one type of real enemy and injurer: these are the comedians of this ideal—
because they arouse mistrust.”218 Nietzsche is not exactly clear whether by comedians he 
means someone such as himself or a playwright (perhaps in the vein of Aristophanes) 
who ridicule the ascetic ideal through their respective works or that the actual comedians 
of the ascetic ideal are the very perpetrators of the ideal themselves because their very 
appearance arouses laughter thus providing the spectacle of a comedy. Either way, to 
“combat” the ascetic ideal is to hold it up for mockery and ridicule due to its self-
forgetting and transgression of limit. Indeed, part of the ascetic ideal’s self-forgetting is 
that it is a closed system because the assertion that there is only one overarching meaning 
to all life makes life referential only to that positing.219 In the desire to provide itself with 
some ultimate meaning, usually transcendent, the purveyors of the ascetic ideal have only 
looked inward and forgotten the joy one can take in eternal becoming which for 
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Nietzsche is the agonistic interplay of all the value-creating forces in nature, none of 
which ever become fixed into permanence. 
 Returning to The Gay Science we are confronted with the question: “If not reason, 
what then is really at work in promoting the species at the expense of the individual?” In 
asking this question we must always keep in mind Nietzsche’s own endorsement of the 
individual, the Übermensch type, over the herd. He offers the following explanation: 
 This drive [Jener Trieb], which rules the highest as well as the basest of human 
 beings—the drive for the preservation of the species—erupts from time to time as 
 reason and passion of mind [Vernunft und Leidenschaft des Geistes]; it is then 
 surrounded by a resplendent retinue of reasons and tries with all its might to make 
 us forget [vergessen] that fundamentally it is drive, instinct, stupidity, lack of 
 reasons.220 
What is comedic, then, is that behind the appearance of purpose and reason in history 
with all the subsequent “resplendent retinue of reasons” really lies its opposite: unreason, 
instinct, chaos, recklessness, Dionysian madness. Only when this dynamic of the species 
over the individual has become “part of humanity,” which is to say only when one comes 
to recognize that they are a single voice within a multitude of voices that constitutes an 
agon, will this secretive laughter for the few and the rare become accessible to all. It is 
only then, as he states above, will “laughter have a future” and form “an alliance with 
wisdom.” When the game is up, so to speak, gaya scienza is what will remain. 
 Although Nietzsche does not mention Hegel here or anywhere in this first 
aphorism (he offers only poets as an example of teachers of existence), nonetheless 
Nietzsche’s phrasing, “reason and passion of mind” and “resplendent retinue of reasons” 
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offers the chance to present a contrast as well as a few similarities to Nietzsche’s views. 
Hegel’s lecture “Reason in History,” published after his death as part of Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, argues that rationality is behind all motivations and appearances in 
history driving it forward in a progression to absolute consciousness. “Reason” he states, 
“...is both substance and infinite power.”221 Reason in the individual, a people, and a state 
are subsumed under the teleological pull of Spirit as it progresses towards itself as self-
knowing. At one point Hegel asserts, “This restless succession of individuals and 
peoples, who exist for a time and then disappear, presents to us a universal thought, a 
category: that of change.”222 This notion of the “restless succession of individuals and 
peoples” as well as the idea of change seems to be prima facie in accord with Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of change and becoming. However, a closer look reveals the similarities to 
be more apparent than real and a cause for laughter. 
 The difference between Hegel and Nietzsche is that, although Hegel recognizes 
the phenomena of change within the unfolding of Spirit, Spirit nonetheless achieves in 
the end wholeness and completion. Any production of difference is always subsumed 
under an over-arching homogeneity as a totality of self-knowing, self-same Spirit. Simply 
put, according to Hegel unreason and chaos are always vanquished by reason and order. 
Therefore, he would never accept Nietzsche’s premise that unreason, error, and folly play 
the crucial role in history’s development. Where Hegel sees the march forward of reason, 
Nietzsche is always quick to point out that far from originating out of the lofty heights of 
a transcendental plane, the genealogy of our moral and ethical valuations lie in a sort of 
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primordial grayness and fog as, for example, Michel Foucault has shown.223 In addition 
there is not a single mention of laughter (Lachen), humor (Humor), comedy (Komödie) or 
cheerfulness (die Frölichkeit) in this particular lecture by Hegel. It purports to find only 
dispassionate reason in history. 
 To be fair, one ought not conclude that Hegel does not appreciate comedy and the 
laughter that accompanies it. As we saw in the introduction, Hegel, like Nietzsche, lauds 
comedy, particularly the genius of Aristophanes. Both philosophers grant that much of 
Aristophanes’ gift lies in the fact that he was aware that he was part of the actual “tumult 
of history” of his time. This is to say, he was part of becoming yet was able through much 
of the (non)sense of his comedy to stand outside that tumult as a spectator, enabling him 
to write the kind of comedies that never betray the most profound philosophical issues. 
So we see Hegel’s deep appreciation of Aristophanes and his craft just as we saw 
Nietzsche’s appreciation of the same. 
 This however raises a point of contention concerning Hegel, Aristophanes, and 
even comedy in general. How can Hegel, the philosopher of reason and Spirit, appreciate 
Aristophanes even to the point of elevating comedy above the epic and tragedy? In other 
words, how can Hegelian rationality and Spirit appreciate comedy whose essence is 
absurdity and, if Nietzsche is correct, an inversion of reason? The answer I argue 
revolves around the perspective Hegel takes, which can be broached two ways. 
 First, Hegel is taking the perspective of the subject and ordinary consciousness. 
By adhering to a dialectical critique of consciousness, he is able to reflect on and critique 
consciousness. This is because in Hegel’s account contradiction cannot stand, that is, 
                                                 
223 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 
II, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 369-91. 
 139
contradictions must be resolved. By observing consciousness as a phenomenon, and what 
appears to it he is able to follow it as it moves from a lack of knowing to self-certainty. 
Because Hegel sees the world as inherently rational, all objects of inquiry must, in the 
end, conform to the subject. In other words, a subject’s reason and the way they comport 
themselves in the world and see the world are preeminently important. To some degree 
this diminishes the importance of the object, comedy being no exception. With the stress 
put on the subject and consciousness, comedy as a phenomenon is important only in that 
it is represented in consciousness and, moreover, that it is understood, however absurd it 
may appear. One must, in a sense, “get one’s mind right” if one is to achieve any self-
certainty about the external world, which means the use of dialectical reason that relieves 
the tension of dualistic thinking. 
 Second, because the subject is both distinguished from the lived world and yet 
finds itself part of it, Hegel will maintain that all of our particular theories (in all of the 
sciences) can not be dislocated from the conceptual-historical framework that gives rise 
to them. In other words, even our theories are given through a perspective; one that 
locates them at a particular place and time in history. The same is true for religion and 
art, including comedy. They too are historical developments (as stated above Hegel treats 
them in the section on art and in the privileged position of just preceding the pinnacle of 
Spirit’s absolute knowing). Hegel argues essentially that, historically speaking, comedy 
exceeds both epic and tragedy because behind the comedic mask lies an actor. In other 
words, the spectator understands what the mask really conceals. But what of the gods? 
Hegel claims: 
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 With the vanishing of the contingent character and superficial individuality which 
 imagination lent to the divine Beings, all that is left to them as regards their 
 natural aspect is the bareness of their immediate existence; they are clouds, an 
 evanescent mist, those imaginative representations. The essence of these having 
 been given the form of thought, they have become the simple thoughts of the 
 Beautiful and the Good, which tolerate being filled with any kind of content.224 
The divine beings that once were present have now been vanquished by the comedies of 
Aristophanes and are now thoughts and concepts deprived of real existence. 
 Both of these reasons, indeed because of them, allow Hegel to laud comedy in all 
of its absurdity and still maintain the critical stance. Even a phenomenon such as comedy 
which may appear to exceed the limits of reason is, nonetheless, brought into reason’s 
purview as well as his phenomenological investigation just like all other phenomena so 
that consciousness might correct itself as it relates to the world in which it is situated. In 
Hegel’s words: 
 The scepticism that is directed against the whole range of phenomenal 
 consciousness,...renders the Spirit for the first time competent to examine what 
 truth is. For it brings about a state of despair about all the so-called natural ideas, 
 thoughts, and opinions, regardless of whether they are called one’s own or 
 someone else’s, ideas with which the consciousness that sets about the 
 examination [of truth] straight away is still filled and hampered, so that it is, in 
 fact, incapable of carrying out what it wants to undertake.225 
                                                 
224 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §746. 
225 Ibid., §78. 
 141
 Then there is the notion of transgression. Unlike Hegel, Nietzsche’s view of 
comedy and laughter always comports itself to the transgression of limit. This is why 
Nietzsche refers to humankind’s reconciliation back to nature as a “primal contradiction,” 
because at its core the Dionysian never gets resolved. It is never “worked out,” unlike 
Hegel’s system of dialectical consciousness, onto a higher plane. As abysmal, the primal 
pain and joy are always held together in their opposition. Logic simply fails to account 
for this phenomenon. Hence comedy and laughter enact the very moment when limits are 
either torn asunder, or at least when limit is recognized as limit to then be subsequently 
targeted for demolition. Nietzsche’s assertion that “the comedy of existence is not yet 
conscious of itself” expresses just this assertion. Nietzsche is saying that the successive 
appearances of moralities and tragedies that bring a certain order out of the chaos of 
nature and history and help perpetuate the species, that is, have demarcated their own 
limits out of themselves, have yet to be seen as appearances, that is, as successive 
appearances in history. To transgress this limit is to garner the perspective Nietzsche 
supposedly has and thus to be consciously aware of these appearances as appearances and 
so as a comedy of history unawares. The “fearless ones,” or free-spirited individuals as 
subjects, are able to recognize the appearances for what they are. This is precisely why 
Nietzsche always promotes the robust individual—the Übermensch type—as one who 
treads lightly on the periphery of history, as one who is able to use history only as a 
springboard forward, as one who recognizes the burden of memory and so attempts to 
forget. “Healthy is who can’t recall” Nietzsche says in “‘Joke, Cunning and Revenge’: 
Prelude in German Rhymes,” which played the part of a preface for the first edition of 
The Gay Science and is itself a playful hint of the transgression that occurs in the rest of 
 142
the text, most notably the transgression that laughter and cheerfulness perpetrate. Hence, 
similar to Aristophanes, those fearless ones recognize that they too exist within a 
particular historical epoch yet through the conscious knowledge of successive 
appearances and illusion are also on the outside. Nietzsche also promotes this kind of 
notion. It is as if, on the one hand, we are swept along on the inside of the great stream of 
becoming but, on the other hand, when we take a different perspective we are also on the 
outside looking in at ourselves. 
 For Hegel, change is surely part of his thinking. Indeed Nietzsche in section 357 
of The Gay Science (Book Five “We Fearless Ones”) asserts that, “We Germans are 
Hegelians even had there been no Hegel, insofar as we (as opposed to all Latins) 
instinctively attribute a deeper meaning and greater value to becoming and development 
than to what ‘is’; we hardly believe in the justification of the concept ‘being.’”226 In one 
sense, then, Hegel also attributes change in and through the negating subject. Through 
sublation [Aufheben] the subject is able to negate what is initially given to consciousness 
into a new, higher level. As Tom Rockmore states, “Through this new concept 
[sublation], Hegel stresses that the developmental process of knowledge preserves what is 
true (wahr) in the prior moment.”227 Yet Hegel’s conception of subject and change, as 
dynamic as it is, is always already an emergence towards Spirit (Geist). There is no 
standing out of the subject. Indeed the individual subject and its will appear to be 
sublated evermore as Spirit unfolds. Thus, although Hegel recognizes change as part of 
his phenomenology, and Nietzsche too recognizes this kind of change in Hegel, Hegel’s 
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sense of change is still an ordered, structured change that never transgresses the limit of 
Spirit. It is as if the change manifested by the negating subject is never able to transgress 
the closed circuit of Spirit which provides the ultimate meaning to the world. For Hegel 
there really does not exist a Dionysian element (call it Abgrund or unreason) that 
appearances scheinen forth from. This is exactly what is so crucial to Nietzsche who 
retains this element as well as the more robust, will-to-power expressing, noble value 
creating subject. 
 Coming full circle, Nietzsche refers to this lack of consciousness on the part of 
humanity (who normally believe themselves to be aware of it) as “the comedy of 
existence.”228 This lack of awareness, often manifested as the will to conscious illusion, 
that is, the need for the illusions provided by in this case the teachers of existence, 
provides fertile ground for comedy. The notion of being unaware, of self-forgetting has 
always been a cornerstone of much comedy, including that perpetrated by great thinkers. 
As Freydberg points out (albeit in reference to Sallis’s thought on comedy), “comedy 
involves the playful collapsing of differences, the playful transgression of limits proper to 
a human being.”229 Often great comedic characters suffer from exactly this notion of self-
forgetting, of not being able to distance themselves from their own existential quandaries 
so as to obtain a more enlightening and comedic perspective on their own situation. And 
for Nietzsche, there is hardly a difference in this case between “enlightening” and 
“comedy.” 
 In book one of The Gay Science, Nietzsche locates an example of the eternal 
comedy of existence in the historical figure of the Roman emperor Augustus. In aphorism 
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36, titled “Last words,” Nietzsche discloses the play of concealment and unconcealment 
in terms of the masks that this ruler had worn during his reign. However, his inability to 
remain silent on his death-bed betrayed his “act”: 
 [H]e let his mask fall for the first time when he made it clear that he had worn a 
 mask and acted a comedy [Komödie gespielt]—he had played the father of the 
 fatherland and the wisdom of the throne well enough to create the proper illusion! 
 Plaudite amici, comoedia finita est!230 
Augustus’s failure in Nietzsche’s eyes to remain disciplined and silent let slip the notion 
to those around him the necessary illusions needed in order to rule. In other words, the 
illusions were unmasked. Notwithstanding the many achievements under the purvey of 
the Roman Empire as a whole, when we consider the level of brutality that also took 
place it was only under the guise, the disguise, of a mask that such terror could be 
perpetrated by a legitimate leader. Most notable though to Nietzsche was that behind this 
mask of Augustus was not concealed a tragedy, or drama, but comedy. This is not to say 
that Augustus did not take his rule seriously or that he saw his rule as something 
frivolous. The comedy lies in the fact that Augustus, unlike the vast majority who 
believed the illusions themselves to be real, was conscious of the play of appearances 
needed to rule. The great emperor Augustus saw himself perpetrating a comedy even 
amidst the bloodshed and terror of the time. 
 This criticism is also leveled at Nero in the same aphorism when Nietzsche states 
that, “The thought of the dying Nero—qualis artifex pereo!—was also the thought of the 
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dying Augustus: actor’s vanity! Actor’s prolixity!”231 Both Augustus and Nero’s 
purported last words were the kind of admission that saw life as shining appearance; they 
saw their capacity as rulers not just in political terms or in the skill needed to manipulate 
the mechanisms of government apparatus, but as lead actors on the stage of life. And, at 
least for Augustus, this stage was a stage of comedy where the follies of humankind 
played out. 
 In Daybreak Nietzsche speaks of this phenomenon although he uses men of Greek 
antiquity instead of Roman leaders. Because virtue (aretē) was highly prized by the 
Greeks, Nietzsche’s claim is that many play-acted, that is, showcased themselves before 
others in a kind of competition of virtue: 
 Among the men of antiquity famed for their virtue there were, it appears, a 
 countless number who play-acted before themselves (vor sich selber 
 schauspielerten): the Greeks especially, as actors incarnate, will have done this 
 quite involuntarily and have approved it. Everyone, moreover, was with his virtue 
 in competition (Tugend im Wettstreit) with the virtue of another or of all others: 
 how should one not have employed every kind of art (alle Künste aufgewendet 
 haben) to bring one’s virtue to public attention, above all before oneself, even if 
 only for the sake of practice! Of what use was a virtue one could not exhibit or 
 which did not know how to exhibit itself?232 
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Nietzsche’s insight, if he is correct, suggests that in Greek ethical life, virtue and acting 
were not mutually exclusive but were so closely mixed that the “play-acting” was 
involuntary, which is to say that it was unconscious. Acting, which in essence is a way to 
appear, was intimately tied to one’s ethical standing. 
 There is however a danger that Nietzsche discerns here. When an “actor” of this 
kind—especially for example a Roman emperor—reveals the illusions necessary for the 
ruled to be ruled, then there is the danger for chaos and terror to return. Similar to the 
noble lies told for the benefit of the ruled in Plato’s Republic,233 Nietzsche is stressing the 
need for disciplined rulers who maintain the requisite silence. Hence his example of 
Tiberius, whom he claims, “was genuine and no actor!” and who was the “most 
tormented of all self-tormentors”234 in that he underwent the pain of knowing the secrets 
and contradictions involved in political rule. Unlike Tiberius, both Augustus and Nero 
failed to remain silent and to take the truth of necessary illusions with them to their grave. 
They betrayed this truth unconcealing it as “the comedy of existence.” 
 However, Nietzsche’s comedic take here is not necessarily aimed at any certain 
individual, as apropos as the example of these Roman emperors may be. Nor is it aimed 
at any particular teacher of the purpose of existence or any specific believer of these 
teachers. Instead it is the largest scale of humanity and history itself that Nietzsche 
locates the comedy. From Nietzsche’s perspective, existence (Dasein) and the 
unconscious parade of humanity who unknowingly promote the species over themselves, 
but think otherwise, is worthy of the greatest laughter. It is a perspective on the whole: a 
perspective in which life itself is the sum total of the great phenomena that appears. 
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 Moreover his claim that, “We still live in the age of tragedy, in the age of 
moralities and religions” because “the comedy of existence has not yet ‘become 
conscious’ of itself” attests to his view that on whole we are only on the cusp, indeed 
hardly prepared, for the inevitable dawning of the tragic view of life. One that says that 
life is often painful and destructive and that there are no eternal rewards waiting for us 
behind life and at the end of life. Until this realization, the need for life to have a purpose 
and meaning will continue to be filled by countless heroes on “the stage” of history, 
whether theologians, moral and ethical philosophers, or even Nietzsche’s example of 
poets. Perhaps, if he sees himself as part of the eternal comedy of existence and the 
evidence surely points to this, Nietzsche too is a hero on this stage, albeit the kind of hero 
who hopes to proffer a move towards life ascending values as a counterbalance to the 
nihilism that he believes looms on the horizon of existence. To illustrate this, as well as 
the necessity of comedy as a response to this existential dilemma, he appropriates a key 
passage from Horace’s Ars poetica: 
 ‘I myself, who most single-handedly made this tragedy of tragedies, insofar as it 
 is finished [sie fertig ist]; I, having first tied the knot of morality into existence 
 and drawn it so tight that only a god can loosen it—which is what Horace 
 demands!—I myself have now in the fourth act slain all gods, out of morality! 
 What is now to become of the fifth act? From where shall I take the tragic 
 solution? Should I start considering a comic solution [komische Lösung]?’235 
 One might be tempted to suggest after reading this aphorism that Nietzsche 
suffers from hubris, that he sees himself as a new god that can “loosen” the knot of 
morality that has gripped existence. But this would be a misreading. For Nietzsche, all 
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gods must be overcome, but surely not to be replaced with another, including himself. If 
read in its entirety, this aphorism exhibits Nietzsche’s irony and playfulness, especially 
when he states that he has slain the gods out of morality, the very phenomenon that gives 
rise to them in the first place. Moreover, the slaying of the old gods ultimately gives way 
to the need for comedy as a means to confront the “tragic solution” in a “fifth act.” If 
Nietzsche sees himself as a hero in any sense, then it must surely be a kind of comic-
hero, or even an anti-hero, that is attempting a furtherance of life ascending values and 
not a restoration to any previous historical norms. And even he as a “hero” would have to 
see himself and this bombastic task as a target for its own earth-grounding laughter. 
 And this is just what Nietzsche stresses. The heroes on the stage of life have their 
own shocking counterpart in the form of laughter. To be sure, Nietzsche’s idea is not to 
laugh at any particular hero (however laughter provoking they might be at times); they 
are a necessity “by promoting a faith in life.” Instead, he calls from the perspective of 
“the long run” of “the whole” because he notes: 
 [E]ach of these great teachers of a purpose was vanquished by laughter [das 
 Lachen], reason and nature: the brief tragedy always changed and returned into 
 the eternal comedy of existence [Komödie des Daseins], and the ‘waves of 
 uncountable laughter’ [Wellen unzähligen Gelächters]—to cite Aeschylus—must 
 in the end also come crashing down on the greatest of these tragedians.236 
Just like the comedy performed at the end of the tragedies at the Dionysia by the ancient 
Greeks, the heroes that have ascended the stage of history are in the end vanquished by 
laughter. However, notwithstanding all of this “corrective laughter,” Nietzsche claims 
that human beings are the beings that still crave its teachers, beings who require teachers 
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of the purpose of existence. The appearance of teachers then is necessary, even though the 
substance of their teachings, under the guise of reason or dutiful purpose, always betrays 
unreason, instinct, and a motivation to protect a certain kind of life they are promoting. It 
is these masks that betray comedy. 
 For Nietzsche nothing is more worthy of laughter for those free spirits, the 
“fearless ones” who are able to recognize the truth of our instinctual drives and impulses 
and who are consciously aware of the succeeding generations of the play of appearances 
that conceal these drives. In a sense, laughter plays just as important a role as the need for 
illusions; both are necessary for life. The ability to grasp this grand perspective, of 
standing out of any particular situation that may appear as the most solemn and important 
to them, that understands that there are only perspectives is a worthy goal and one that 
Zarathustra will soon come to embrace. 
 But what are we to make of Nietzsche’s views on truth and perspective? 
“Perspectivism” Nietzsche claims, “is the fundamental condition of all life.”237 How can 
Nietzsche claim that the only thing human beings can have is a perspective while 
believing his perspective is of the whole? Is not a perspective of this kind exactly what he 
claims we ought not to try and take, indeed that is impossible to take “that of the whole” 
as if we were a divinity of some sort? Recall that he says, “To laugh at oneself as one 
would have to laugh in order to laugh from the whole truth—for that, not even the best 
have had enough sense of truth, and the most gifted have had far too little genius!”238 I 
argue that this can be addressed two ways. 
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 First, Nietzsche might well be engaging in his own play on perspective. By this I 
mean that Nietzsche’s perspective is less a “godlike” perspective and more of the kind of 
perspective suitable to someone human, all too human. It is only a grand perspective, that 
is, a perspective of perspectives in that his understanding of “the whole” does not entail 
some transcendent meta-position from which we have the luxury of standing completely 
outside the prescribed limits of our earthbound humanity. In other words, as a meta-
perspective it is a perspective that is keenly aware of itself as a perspective and thus 
never succumbs to the temptation to step outside space, time and the world of becoming. 
Human beings must be content, indeed cheerful with the knowledge, that there is no 
“meta” position outside of nature from which one could judge existence as good or evil. 
 Second, if one were to analyze Nietzsche on purely strict, logical terms, his 
comments on perspective and the whole would surely be found lacking. Yet, this is 
exactly the kind of “restrictive” thinking he is trying to escape. Recall that, for Nietzsche, 
philosophy must be in service to life. And the lighthearted, cheerful, free-spirited life he 
is espousing in The Gay Science is the kind that utilizes humor to advance this particular 
kind of life at the expense of always being “logical.” This point is expounded in aphorism 
82 of book two where he compares the supposed disposition of the Greeks to the French. 
Here Nietzsche’s claim is that logic is equated not only with lack of spirit but lack of 
humor as well: 
 The Greeks are indescribably logical and simple in all their thought; at least in 
 their long good age they never wearied of this; as so often do the French, who all 
 too gladly take a little leap into the opposite and actually only endure the spirit of 
 logic when, through a series of such small leaps into the opposite, it betrays its 
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 sociable civility, its sociable self-denial....The Greeks’ sense of sociability was far 
 less developed than that of the French is and was; that is why there is so little 
 esprit in even their most spirited men; that is why there is so little humour 
 [geistreichsten] in even their humorists [Witzbolden].239 
For Nietzsche it is not that logic is not necessary or does not play a role at all, and as we 
shall see, he even claims that it is even necessary to promote a certain kind of life among 
its practitioners. His point in this aphorism is that the purely logical stance and those who 
may see everything only through its lens, suffer from a lack of energetic imagination and 
sociability (one can surely argue against Nietzsche on this point). Logic, claims 
Nietzsche, ought to be used in doses much like the “bread and water” of prisoners, that is, 
sparingly so that it may provide a minimum of sustenance. However, it should never be 
allowed to dominate and therefore ruin the spirit of “sociable civility.” 
  Moreover, the notion that we can locate certain tendencies in whole groups, in 
the way that Nietzsche appears to be doing, is itself ripe for laughter in that these types of 
sweeping judgments although they appear logical (“this group is all X” and “this group is 
all Y”) are in essence hardly valid. But even though it appears that Nietzsche believes 
these statements to be absolutely binding, this is deceiving and the deception is 
eventually unveiled. Consider book two, aphorism 95 where he says of the French 
politician and writer Nicolas Chamfort that he: 
 [W]as rich in depths and backgrounds of the soul—gloomy, suffering, ardent—a 
 thinker who found laughter [Lachen] necessary as a remedy against life and who 
 nearly considered himself lost on those days when he had not laughed [gelacht]—
 seems much more like an Italian, related to Dante and Leopardi, than a 
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 Frenchman! We know Chamfort’s last words: ‘Ah! Mon ami’, he said to Sieyès, 
 ‘je m’en vais enfin de ce monde, où il faut que le cœur se brise ou se bronze—’. 
 Those are surely not the words of a dying Frenchman.240 
Nietzsche held Chamfort, along with a few other French writers and thinkers, in high 
esteem because of their wit and passion. But here the laughter that Chamfort employed in 
his life as a way to forego disillusionment, the kind of laughter that was previously 
attributed to the French as opposed to the solemn logic of the Greeks, now belongs to the 
Italians. There certainly appears to be a contradiction but one that Nietzsche surely 
recognizes. He uses this contradiction as a weapon against those wielders of reason who 
would demand a rigid consistency that Nietzsche simply does not believe can be 
maintained in lived experience. We are our contradictions because lived existence often 
times outstrips formal logic. So in the end, we come to recognize that Nietzsche himself 
sees a certain fluidity and heterogeneity of traits—in a sense a coming and going of traits 
as opposed to a stable essence—that allows for a more dynamic subject that can navigate 
these multiple textures of life, both good and bad. 
 He does, however, state in aphorism 348 “On the origin of scholars” in book five 
that one may find certain idiosyncrasies behind the scholarly work of individuals. These 
idiosyncrasies betray what is motivating the kind of thinking they are undertaking. One of 
the examples he gives is that of Jews. In defense of them he says of logic: 
 A Jew, on the other hand, in keeping with the characteristic occupations and the 
 past of his people, is not at all used to being believed [glaubt]. Consider Jewish 
 scholars in this light: they all have a high regard for logic, that is for compelling 
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 agreement by force of reasons [das Erzwingen der Zustimmung durch Gründe]; 
 they know that with logic, they are bound to win [siegen müssen] even when 
 faced with class and race prejudices, where people do not willingly believe 
 them.241 
Here logic serves the particular life of Jewish culture, that in Nietzsche’s time especially, 
was under pervasive racism and discrimination (and was to become even more so as the 
next few decades dawned in Germany and elsewhere on the continent). Indeed, Nietzsche 
ends this aphorism to say that Europe, especially Germans, owe a great deal of reverence 
to Jews and Jewish thinkers for “making its people more logical, for cleaner intellectual 
habits.”242 
 We can also locate the ebb and flow of logic and humor in a poignant example 
from more recent history. In his book, From the Kingdom of Memory, Elie Wiesel 
presents his own thoughts on the inversion, indeed the perversion of logic and reason 
during the period of National Socialism in the mid 20th century. Wiesel brings this notion 
of inversion to prominence through the image of The Tower of Babel. The Holocaust is 
described this way by Wiesel: 
 Mankind, jewel of His creation, had succeeded in building an inverted Tower of 
 Babel, reaching not toward heaven but toward an anti-heaven, and there to create 
 a parallel society, a new “creation” with its own princes and gods, laws and 
 principles, jailers and prisoners. A world where the past no longer counted—no 
 longer meant anything.243 
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Just as Guido’s world was inverted in the film Life is Beautiful, so too was Wiesel’s 
world, and the world of the Jews, and other European minorities in the mid-20th century. 
Or one might say the world underwent an inversion and a withdrawal of all that was 
familiar. Wiesel says that by this inversion that Jews were prisoners “in a social and 
cultural void,” “another universe,” a universe “so distorted, so unnatural.” 
 Yet, in the midst of this nihilistic void, Wiesel also relates the story of the French-
Jewish humorist Tristan Bernard who was arrested by the Germans; “[A]fter months in 
hiding, his fellow prisoners were surprised by his smiling face. ‘How can you smile?’ 
they asked. ‘Until now, I have lived in fear,’ he said. ‘From now on, I shall live in 
hope.’”244 What is evident then in Tristan Bernard’s account is a non-logical giving over 
into opposites. Bernard feels most free after his capture. His humor and ability to smile 
happens in the midst of the most tragic and severe event of his life. What good would 
logic do for Bernard Tristan at this point? The reign of National Socialism marks the very 
closing of logic and the ability to persuade by rational argument. As the most irrational of 
events, it marks out the very limit of logic and reason whose ability to persuade was no 
longer felt. Yet in this desert of reason, laughter found a home amidst madness. 
 If we were to appraise this in terms of Nietzsche’s views, it becomes evident that 
the logic that he sees permeating Jewish thinking in his time, which helped further the life 
of this culture, met its fate in the madness of National Socialism. I would argue that for 
Tristan Bernard the ability to appear cheerful and smile even in the midst of this tragic 
finale of the 20th century, is an act of extreme courage. This courage comes from the 
conscious awareness that human absurdity may appear as comic, even if set in the most 
horrific of circumstances, allowing one to surmount it in order to conquer despair. Those 
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who come to realize the play of appearance made manifest by many perspectives and the 
play of reason and unreason should begin to see the “eternal comedy of existence.” The 
necessity of a “gaya scienza,” that frees thinking into a new playful, but still serious 
space, where we can stave off disillusionment enabling us to become the noble beings 
that we are. 
 
 
III. The Fool’s Cap and the Play of Appearance 
 
 Nietzsche’s thoughtful appraisal of comedy and appearance continues throughout 
the rest of The Gay Science. Because Nietzsche rejects any essence that somehow lies 
behind an appearance, he refuses to accept then that appearances are only a dim 
counterpart to essences. He states in aphorism 54 of book one, “What is ‘appearance’ 
[Schein] to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence [Wesens].”245 Life itself 
is appearance, or better yet “beautiful shining.” Nietzsche is at pains to disavow any 
belief in a binary appearance/essence distinction. He further characterizes life and 
appearance as if one were dreaming, but conscious that one is dreaming. Indeed, what are 
dreams if not appearances and if life consists of things that appear—objects, other 
subjects—what then is life if not the conscious awareness of these appearances? He 
states, “appearance [Schein] is the active and living itself, which goes so far in its self-
mockery [Selbstverspottung] that it makes me feel that here there is appearance [Schein] 
and a will-o’-the-wisp and a dance of spirits and nothing else.”246 
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 In terms of comedy this idea of existence or life as appearance works in two ways. 
First, as we saw in the first section that focused almost exclusively on The Birth of 
Tragedy, comedy was tragedy’s counterpart and equal that disclosed the Dionysian 
impulse in its own way. Comedy, along with tragedy, allows the spectator to behold those 
aspects of existence that are painful or absurd. They allowed for the discharge of 
Dionysian madness through beautiful Apollonian appearances so that we may say “yes” 
to life and not succumb to disillusionment. 
 The second way appearance works is that by looking at life itself as an appearance 
without the need for essences behind it generates its own comedic moments. These 
comedic, laughter provoking moments are born out by the “actors” who themselves 
appear consciously unaware of the kind of insight Nietzsche believes he has. The 
supposed serious business of bustling humanity, of people consumed with their own self-
importance, is really fleeting appearances that help constitute the “eternal comedy of 
existence.” So, unlike the first way, where appearance works in a sort of pre-established 
arena where we consciously gather, in this second aspect it is not necessary that one 
gather into a theater as a spectator to witness a tragedy or comedy. This distinction 
between the proper theater of comedy found in the early work The Birth of Tragedy and 
the kind of comedy one can locate in lived reality (one’s own lived reality and the 
appearance of others) is made clear by Nietzsche later in The Gay Science when he states: 
 Whoever has enough tragedy and comedy in himself probably does best to stay 
 away from the theatre; or, should there be an exception, the entire event—
 including theatre and audience and poet—becomes the actual tragic and comic 
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 spectacle to him, so that the piece that is performed means little to him by 
 comparison.247 
In what is the remarkable workings of irony, existence itself many times harbors its own 
comedic elements as we appear before each other deceptively unaware in the play of 
humanity. We become the cause of provocative laughter. 
 Nietzsche proffers many good examples of this second understanding of 
appearance in The Gay Science. Aphorism 30 of book one provides a model example. 
This aphorism titled “The comedy of the famous [Komödienspiel der Berühmten]” 
discloses the motivations that “famous men” undertake in order to maintain the 
appearance of their fame, which Nietzsche claims “they need.” His example of famous 
men (Männer) are politicians (apparently women are not considered here, an omission 
that provokes its very own cautious laughter). Nietzsche offers a keen insight into the 
play of appearances that these men of fame undertake; a play of concealment and 
unconcealment that to the conscious eye of the aware observer discloses some of the most 
sublime comedic moments. 
 These famous men, says Nietzsche, typically act with “ulterior motives” so that 
they may appear to others in an advantageous light. Accordingly he states, “from one 
they want a piece of the splendour and reflected splendour of his virtue; from another the 
fear-inspiring aspects of certain dubious qualities that everyone knows him to have”248 
and so forth. Depending on those who appear as his company, he gravitates to the 
required mask of his own appearance. As Nietzsche points out in this quote, this play of 
appearance is often a doubling, that is, a “splendour and reflected splendour” or one 
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might say “a shining of what das Scheinen.” For many, especially politicians, this 
doubling or layering of appearance provides a cushion from which to absorb the 
accolades, fears or sympathy they seek from others, as well as give those who bestow 
these praises an object for their attention. For Nietzsche there is no distance between the 
wearing of masks and the comic—the masks are us. But how exactly? 
 If we consider Plato’s cave-like image at the beginning of book seven in the 
Republic, then to a large degree politics is based on images, that is, the phenomenon of 
appearance. In turn, when we take into account Nietzsche’s view that no essence lies 
behind appearance, then politics as an endeavor is least tethered to some original form or 
essence, such as justice, even though we believe it to be or believe that it ought to be. If 
justice and the nature of the political is anything in Nietzsche’s scheme, then it is 
certainly the understanding, appreciation, and ability to manipulate appearance to one’s 
advantage. The typical politician seeks his own advantage and that most likely means an 
advantage that asserts his power. However, this power is the image that the politician 
projects to his followers. In other words, it is one’s appearance that is in service for 
politicians and other men of fame. Justice, then, ends up as a phenomenon that is 
intimately tied to appearance and not something distinct, distant and transcendent. “And 
so the surroundings and exteriors of famous men die off continually”249 says Nietzsche. 
Appearance then is at one time something very powerful and yet is something that can be 
shed like the skin of a snake. The potency of appearance and its chameleon-like character 
is its power...but for Nietzsche also its comedic value.250 
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 Nietzsche describes this phenomenon of famous men and the play of appearance 
in terms of comedic stagecraft. The constant shuffle of props as well as the coming and 
going of friends and allies that reinforce a particular appearance all but fulfill the 
spectacle of a comedy. Accordingly he states: 
 Their friends and allies belong, as I said, to these stage properties [Bühnen-
 Eigenschaften]. What they want, however, must stand all the much more firmly 
 and unshakeably and be splendidly seen [weithin glänzend stehen bleiben] from 
 afar; and this, too, sometimes requires its comedy [Komödie] and its theatrics 
 [Bühnenspiel].251 
For Nietzsche, notwithstanding the seriousness of the political and its objectives, the 
individual characters that make up the political as well as their sycophants are nothing 
short of comical. Moreover, Nietzsche stresses the need for a more detached, birds-eye 
perspective if one is to see the laughter-provoking scenes generated by these so called 
“famous men.” One is, of course, always situated within a state with its political 
apparatus and one may also be involved to a healthy extent in the important issues of the 
time. Yet the perspective Nietzsche is advocating is both a figurative and literal stepping 
back, allowing one to be on the outside looking in. The result? Nothing less than 
existence as a comic stage where famous men betrayed by their motivations appear for us 
as “glänzend... Komödie.” The word “glänzend” is translated as “splendidly.” However, 
keeping faithful to Nietzsche’s high regard for the image as that which appears, glänzend 
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can also be translated as “shining.” Once again, to appropriate Shakespeare, “All the 
world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players” on this stage of life, 
radiantly shining for each of us in what often times are comic moments amidst the most 
serious of pursuits. 
 Some might object that Nietzsche is disparaging politics, the political process and 
those who participate in them. That politics has all of its serious issues—going to war, 
civil equality, economic justice, to name a few—is hardly an occasion to disassociate 
oneself from it, let alone see it as comic. However, although it may be least apparent, the 
opposite is true. To appreciate this one has to, as always with Nietzsche, navigate the 
many masks that he wears. In a strange irony, Nietzsche could quite convincingly be 
arguing that if one were to engage the political in a serious manner, that is, if one were 
predisposed to effect some sort of social change by direct and frequent participation in 
the political process, then to take the political seriously there is required not a full 
immersion into the political currents but a healthy distance. Often times when one is 
immersed in something directly, one’s perspective of the whole is diminished. How often 
have we provided our time (and financial assistance!) to a political figure or cause that 
we thought we understood and believed in and then became disillusioned as either little 
changed or the opposite took effect? From a distance, one has the advantage to see what 
is motivating many or most of its practitioners, allowing one not only to understand better 
the phenomenon at hand but perhaps generating some well needed laughter at the 
spectacle of “famous men” and their “stage properties.” With the healthy perspective of 
distance we are better judges of those who hold political power than those who are close, 
but unknowingly relegated, to stage props. 
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 This observation of humanity by Nietzsche, in this case the intersubjectivity of so 
called “famous men,” takes place from a distance. It occurs from an anonymous place 
within the space of the shining of appearance, which allows him to feel the power that 
results from these appearances in their very play. In part, this power consists of the joy 
one gets from the conscious knowledge of these illusions as illusions. It is, in a sense, the 
reward of the transgression Nietzsche feels he is making through this conscious 
awareness of this play of appearance. One that has not “yet become conscious of itself” to 
others but to him, is nothing less than the finest comedy. As a result, existence is likened 
by Nietzsche to a state of dreaming where Apollonian images scheinen: 
 [A]mong all these dreamers, even I, the ‘knower’, am dancing my dance; that the 
 one who comes to know is a means of prolonging the earthly dance and thus is 
 one of the masters of ceremony of existence [den Festordnern des Daseins], and 
 that the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge [die erhabene 
 Consequenz und Verbundenheit aller Erkenntnisse] may be and will be the 
 highest means to sustain the universality of dreaming, the mutual comprehension 
 of all dreamers, and thereby also the duration of the dream.252 
This perspective allows Nietzsche and any conscious observer of human folly not only to 
bear the tragedies and moralities that still grip life but to begin to twist free of them into a 
new, cheerful thinking. It is a space in thought where these tragedies and moralities start 
to lose their force and dissolve into “the eternal comedy of existence.” Accordingly, we 
see then that comedy and serious matters are hardly antithetical just as we saw with 
tragedy and comedy that often times mingle in close proximity so that each bends and 
folds into the other, sometimes giving over into one the other yet able to remain distinct. 
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 Nietzsche continues his analysis and appreciation of appearance as it relates to 
comedy and laughter in the critical aphorism that concludes book two. However 
aphorism 107, “Our ultimate gratitude to art,” treats appearance in a much different way 
than we have seen in The Gay Science thus far. In this aphorism, he looks at existence as 
the phenomenon of appearance and art as the most sublime kind of appearance. By doing 
this we hear the continued reverberations of his most important insights from The Birth of 
Tragedy. This aphorism not only reiterates Nietzsche’s profound belief in the necessity of 
art, it also showcases laughter and folly in the most significant way, whereas The Birth of 
Tragedy concentrated mainly on tragedy. 
 In this aphorism Nietzsche uses art as a “counterforce” to science. Recall that in 
the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,” 
which was published in 1886 only a year before The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks, “what 
indeed is the meaning of all science, viewed as a symptom of life? What is the purpose, 
and, worse still, what is the origin of all science? What? Is scientific method perhaps no 
more than fear of and flight from pessimism? A subtle defence against—truth?”253 
Nietzsche is concerned with science in terms of how it affects life. More specifically, he 
sees it not as many of his contemporaries see it, which is the overwhelming tendency to 
treat it as if it is the supreme method of disclosing the deepest truths. In other words, 
many believe that science describes and understands the world as it actually is. But for 
Nietzsche the theoretical tendency is a fleeing in the face of Dionysian truth, which is to 
say tragic knowledge, because it veils this truth with its own Apollonian illusion in the 
form of a runaway theoretical optimism. The very premise of science rests not only on 
the quest to discover truth by its own method but it also rests on the notion that life itself 
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is a problem that needs to be “fixed,” a premise that Nietzsche rejects. Nietzsche reverses 
this, viewing science as a problem and something hostile to life and unable to come to 
grips with tragic knowledge: “a problem with horns” he says in The Birth of Tragedy. 
 In aphorism 107 Nietzsche posits art as a counterpoint to science. It is the 
phenomenon that is best suited to deliver us from disillusionment that results from the 
failure of science to “correct” existence. Thus he states: 
 Had we not approved of the arts and invented this type of cult of the untrue 
 [Unwahren], the insight into general untruth and mendacity that is now given to 
 us by science [die Wissenschaft]—the insight into delusion and error as a 
 condition of cognitive and sensate existence—would be utterly unbearable. 
 Honesty [Redlichkeit] would lead to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has 
 a counterforce [eine Gegenmacht] that helps us avoid such consequences: art, as 
 the good will to appearance [guten Willen zum Scheine].254 
First, what is newly apparent in this aphorism of The Gay Science is that Nietzsche is less 
hostile to science. The tone is less an outright rejection of science and more accepting of 
science, but only under the guise of its intrinsic limits. In other words, it recognizes the 
value of science by pointing out the very limits that science can never overcome. This 
was certainly less evident in The Birth of Tragedy, where science was harshly critiqued 
and even personified in the figure of Socrates who championed dialectical reasoning. 
There is little doubt that at the conclusion of The Birth of Tragedy, art was seen as the 
unquestioned champion of man’s “highest task” and the “greatest metaphysical activity.” 
But what is striking here is Nietzsche’s claim that art too, like science, is its own type of 
“untruth” indeed, a “cult of the untrue.” Hence we see a more balanced tone between art 
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and science than we did in The Birth of Tragedy. One is compelled to ask then, does art 
still retain the same status over science as it did in The Birth of Tragedy? And if so, What 
is the difference? The answer to the first question is yes. However, the second question 
requires scrutiny. 
 What Nietzsche is preeminently concerned with here is honesty. Honesty 
(Redlichkeit) has a more nuanced meaning in German. It denotes more than the general 
prohibition against telling untruths in that it is mainly focused on the scholarly work of 
academia, which in Nietzsche’s time was the work done by thinkers that made up the 
totality of sciences the Germans called Wissenschaft. Thus it is aimed at intellectual 
honesty as the cohesiveness that binds all the sciences together, including the humanities. 
 Nietzsche’s critique is that science is never free of error “as a condition of 
cognitive and sensate experience.” Science requires its own necessary illusions in order 
to function at all.255 However, we expect science and its practitioners—those concerned 
with the truth—to be least likely to utilize illusions because we equate truth with 
something transcendent and fixed. Most people are either unaware of this dynamic or do 
not believe it. Posited science, for them, is describing the world the way it really is 
because it assumes that the fixed, rigid realm of Being lies behind the world as its 
guarantor. Hence Nietzsche’s assertion is that if one were to exercise intellectual honesty, 
or Redlichkeit, then the truth of science and its method could only lead to disillusionment 
(literally the taking away of the illusion). To reiterate, this is not to say that Nietzsche is 
                                                 
255 Hans Vaihinger says in The Philosophy of ‘As if’ “That life and science are not possible without 
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opposed to science and its practice, but only that at its heart lies the type of “untruth” that 
few people are aware of or fail to acknowledge. Hence it is once again a failure of 
Redlichkeit, of honesty, that Nietzsche finds as the problem. Somewhat similar to the 
kind of nausea we saw with Sartre, a truly honest appraisal of science, Nietzsche 
believes, “would lead to nausea and suicide.” 
 But of course Nietzsche, the philosopher of life, does not want us to take our own 
life. Instead he would have us recognize these illogical “foundations” and irrational 
beginnings of science and the subsequent need for art. It is when philosophers of all 
people fail in this recognition that comedy ensues. Indeed this kind of self-forgetting is at 
the heart of almost all great comedy, and for Nietzsche counts as one of the severest 
transgressions in his catalogue of crimes. 
 There is, however, an important distinction that must be made between that of 
memory related to history and the self-forgetting intrinsic to comedy. This comic self-
forgetting that is tied to the philosopher’s epistemological enterprise must not be 
confused with the type of healthy unhistorical thinking Nietzsche advocates in the essay, 
“On the uses and disadvantages of history for life” in the Untimely Meditations. In this 
essay the idea that one can “live almost without memory”256 is tied to happiness, history, 
and action. Nietzsche uses the image of grazing cattle that live contently because they 
live unhistorically in that they do not burden themselves with the past and are unaware of 
the great stream of becoming they are part of. For the human being though, memory can 
be a burden if it becomes oppressive. If the human being is unable to forget, to de-
memorialize at least to a large extent the past and is, “thus condemned to see everywhere 
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a state of becoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being.”257 This kind 
of burdensome memory would lead to inaction much in the same vein as we saw above 
with lethargy in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche goes on to stress that both, “the 
unhistorical and the historical are necessary”258 although he characterizes the 
unhistorical “as being more vital and more fundamental”259 to the action of a healthy 
individual. 
 And this is where we see the difference between science, art, and their respective 
illusions. Nietzsche’s appreciation of art, including the appearances that constitute both 
tragedy and comedy, are indeed appearances but of a much different kind. Unlike 
science, art “as the good will to appearance” (Nietzsche’s emphasis) allows us to derive 
sublime pleasure from our own creations. “Good will” here denotes the kind of will that 
recognizes appearance as appearance and does not attempt to seek meaning behind the 
appearance. In other words, it is a reveling in appearance without prejudice. Nietzsche 
states that with art, “We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off, from finishing 
off the poem,”260 which is to say that art hovers before us as if it were a mirror. Whereas 
with science its “function” is almost always in service to the kind of life that seeks to 
correct existence and devalue the world of becoming. This is why it has always been 
necessary for science to posit the unchanging world of being behind appearance: the 
same kind of positing we saw in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” above. 
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 By appearing to ourselves in the form of art, we are able to bear and even affirm 
the changing world of becoming where we find ourselves at the mercy of time, change, 
cause and effect, but most importantly tragedies and follies: 
 As an aesthetic phenomenon [ästhetisches Phänomen] existence is still bearable 
 to us, and art furnishes us with the eye and hand and above all the good 
 conscience [gute Gewissen] to be able to make such a phenomenon of ourselves. 
 At times we need to have a rest from ourselves by looking at and down at 
 ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing [lachen] at ourselves or crying 
 at ourselves; we have to discover the hero no less than the fool [den Narren] in 
 our passion for knowledge; we must now and again be pleased about our folly 
 [froh] in order to be able to stay pleased about our wisdom! And precisely 
 because we are at bottom grave and serious human beings and more weights than 
 human beings, nothing does us as much good as the fool’s cap [die 
 Schelmenkappe].261 
Unlike the world of being, which is posited outside of space and time in a realm that can 
never truly be bridged, art allows us to distance ourselves from ourselves within the 
world of becoming because it allows us within our space and time to hold up pieces and 
moments of ourselves for reflection. On the one hand, we are part of the stream of 
becoming, on the other hand, art allows us a reprieve to behold ourselves within this 
stream. For Nietzsche it is the only significant way we can bear and affirm the contingent 
world of becoming that we are part of. 
 What is even more evident in this aphorism is Nietzsche’s appreciation of folly 
and laughter as it relates to the kind of Redlichkeit he is speaking about. Nietzsche 
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stresses that if we are to remain faithful to the kind of beings that we are—human, all too 
human beings—then honesty really means recognizing the kind of dishonesty inherent in 
our desire for knowledge. In other words, there is a lawful and fluid play between 
honesty and dishonesty that Nietzsche recognized as far back as 1873, when he wrote in 
“On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” that, “The feeling that one is obliged to 
describe something as red, another as cold, and a third as dumb, prompts a moral impulse 
which pertains to truth; from its opposite, the liar whom no one trusts and all exclude.”262 
Perhaps Nietzsche is suggesting that the liar—the artist and/or the philosopher of 
Zarathustra’s strain—really is the truth teller because the liar, especially through the 
analysis of language, challenges the “lawful” and supposed universal designation of 
things. In this context then art, as a “cult of the untrue,” really is a truth teller. This was 
not lost on Pablo Picasso who professed, “Art is the lie that enables us to realize the 
truth.”263 
 When we locate this aphorism in the context of The Gay Science and its call to 
release thinking from the kind of heaviness that has dominated it until Nietzsche’s time (a 
heaviness characterized by imperatives and “goal oriented” metaphysics such as Hegel’s 
phenomenology of spirit), we find again a playfulness between folly and seriousness and 
between science and art. If our science and knowledge are to be taken seriously, and 
more importantly if they are to be honest, then laughter, folly and comedy are necessary 
counter-elements. They help to bring balance to the lawfulness of all knowledge seeking 
endeavors. Why exactly do we need folly to help achieve this?: 
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263 Pablo Picasso, “Picasso Speaks,” trans. Marius de Zayas for The Arts (New York, 1923). 
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 [W]e need it against ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, 
 mocking, childish, and blissful art lest we lose that freedom over things [Freiheit 
 über den Dingen] that our ideal demands of us. It would be a relapse [Rückfall] 
 for us, with our irritable honesty [reizbaren Redlichkeit], to get completely caught 
 up in morality and, for the sake of the overly severe demands that we make on 
 ourselves, to become virtuous monsters and scarecrows. We have also to be able 
 to stand above morality—and not just to stand with the anxious stiffness of 
 someone who is afraid of slipping and falling at any moment, but also to float and 
 play above it! How then could we possibly do without art and with the fool 
 [Narren]?—And as long as you are in any way ashamed of yourselves, you do not 
 yet belong among us!264 
It is clear that Nietzsche equates art, especially comedy and the fool, with freedom. 
Unable to see folly in our endeavors, it is as if we are condemning ourselves and the way 
in which we practice science and the quest for knowledge, to the kind of oppressive 
weightiness that Nietzsche’s thinking hopes to free us. This thinking is characterized by 
transgression that says “no” to imperatives, that “floats and plays” outside of any 
syllogistic structure, that is out of step with the march enough so that it dances. If 
necessity that has traditionally been allied with Being has any role at all, it is that art and 
folly are what is necessary as they temper our lives within the contingent world of 
becoming. They allow us to remain free or, as Nietzsche puts it in quasi medical terms, 
art as medicine, keeps us from relapsing so that we do not lose the very freedom over the 
things we seek to understand. Especially as they are manifest in art, folly and laughter 
allow us the distance necessary, not only from the serious work that we do as human 
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beings, indeed “more weights than human beings,” but it allows for us to distance 
ourselves from ourselves. All of this occurs within the world of becoming so that we can 
showcase our folly and in turn reground our scientific and philosophical excess back to 
the earth. And because “ground” has a long history within the Western philosophical 
tradition this notion of a regrounding that returns to the earth is very different from this 
history. It is to see these practices under the auspices of their intrinsic limits and the 
illusions they employ. It is to see the endeavors of science and philosophy as part of the 
world of nature, that is, of becoming where we are subject to its flux and chaos and yes, 
to affirm all this as necessary in the manner of amor fati. Hence this “ground” is far from 
the ground that guarantees certainty, it is in essence an abgrund. 
 To be sure we can find just such an image of this crazy mixture of seriousness and 
folly much farther back in philosophical history than Nietzsche states here. As was 
related in the Introduction, Thales was engaging in his own pursuit of knowledge and 
discovery in the form of astronomy. While looking up and making his astronomical 
observations, Thales forgot himself and stumbled into a well, much to the mirth of a 
servant girl. If this image teaches us anything, then it surely is that folly and wisdom are 
aligned and not antithetical. Nietzsche recognizes this about “the first philosopher of the 
West” as well. In Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche is trying to 
show the type of creative genesis that lies behind the scientific edifice that will come to 
dominate thinking for millennia in a short time. His characterization of the kind of 
thinking undertaken by Thales, who believed water to be the one underlying substance of 
the world, shows it to be more free and poetic or unmoored from the purely scientific and 
logical: 
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 What then is it that brings philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? Is it 
 different from the thinking that calculates and measures [dem rechnenden und 
 abmessenden], only by virtue of the greater rapidity with which it transcends all 
 space? No, its feet are propelled by an alien, illogical power [unlogische 
 Macht]—the power of creative imagination [die Phantasie]....Even if all the 
 footholds have crumbled by the time logic and empiric rigidity want to cross over 
 to such a proposition as “all is water,” even after the total demolition 
 [Zertrümmerung] of any scientific edifice, something remains. And in this 
 remainder lies an impelling force [treibende Kraft] which is the hope of future 
 fruitfulness [die Hoffnung zukünftiger Fruchtbarkeit].265 
Creative imagination that precedes both sensibility and understanding and is the root of 
all our artistic endeavors, indeed any of our endeavors, emancipates thinking out into the 
freely open. One might prefer another perspective and say that imagination allows for the 
boundless to enter back into our thinking once again. Hence the greatest weight and 
importance of the Thales image lies not in any of its scientific discoveries and analyses, 
although these have their own measure of importance. The important image is one of 
seriousness sewn with laughter and folly which forms a shining rhapsody of humankind. 
Far from being a distant, irrelevant image of the past, the image of Thales appears before 
us as our image...as an image of us. 
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IV. Conclusion: From The Gay Science to Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 The laughter and comedy that is central to The Gay Science showcased 
Nietzsche’s appeal for a new approach to thinking and its attendant wisdom. We saw that 
Wissenschaft was henceforth released from the kind of heaviness that had constituted it at 
least since the time of Socrates. This was accomplished in a number of ways. 
 First, gaya scienza itself was a new orientation towards existence that stressed an 
unmooring from the kind of thinking anchored to “thou shalt” binding imperatives. This 
new thinking achieved this not through any ressentiment of the old order, that is, it was 
not simply a reactionary stance that was an antithesis to this order. It released itself in and 
through its own cheerfulness and “yes saying” to life. One of the ways Nietzsche believes 
we can achieve this is by having recourse to our own bodies—letting otherwise inchoate 
states translate themselves into a vital, cheerful philosophy. Thus, there is a strong 
emphasis in Nietzsche, especially in The Gay Science, on the transfiguration of the body 
from something that formally was the seat of sin to a phenomenon that celebrates 
cheerful life in its return and replenishment. The body’s pain was something to be 
transfigured and affirmed and used to forge an outlook on life that celebrated strength and 
life ascending values. Nietzsche appears to say that the key to this overcoming of pain in 
large part lies in a hermeneutics of our physiological state: “The fact that someone feels 
‘guilty’, ‘sinful’, by no means proves that he is right in feeling this way; any more than 
someone is healthy just because he feels healthy.”266 Instead of interpreting physiological 
pain as the factual state of sin, it ought to be transfigured, or as he says in this same 
aphorism “digested” in the same way one “digests his meals.” 
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 What becomes evident then is the close connection between hermeneutics and the 
body.267 To be sure, the feeling, affected body before any valuating, before any 
psychological or transcendent cause is posited, is already undergoing interpretation as 
Nietzsche makes clear: 
 [W]hat does valuating mean itself? Does it refer back or down to a different, 
 metaphysical world? As Kant (living before the great historical movement) still
 believed. In short, where did it ‘originate’? Or did it not ‘originate’? Answer: 
 [M]oral valuating is an interpretation, a way of interpreting. The interpretation 
 itself is a symptom of particular physiological conditions, as well as of a particular 
 intellectual level among the ruling judgments. Who interprets?—Our affects.268 
To be a body that is affected is always already an interpretation. I believe Nietzsche is 
saying that he wants his readers to ruminate and think about the body just as carefully as 
we do psychological states, and even to entertain the possibility that the pain we may feel 
in our soul may be an effect of our physiology. When our physiology is affected some 
way—once again suffering seems to be Nietzsche’s prime example—our interpretation 
ought not rush to a conclusion, especially one that posits a cause of our pain due to some 
transcendental transgression (our very Being as a state of sin). Instead, Nietzsche would 
have us hover in the “in between,” our initial inchoate physiological states and thinking 
consciousness that gives rise to hermeneutical explanation. It is as if, contra Kant, 
Nietzsche is saying that authentic duty lies in mastery of one’s own affected body and its 
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subsequent interpretation (hopefully into cheerfulness and laughter) before our affects are 
assimilated by others into the socio-cultural formations of the herd. 
 Second, to come to grips with the kind of tragic knowledge examined in the first 
section, knowledge essentially of nihilism and the collapse of all values hitherto, as 
Nietzsche says many times, a necessary first step is to recognize oneself as homeless, as 
nomadic much in the tradition of the troubadours. This is to say that because of the loss 
of any transcendent meaning—the death of God is announced in this work—existence 
becomes a place of unfamiliarity unlike one’s home. Nonetheless, because we find 
ourselves here, existence no matter how familiar or unfamiliar is always our home. But to 
be able to grapple with this homelessness, Nietzsche attempts a kind of reversal that is as 
troubling as it is liberating. It turns us out into the freely open in which thinking can 
become creative once again. To be sure, Nietzsche recognizes that his thinking is for the 
few and the rare, that his thinking is in a sense untimely because he sees himself keenly 
aware of the tragic view of existence where others do not. He is also quite aware of the 
repercussions that take the form of pessimism. If he is to have us transform this 
pessimism into life affirming laughter, a necessary first step is to take the perspective on 
one’s new home, the existence into which we are thrown, so that we can become who we 
are without illusions. 
 Third, there is a paradigm shift at work that attempts to rethink humankind only in 
relation to the earth as opposed to “other worldly hopes.” Existence is to be understood in 
purely human terms, which means that sensate experience is given more weight than the 
intelligible realm. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche stressed that “only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence eternally justified,” which is to say that only that which appears 
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to sense is to hold sway. For Nietzsche the most important aesthetic phenomena are those 
of art, especially tragedy and comedy, which disclose in the deepest way the symbols that 
constitute our humanity. They are the only appearances able to disclose the Dionysian 
abgrund to which we are all subject. 
 Fourth, there is a constant stress in Nietzsche that the most human beings can 
have on things is a perspective. This provides a tension, a very comic tension at times, 
because most people, including philosophical thinkers, believe first that metaphysics is a 
hierarchy. For example, this paradigm has god at the top and we are a pale reflection of 
its supposed perfection, and two, that if there are perspectives, then the belief is that they 
harbor an all-encompassing bird’s eye view of things. In other words, they fail to see 
their particular perspective as a perspective, as extremely limited and narrow in its 
relation to millennia and history. One of Nietzsche’s examples is the idea that we are all 
in service to the species, even though it may appear to us that we are promoting our own 
self-interest. For Nietzsche, this is laughter provoking in that we not only fail to 
recognize this but we also fail to comprehend that errors have played the major role in the 
development of our species. 
 Fifth, the mocking tone of The Gay Science promotes the idea of transgression as 
opposed to obedience. Nietzsche’s preface to the first edition, “‘Joke, Cunning, and 
Revenge’ Prelude in German Rhymes” set the stage for the mischievousness that was to 
take place in this work. One of the ways Nietzsche says we can begin to transgress the 
kind of limits he believes characterizes thinking since at least Socrates. To be sure, 
transgression exists within laughter itself, which in its very discharge says that one is no 
longer swayed by previous thinking. Moreover, laughter itself is also a way to 
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disassociate oneself from the very dialectical process that keeps one bound to such 
thinking (this will come to even more prominence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra). To use 
Nietzsche’s own metaphor on dancing, there is a freedom in laughter that releases 
thinking from a march to a dance. 
 Last and perhaps most poignantly Nietzsche stresses the need to see life itself in 
all of its beauty and hideousness as an appearance that provides us with its own laughter 
provoking moments. Amidst the kind of tragic view of life Nietzsche is arguing that 
existence itself, when we step back and let it appear to us, can shine. This can happen 
even when or where it is least likely, in even the most depraved and serious of times 
laughter is always possible, if not necessary. We can now start to see how The Gay 
Science is in a certain sense an opening act for Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first mention 
of Zarathustra does not occur in Thus Spoke Zarathustra but in The Gay Science. 
Nietzsche ends the first edition of this work in 1882 with aphorism 342, “Incipit 
tragoedia,” introducing us to his Zarathustra and it is clearly evident that Nietzsche is 
invoking the kind of poetic imagery that showcases the kind of inversion that he 
envisions for philosophical thinking. 
 For example, in this aphorism Nietzsche invokes the image of the sun. Of course 
the sun is a central image especially as it occurs in Plato’s Republic as an offspring of the 
good.269 For Nietzsche the sun has a much different significance as it relates to the 
inversion of the sensible/intelligible distinction. Nietzsche’s emphasis lies not on the sun 
itself, nor as an “offspring of the good” but on those for whom the sun shines—earth-
bound human beings. Thus he says of the sun, “What would your happiness be if you did 
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not have those for whom you shine!”270 Second, Nietzsche states that the sun rises to 
Zarathustra’s place in the mountain not that Zarathustra or anyone else has to ascend to it 
(whether through thinking or otherwise). Thus Nietzsche says that Zarathustra became 
“sick” of his wisdom and there was now a need for “going under” in order to 
“undermine” previous philosophical grounds. A major aspect of this going under for 
Zarathustra is to bring back laughter and folly to human beings who have forgotten how 
to laugh. Thus Zarathustra says, “Behold, I am sick of my wisdom [Weisheit], like a bee 
that has collected too much honey; I need outstretched hands; I would like to give away 
and distribute until the wise among humans once again enjoy their folly [Thorheit].”271 
 Once again it is clear that for Nietzsche wisdom and folly are never divorced. As 
we will see, one of Zarathustra’s first tasks in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is to invoke the 
“higher men,” that is, men of learning, so that they learn to laugh again, which means to 
recognize the appearance of folly in human affairs as well as in the kind of thinking done 
by men and women of learning. But the set-up to the laughter and the higher men actually 
occurs in book three of The Gay Science. Aphorism 177, “On ‘the educational 
establishment,’” states, “In Germany, higher men lack one great means of education: the 
laughter [Gelächter] of higher men; for in Germany, these do not laugh [lachen].”272 
Here we do find a significant difference, in that the lack of laughter amongst higher men 
is limited to those in Germany whereas in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we will see that this is 
extended to all human beings, regardless of nationality. The “higher men” are of the 
earth. Hence we can say that Nietzsche will end up broadening his perspective to include 
any higher men of learning. 
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 Perhaps the greatest primer that The Gay Science offers its readers as a 
preparation for Thus Spoke Zarathustra is its inclusion of laughter, a bestiary and other 
animal imagery that helps us to see ourselves in our human, all too human capacities. 
Aphorism 224, “Animal’s criticism” in book three states, “I fear that the animals see man 
as a being like them who in a most dangerous manner has lost his animal common 
sense—as the insane animal, the laughing animal [das lachende Thier], the weeping 
animal, the miserable animal.”273 Nietzsche leaves much room for interpretation here. 
Nonetheless two things can be said. First, Nietzsche seems to want to stress a continuity 
if not a likeness with animals so that we do not simply privilege ourselves over them to 
the point that our illusions strip us of our earthbound situatedness. Similar to animals, we 
too are biological beings and creatures of the earth. Second, if this first interpretation is 
correct then it calls into question the very question of our humanity. If we are not 
privileged and the death of God and the advent of nihilism shows that we are, at a 
minimum biologically speaking, just another animal, what will then fill this nihilistic 
void? By taking the perspective of an animal as Nietzsche does in this aphorism, he is 
asking how it is possible in the midst of tragic knowledge to consolidate all of these 
individual, disparate characteristics that an animal might see—the insane, laughing, 
weeping, and miserable animal—into a “common sense” so as to counter nihilism. 
 Aphorism 314, “New domestic animals” states, “I want my lion and eagle around 
so that I can always have hints and forebodings to know how great or small my strength 
is. Must I look down on them today and fear them? And will the hour return when they 
look up at me – in fear?”274 Once again, these kind of pronouncements by Nietzsche 
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surely grant the fact that there is much hermeneutical license involved, indeed required in 
Nietzsche’s writings. Nonetheless the polemic in both of these aphorisms revolves around 
the notion of perspective and whether we are capable of having the kind of perspective on 
ourselves where we see each other as human creatures of the earth that have “become 
interesting.” 
 Nietzsche is stressing the need to have a perspective on oneself that in light of all 
that we have called ourselves—rational animal, a thinking thing, something worthy as an 
end in itself—we have forgotten that we are also all the things (and more) that he claims 
we are in this aphorism. Once again we see Nietzsche in the mode of a psychologist, 
stressing the kind of phenomena that constitute us as a human animal but that we too 
often sublimate to the values of the herd. Laughter is just one such example he uses in 
conjunction with the animal perspective. It will reoccur in full splendor in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. 
 In the second aphorism there is again a play of animals and perspective. In 
Nietzsche’s view, when things have reached their zenith and have fulfilled their role, 
whether it is Christ and Christianity or Socrates and the Greeks, then all must perish 
under the weight of its own greatness. In other words, there is typically an almost 
palpable tension found in Nietzsche’s writings: an agōn either between people, thinkers, 
cultures or values. Both the lion and eagle are metaphors of strength and vitality. The 
lion’s perspective is of the earth as it roams and seeks its prey and the eagle’s perspective 
is of the sky from which it descends to its prey. For Nietzsche, we might say that both the 
lion and eagle are reminders of one’s own vitality, in both body and spirit, and whether 
he has reached his heights as a thinker or is falling short of his own noble goals. 
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 Before we transition to Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the prolific laughter that one 
finds amidst that work, it seems as though a necessary first step is to address Nietzsche’s 
appropriation of Zarathustra. Why does Nietzsche choose such an archaic figure from 
whom many things are said and from which laughter resounds on many occasions? What 
is the significance of Zarathustra the historical figure and Nietzsche’s literary-
philosophical Zarathustra? 
 The Gay Science saw Nietzsche trying to reassert the need for laughter and folly. 
If we are to successfully confront nihilism and pessimism, remain optimistic, and forego 
ressentiment, then laughter and comedy are all the more necessary. With Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra we come to see this laughter enacted in this character. Zarathustra, as a 
historical figure of Persia, was the first to introduce the distinct notions of good and evil 
in the West. These moral tenets gripped thinking, argues Nietzsche, until his time. The 
tragedy is that they are beginning to lose their grip on culture. Nietzsche believes they are 
dissolving and he recognizes this fulcrum of world history in which all previous values 
are becoming devalued. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, through laughter, comedy and parody, 
will attempt to teach “higher men” the need for these qualities if life is to be not only 
bearable but joyful. In other words Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is a precocious character. 
Unlike the vast majority he addresses in this work, he is conscious of the tragic outlook. 
Learning to laugh, that is, to attune oneself so that one is able to locate laughter at the 
intersection of good and evil, where it was previously forbidden, allows for a movement 
beyond good and evil. The task is to be the figure who can disclose to others—especially 
the learned—the tragedy that looms on the horizon of existence: a horizon that has 
hitherto provided metaphysical comfort and meaning to countless peoples. This is why 
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didactic as Zarathustra can be at times, he is also poetic. Through his own unique logos 
he discloses a new perspective on existence, fulfilling the role of poet who attempts to 
move “beyond good and evil,” that is, beyond the old order of things. As Higgins writes, 
“The mission of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is not to pronounce and enforce moral 
judgments on others. Instead, it is the on-going attainment and revision of insights, which 
he does not dishonestly force into easy consistency with one another...”275 But most 
notable to this task is Nietzsche’s insistence that Zarathustra not only speak in this work 
(hence the title), but laugh. This pervasive laughter that takes many forms—scorn, 
destruction, humor and so forth—even overflows Zarathustra himself. Many of the other 
characters, such as the animals in this work, laugh as well. In the last analysis Nietzsche 
invokes us to step back into a new perspective and laugh as well at the “eternal comedy 
of existence.” 
 In essence, then Nietzsche’s literary-philosophical creation enacts a palimpsest on 
the old, historical Zarathustra (from the Greek palimpsestos, “scraped again,” from palin 
“again” and psen “to rub smooth”). Keeping in mind Nietzsche’s notion that knowledge 
should be forward looking, that is, a will to new knowledge as opposed to a return to 
some original in order that we copy it, Nietzsche appropriates the old historical 
Zarathustra who introduced the world to good and evil so that he could create a new 
perspective through his own palimpsest that looks towards the future even though there 
might not yet be ears for such an untimely message. Thus begins, as Nietzsche has it, the 
“wicked and malicious” parody. 
 
 
                                                 
275 Higgins, Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s Gay Science, 163. 
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Chapter Three: Thus Laughed Zarathustra 
 
“I am leaving Genoa as soon as possible and going into the mountains—this year I do not 
want to talk to anybody. 
 Do you want to know a new name for me? The language of the church has one—I 
am...the Antichrist. 
 Let us not forget how to laugh!” 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, 1883~ 
 
 
I. Zarathustra’s Laughing Call 
 
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra is perhaps the work of Nietzsche’s that is most different 
from all his other texts. It is written mostly in the aphorism style, which is different from 
most other philosophical treatises in which a subject is announced, problematized and 
then defended one way or the other. However, the aphorisms contained within this text 
exhibit a poetic and dramatic texture even unlike his previous works. This leads Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari to proclaim, “Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of 
knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown 
in thought.”276 As the title makes clear, Zarathustra indeed speaks but this speaking is not 
limited to the normally privileged form of formal philosophic discourse, such as 
dialectics. The Zarathustra who speaks, that is, who conveys his wisdom, does so in many 
ways. Besides the use of language and dialogue that he has with others, Zarathustra also 
at times sings and dances. However, included in all of these phenomena that constitute 
                                                 
276 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987), 6. 
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Zarathustra’s voice is laughter and, as we shall see, laughter and comedy abound in this 
most idiosyncratic of Nietzsche’s work, helping to weave lightness amidst its profound 
message. 
 To begin to see how laughter resonates in this text, we can think of its occurrence 
along two axes. The first axis denotes who is doing the laughing. It is not always 
Zarathustra. His animals are also his “followers,”277 that is, those he encounters along his 
way who gather in his cave, who laugh on many occasions. Moreover, when Zarathustra 
leaves his cave to commence “going down” (untergehen) the townspeople respond with 
their own laughter. It is a laughter that provides Zarathustra with his first philosophical 
challenge to his going under. 
 The second axis denotes the kind of laughter that occurs. In this text, laughter 
takes on many different forms and textures and on no occasion is laughter simply 
gratuitous. Thus laughter erupts on occasion as something provocative and even at times 
scornful. Laughter may also occur as a form of affirmation that signals Nietzsche’s 
willingness to harness what he sees as his task in and through his parody of the historical 
Zarathustra (including the moral concepts of good and evil that he initiated) with his own 
literary Zarathustra, preparing the way for a new future that affirms life in the face of 
nihilism. In effect there are two voices of Zarathustra, one historical and one that parodies 
the historical Zarathustra. To be sure, there are many more voices that emanate from this 
work, as one of Nietzsche’s goals is to gather all the voices of the earth as if they were a 
chorus because we are all, in a sense, subject to one another. For Nietzsche, parody is the 
                                                 
277 One has to keep in mind that Nietzsche doesn’t want followers in the traditional sense, that is, people 
who look to him as a guide or figurehead that determines to a large extent their path in life. Nietzsche wants 
people to take up the possibilities of their own authentic existence and create themselves as if they were an 
artist, which is to say compose their soul. 
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prime comedic device that showcases the many layers and interconnections of 
Zarathustra not only to the other characters but to wider, philosophical history as well. In 
his book, The Multivoiced Body, Fred Evans makes clear this interconnection of voices: 
 Because the subject matter of this struggle is embedded in the linguistic 
 community, it reflects these other points of view from the beginning. Thus any 
 new utterance about this subject matter is already partially constituted by and in 
 contest with the other social languages of the community.278 
Although Evans is using Dostoevsky’s novels as his example via Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
notion of linguistic hybridization, nonetheless he lists “[p]arody, hidden polemic, 
reverence” as examples of “dialogic overtones,”279 all of which are present in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Descending from his isolation in his cave Zarathustra is, to be sure, 
embedded in the very community of human beings with their views and corresponding 
voices that he wants to usurp. 
 There are of course many more examples. Suffice it to say that in terms of 
laughter, a finely attuned hermeneutical lens is needed to navigate up and down the poles 
of both axes in order to unconceal its significance. Zarathustra’s laughter often times 
lacks subtlety and may appear as abrasive, even belittling, but its occurrence is never 
frivolous and it is surely a sign of something deep in his teaching. However, before 
beginning, a few short words ought to be made280 that attempt to frame the over-arching 
                                                 
278 Evans, The Multivoiced Body, 71. See also Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. 
Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), especially chapter five, “Discourse in 
Dostoevsky.” 
279 Ibid. 
280 I am aware that a few short words could never adequately render the meaning of this complex work. 
Laurence Lampert notes that Nietzsche himself states in Ecce Homo that, “At some point,...perhaps there 
will be endowed chairs dedicated to Zarathustra interpretation.” Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, 
Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 100/Section I of “Why I Write Such Good Books.” Laurence 
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issue at hand in this distinctive work of Nietzsche’s so that we can best see how humor 
and laughter play their key role. 
 There are three overriding issues at play in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first two 
involve Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the major metaphysical claims of the eternal 
return of the same (the eternal recurrence) and the will to power. Although there are 
many interpretations of the eternal return, mine is twofold. To begin we must recall that 
Nietzsche first introduces the eternal return in The Gay Science and not Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In the former work I argue that Nietzsche’s initial thought on the eternal 
return revolves around a regulative fiction in the form of an existential calling. Nietzsche 
is asking his reader to consider his or her life in terms of having to live it over again for 
eternity. In other words, the existential imperative is to have lived a life in which you had 
become who you are and fulfilled your highest aspirations or your “will to power.” Thus 
he says: 
 What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and 
 say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live 
 once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it 
 [nichts Neues daran], but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh 
 and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you [muss 
 dir wiederkommen], all in the same succession and sequence.’281 
The eternal return that Nietzsche speaks of here clearly indicates an existential 
dimension, but in Thus Spoke Zarathustra there is a more refined effort underway by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teachings: An Interpretation of ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra,’ (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986), 1. 
281 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 194/Aphorism 341. 
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Nietzsche. He treats the eternal return as a metaphysical idea while still keeping its 
existential overtones: 
 Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally [ewig 
 wiederkehren] and we ourselves along with them, and that we have already been 
 here times eternal and all things along with us....But the knot of causes [der 
 Knoten von Ursachen] in which I am entangled recurs—it will create me again! I 
 myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I will return, with this sun, 
 with this earth, with this eagle, with this snake—not to a new life or better life or 
 a similar life:—I will return to this same and selfsame life [gleichen und selbigen 
 Leben], in what is greatest as well as in what is smallest, to once again teach the 
 eternal recurrence of all things.282 
Here, the stress is not on a metaphysics taken in its literal sense as that which is beyond 
the physical, that is, as the positing and appeal to some supersensible criteria. Instead it is 
the kind of metaphysics that constitutes the causes and repetitions of that which eternally 
returns. Reflecting on the eternal return in Ecce Homo Nietzsche says, “The doctrine of 
the ‘eternal return,’ which is to say the unconditioned and infinitely repeated cycle of all 
things—this is Zarathustra’s doctrine.”283 We can understand the “unconditioned” here as 
that which occurs without the imposition of form, in other words what eternally returns is 
chaos. If the cheerfulness that beats at the heart of The Gay Science shows anything it is 
that even though we are heirs of the past, nonetheless we are responsible for our time 
now, which lies between the infinite expanse of the past and the infinite expanse of the 
future. Babich links the eternal return with love stating: 
                                                 
282 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 178/“The Convalescent.” 
283 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 110/Section 3 of The 
Birth of Tragedy. 
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 Amor fati is not the resignation of destiny but blessing wrought in the moment of 
 perfection. The consummation of love is to take them all together. Amor fati 
 affirms the past and the future turning like the path the walker traces on either 
 side of the lake at Silva Plana....The affirmation of the eternal return is a selective 
 benediction transfiguring everything with the same golden or silver glance.284 
Nietzsche’s imperative is to refuse assimilation into what he sees as the weighty, serious, 
transcendental oppressiveness of the morality of his time. Laughter and cheerfulness are 
key characteristics envisioned for the psyche of the new artist-philosopher, which is 
given in the voice and image of Zarathustra. His focus is of the earth which was, perhaps, 
glimpsed in the Socrates of the Phaedo as the reborn “music-making Socrates.” 
 However, Nietzsche is still concerned about how meaning or value is generated 
by human beings in light of this new existential condition: there is no eternal, pre-given 
meaning especially the notions of good and evil which had until Nietzsche’s time “book-
ended” all moral discourse. So entrenched were they that Zarathustra says, “No greater 
market place on earth did Zarathustra find than good and evil.”285 Now Zarathustra is at 
pains to deconstruct (some might say “destruct”) and overcome these notions. In light of 
this lack of any teleological, pre-established “ends” we must create our meaning. For 
Nietzsche the eternal recurrence becomes two things. First, it becomes the illustration of 
this meaningless (Nietzsche says in The Gay Science aphorism 341, “[W]ould you not 
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?” 
Zarathustra is in many ways this “demon” that heralds the eternal return). Second, it 
becomes more importantly, the fertile ground, the chaos, that is always there from which 
                                                 
284 Babich, “The Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, 11. 
285 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , 42/“On a Thousand and One Goals.” 
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one can confront nihilism by first recognizing it and then setting to work on creating 
one’s soul within the freedom opened up by the eternal return. 
 It is important to stress that what Nietzsche is saying in terms of the eternal 
recurrence is not that the same events will return over and over again. Nor does he mean 
that all subjects will return over and over again eternally to live the same life. What 
returns is chaos or, “the knot of causes” in which we are a part; “I myself belong to the 
causes of the eternal recurrence” says Zarathustra’s companions the snake and eagle 
when they formulate what Zarathustra might say of the eternal return (my emphasis on 
“causes”). And what is another name for chaos if not what the young Nietzsche 
“formalized” in his earlier work, The Birth of Tragedy—the Dionysian or that which is 
without ground. The deep Dionysian chaos that Nietzsche describes in section four, as 
“that which truly exists, the eternally suffering and contradictory, primordial unity,” is 
antecedent to any manifest structure—individuals, systems, society, culture—and thus is 
the primal unity of all things. Hence, if the eternal return attempts to establish anything, 
then this “anything” is uncertainty. 
 The second over-arching issue found in this work is the will to power. Like the 
eternal return, the will to power has various interpretations. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche treats the will to power as the mechanism or force by which we create meaning 
for ourselves and also that which pervades all living things. He states, “Wherever I found 
the living, there I found the will to power.”286 If the eternal return is the Abgrund that 
always brings chaos, then the will to power is the force that attempts to organize itself out 
of this primordial raw material so that we “become such as we are.”287 So, for example, a 
                                                 
286 Ibid., 89/“On Self-Overcoming.” 
287 Nietzsche appropriated these words (and variations of them) from Pindar, Pythian Odes, 2, line 72. 
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poet may enhance his or her feeling of power by disclosing a vision of the world in and 
through the play of signs, semiotic systems and images. Indeed, their power may stem 
from challenging the prevailing systems of the day.288 
 But Nietzsche is careful to delineate the will to power along two main paths. The 
will to power can act as a nihilistic force. In other words it can, by virtue of its volition, 
will nothing in the sense that it may continually say “no” to life. This will to power is 
essentially reactive. Nietzsche stresses the need to overcome this tendency: 
 ‘No deed can be annihilated [vernichtet]; how could it be undone through 
 punishment? This, this is what is eternal about the punishment called existence 
 [der Strafe Dasein], that existence must also eternally be deed and guilt again! 
 Unless the will were to finally redeem itself and willing became not-willing 
 [Nicht-Wollen]—;’ but my brothers, you know this fable song of madness!289 
What is being stressed here is the same line of argument that Nietzsche makes in The 
Birth of Tragedy when he addresses Buddhism (via Schopenhauer). What the Buddhist 
seeks to overcome is desire and to do that one must stop willing or at least diminish one’s 
will as much as possible. But for Nietzsche this is neither possible nor desirable—“man 
still prefers to will nothingness, than not will...”290 he says at the conclusion to On the 
Genealogy of Morality. 
 On the other hand, one can will in an active way. Again, On the Genealogy of 
Morality best illustrates this notion of an active force. Nietzsche details in the first essay 
the noble, aristocratic class that refuses the ressentiment of the reactive priestly class and 
                                                 
288 Thomas Mann says about Friedrich Schiller in an excerpt from “A Weary Hour,” “He must not descend 
into chaos; or at least he must not stop there. Rather out of chaos, which is fullness, he must draw up to the 
light whatever he found there fit and ripe for form. No brooding!” Mann, Last Essays, 210. 
289 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 112/“On Redemption.” 
290 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 120/Third essay, 28. 
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their designation of good and bad into good and evil that has gripped morality and ethics. 
The active force of those that see themselves as noble affirms life in all of its conditions, 
which means affirming even suffering as well as chaos, which is essentially another name 
for the Dionysian phenomenon. 
 But we must also keep in mind one more crucial point in terms of the will to 
power and the forces that come to direct it. These active and reactive forces can be either 
outwardly directed, that is, understood in terms of wider culture that seeks to organize the 
chaos of nature or they can be inwardly directed as a struggle within an individual. For 
example, Nietzsche argues that if reactive forces are to permeate a culture (one must keep 
in mind that there is always an agōn at some level between active and reactive forces and 
never a complete annihilation by one over another) then that culture will decline. But if 
active forces are allowed to ascend and the instincts are given an outlet, then culture will 
flourish. This Nietzsche makes clear in On the Genealogy of Morality, in the example 
above of the aristocratic and priestly classes. 
 However, there is also an inward directedness of active and reactive forces. In this 
sense, the living subject possesses its own will to power, which is to say that there is a 
constant struggle within the individual of competing drives that are constantly changing 
and shifting. Nietzsche wants the individual to harness active forces so that its will to 
power becomes enhanced towards its own noble, value creating ends. This 
outward/inward directedness of the will to power is illustrated by Nietzsche when he 
states: 
 Development of mankind 
 191
 A. To gain power over nature [Macht über die Natur] and to that end a certain 
 power over oneself. Morality was necessary in order for man to prevail in the 
 struggle with nature and the ‘wild animal.’ 
 B. Once power over nature has been gained, one can use this power to continue 
 freely shaping oneself [sich selbst frei weiterzubilden]: will to power [Wille zur 
 Macht] as self-heightening and strengthening.291 
The will to power, then, is intimately connected to the eternal return.292 Gaining power 
over nature means looking into and fathoming its depth without illusions and affirming 
what one sees, which for Nietzsche is will to power. Then, in turn, one can declare, in the 
spirit of the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, “Once more, and again!” What we will see as a 
feature of these staples of Nietzsche’s thought is the way in which laughter plays a key 
role in their expression and attainment—laughter that is brought into play by Zarathustra 
to help covey his wisdom. 
 The last over-arching issue in Thus Spoke Zarathustra concerns the nature of this 
work, which is more of a poem or novel than a typical philosophical treatise. It can also 
be defended as a song, that is, a “musical” work, that Nietzsche composes for his readers 
because it possesses many of the characteristics of a musical score—its own refrain, 
rhythm, intensity, speed and so forth. It is also musical in that it comes from that 
Dionysian space that it wants to showcase to the world, a space that is antecedent to 
language, as Nietzsche stressed in The Birth of Tragedy. Indeed Nietzsche claimed that 
The Birth of Tragedy should have sung and not spoken. I believe that with Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra Nietzsche is giving us his gift of song that he had hoped for in his earlier 
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work. Both Sallis and Freydberg recognize Nietzsche’s stress on the musicality of a work 
as well as the Dionysian and the irreducibility or synthesis of these elements. In his work 
that examines Sallis’s thought Freydberg states: 
 Sallis points out throughout Crossings that the thought of The Birth of Tragedy 
 and of the Apollonian/Dionysian resists synthesis at every turn. He calls it a 
 “questionable, almost inaccessible, impossible” book on account of the strange, 
 foreign voice that sounds from it—“it should have sung, this ‘new soul’—and not 
 spoken!” But sung how? Not in a Wagnerian voice, nor—I suggest—even in a 
 Greek voice. Sallis’s final sentence: “Rather, a song to which one could dance, a 
 song of holy laughter,” a Zarathustrian song. 293 
 In this light, it is crucial to remember that as a work of this kind it is not only 
important to keep in mind how this song is composed and sung but more importantly how 
it is heard, how it (re)sounds in the mind and ear of the listener, how the song of holy 
laughter resonates with those willing to affirm their ties to the earth and the other 
elementals that are gathered by it, presuming of course that there are ears ready to hear 
such a song. 
 Taken together, all of this showcases this work as something dramatic. This 
dramatic structure, as Laurence Lampert maintains, includes many of the requisite 
elements such as characters both human and animal, place, time as well as rising action 
and dénouement. These elements come to dramatize Nietzsche’s views rather than 
present it in the form of a logically defended position. Thus Lampert states, “the point of 
the drama is to show how Zarathustra grows into the task required of the philosopher in 
that destitute time that Nietzsche diagnosed as the terminal nihilism of Western culture, 
                                                 
293 Freydberg, The Thought of John Sallis, 269-70. References to John Sallis are in Crossings, 150. 
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how he is educated to the task of a new founding.”294 In essence, then, when we read a 
work such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we must let the themes of laughter and comedy 
resonate in a way proper to this kind of dramatic composition: a reading that brings into 
sharp focus the challenges that human beings face as they inevitably confront nihilism in 
the postmodern world. In many ways, Nietzsche considers Thus Spoke Zarathustra to be 
his crowning achievement as is evidenced by a look at the letters he wrote to his friends 
and colleagues at the time and Ecce Homo as well.295 Still, he never lost sight of the fact 
that folly resided at its very heart. As he wrote to Franz Overbeck in 1883 after 
completing the first part, “This reminds me of my latest folly—I mean Zarathustra.” 
 Because the intersection of literature and philosophy becomes prevalent with 
French postmodern thinkers296 and because Thus Spoke Zarathustra faithfully fulfills its 
role as literature as well as philosophy, it would appear prudent then to see how this work 
relates to contemporary thought. Many postmodern philosophers were influenced by 
Nietzsche, prominent among them is Gilles Deleuze. We saw an overview of how his and 
Guattari’s major work, A Thousand Plateaus, emphasized a non-traditional, non-
hierarchical metaphysics. Instead of a metaphysics that posited a teleological goal (God, 
                                                 
294 Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 4. 
295 Nietzsche says in Ecce Homo, “My Zarathustra has a special place for me in my writings.” Nietzsche, 
The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 72/Part 4 of the Preface. 
296 Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Discourse of the Syncope (Stanford University Press, 2008) comes to mind. In 
this work Nancy explores why Kant, the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment project, was a bad 
writer thus calling into radical questioning the intersection of critical philosophy and literature. While 
Nancy concludes this work by labeling Kant a “Logodaedalus” (one who quibbles over words and 
semantics) he writes that philosophers are hardly oblivious to the question. He quotes Nietzsche from Ecce 
Homo in a footnote; “I have some notion of my privileges as a writer; in a few instances I have been told, 
too, how getting used to my writings ‘spoils’ one’s taste. One simply can no longer endure other books, 
least of all philosophical works. It is a distinction without equal to enter this noble and delicate world—one 
must not by any means be a German!.” (147) (Ecce Homo trans. by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 
1967). 
 194
Forms, Spirit etc.),297 their metaphysics generates in perpetuity multiplicity through the 
dynamic play of the plane of consistency with the plane of organization; multiplicity 
being either what Deleuze refers to as “arborescent” with hierarchical elements or 
“rhizomatic” that possesses diverse and diverging elements. For Deleuze and Guattari 
both kinds of assemblages communicate with one another. However, rhizomatic 
multiplicities by their very nature always maintain an advantage over their arborescent 
counterparts. This is not because they necessarily dominate them in some way but 
because, as rhizomatic, they are always already giving rise to new genetic lines of 
development and expansion and thus are never totalized as a unity the way arborescent 
multiplicities may appear.298 In addition, because their system is non-totalizing since 
there is no single, stable transcendent principle under which all else is subordinated and 
thus reality is constituted as pure immanence, I refer to it as a radical materialism. 
 Although there are indeed differences between Nietzsche and Deleuze’s 
philosophical views, there is also a deep kinship. For example, Nietzsche speaks of 
multiplicity on many different levels (a multiple interpretation of multiplicity itself) 
including physiological drives, psychological drives, and the multiplicity of affects just to 
name a few. Likewise Zarathustra says, “The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with 
one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.”299 And even what appears to 
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be the kind of metaphysics that describes reality itself, such as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of assemblages and absolute deterritorialization, Nietzsche says something very 
similar: 
 And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show you it in my mirror? 
 This world: a monster of force [Ungeheuer von Kraft], without beginning, without 
 end, a fixed, iron quantity of force which grows neither large nor smaller, which 
 doesn’t exhaust but only transforms [verwandelt] itself, as a whole unchanging in 
 size, an economy without expenditure and losses, but equally without increase, 
 without income, enclosed by ‘nothingness’ as by a boundary, and not something 
 blurred, squandered, not something infinitely extended [nichts Unendlich-
 Ausgedehntes].300 
In this same passage Nietzsche goes on to describe this eternal process of construction 
and destruction as “multifarious” (vielfältigsten) and even “Dionysian,” which stays 
faithful to our earlier analysis that the Dionysian is seen as non-rational, non-
foundational, that is, as an Abgrund. We will come to see how Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra attempts to usurp the prevailing nihilistic tendencies of the West, most 
importantly morality and its leveling influence, by facilitating its reterritorialization. If 
Zarathustra’s message is meant to convey anything it is the importance of affirming life 
within the world of becoming by authentically owning up to the tragic knowledge I have 
detailed thus far. 
 These are the overarching issues in this work and they provide the framework 
within which provocative laughter occurs. Because laughter is so ubiquitous in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, I will examine those occasions where its impact is felt most deeply. 
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We will see that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra laughs often because he sees it as his task to 




II. Zarathustra and the Costumed Drama 
 
 We saw in the second chapter on The Gay Science that Nietzsche harbors a deep 
appreciation for appearance (Erscheinung), especially appearance as beautiful Schein. 
This is not only because appearance is what constitutes reality for us but also because the 
aesthetic justification of life in which beautiful, shining appearance is disclosed is done 
through appearing. This disclosing is one that privileges the eye and not one that 
privileges the ego or “I” of the self-certain Cartesian cogito, which attempts to know 
phenomena through calculation and clear and distinct ideas. Moreover, shining 
appearance can take the form of the sublime or of the absurd in which “the eternal 
comedy of existence” parades before us in a timeless play. 
 As unique a work that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, we can use one of Nietzsche’s 
comic examples from The Gay Science that we previously examined as a bridge to this 
work. In The Gay Science the comedy of existence often times disclosed itself as the 
comic appearance of famous men, most notably political leaders. The main emphasis was 
on the kind of pathos of distance that Nietzsche advocates which lets us view the 
otherwise serious issues of a political nature in a comic light. These included the kind of 
“stage play” that famous men engage in as they utilize other people as props in order to 
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present the type of appearance that is beneficial to them at any given moment. Of course 
the comedy laid in the fact that this image-play, which most are not aware of, provided a 
comic spectacle for the acute observer of appearance. The proper perspective—a 
perspective that few have—allows the eternal comedy of existence that has “not yet 
become conscious of itself” to play forth for them in its absurdity, even as those deeply 
immersed in it perhaps believe it to be a pivotal moment in history in which they are a 
key player. 
 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche revisits this same phenomena although this 
time the spectator is Zarathustra himself. In the section titled “On Human Prudence” in 
the second part, the polemic Zarathustra struggles with revolves around prudence. 
Normally prudence—the ability to govern oneself and one’s affairs wisely especially by 
use of reason—is understood and embraced by those seeking a solid, practical ethic. But 
for Nietzsche, who is advocating for the ethic of the overman (Übermensch) and the will 
to knowledge that happens “beyond good and evil,” prudence is at war with itself. 
Zarathustra struggles with his commitment to mankind and his disciples and also to the 
overman for which mankind is a bridge; “I bind myself with chains to mankind because I 
am drawn upward to the overman.”301 Zarathustra’s prudence, which takes four forms in 
this section, has allowed him to be committed to mankind in his project of overcoming. 
In terms of action and speech, he has been able to project the proper intensity to his 
listeners yet at the same time this prudence by its very nature has made him overly 
cautious and shrewd to the point that the lightness of touch needed to ascend to the 
overman has been stifled. 
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 What Zarathustra enacts at this point in his wanderings is essentially the prudence 
of imprudence, that is, the necessity at times of being imprudent so as to allow his project 
that paves the way for the overman to move forward. This play of prudence and 
imprudence harbors its own comedic value, namely that at times prudence requires one to 
be imprudent! Indeed the very nature of prudence with its cautious, guarded stance 
requires in this instance imprudence or the abandonment of these principles. In other 
words the play involves what is essentially a comedic giving over into opposites. 
 In the case of Zarathustra, prudence and imprudence plays itself out in his 
closeness and detachment from mankind—the very people he is attempting to help. He is 
aware that he is seeking ears for his message but that his message of mankind as a bridge 
to the overman may not be suitable for all ears. Thus he must act imprudently at times in 
his relationship with them, which is to say he must temper his showing of himself to 
them. In essence, the play of prudence and imprudence really is the play of appearance or 
with appearance, that is, the ability to know when to appear to mankind as well as when 
to let mankind appear to him in its splendor. One of Zarathustra’s preferred means of 
prudence involves the spectacle of vain people whom he admires, not necessarily for their 
particular mode of vanity but for the appearance vanity itself provides as spectacle. Thus 
Zarathustra says of the vain: 
 For life to be a proper spectacle, its play [Spiel] must be well-played [gespielt]; 
 but for this good play actors are needed. I found all vain people to be good actors; 
 they play and want to be spectacular—all their spirit is focused in this willing. 
 They perform themselves, they invent themselves; in their proximity I love to be 
 a spectator of life [dem Leben Schauspiele]—it heals me of my melancholy. 
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 Therefore I spare the vain, because they are physicians for my melancholy and 
 keep me riveted to people as if to a play [Schauspiele].302 
Most notable is the fact that Nietzsche characterizes this phenomenon of appearance as a 
play that happens in life. Being “riveted to people” outside the formality of a theatre is to 
say that the appearances that constitute the very texture of life become the comic venue. 
In the case of the vain, the resounding excess they often exhibit remains faithful to the 
resounding excess of the comically masked Dionysus. So, comparable to the play of 
appearance of the famous men in The Gay Science, Zarathustra also recognizes the 
playfulness of the vain. 
 However, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra there is marked difference. This time a 
certain depth appears that the example of the famous men in The Gay Science only hinted 
at. Nietzsche is attempting to confront the nihilism that he sees as beginning to grip 
humankind by advocating a coming to grips with tragic knowledge that refuses to allow 
any “meta” positions to condition life or provide it meaning. It becomes clear that 
Zarathustra is that voice that attempts to achieve these goals. Moreover, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche is not just engaged in detached observation of the phenomenon of 
appearance as the section in The Gay Science treated above seems to suggest. Instead, his 
Zarathustra is the appearance on the historical stage parodying the older notions of good 
and evil in all their variety. This parody heralds an overcoming by the more-than-human 
type of the overman. Thus Spoke Zarathustra then cannot be reduced to the text with its 
plot and characters. It overflows the text into life itself in order to propagate its message 
of the eternal return, the overman, and the coming to grips and overcoming of nihilism. If 
this message is not tempered by Zarathustra in a nuanced way, so that his audience either 
                                                 
302 Ibid., 113/“On Human Prudence.” 
 200
fails to grasp it or becomes overly frightened and unwilling to be the ears for his 
message, then he will have failed. 
 In this same section, this is exactly why Zarathustra muses to himself that his 
fourth kind of human prudence requires a “secret laughter” because of its dangerousness 
to ears that are not yet ready to hear his message. He says, “I do not allow my view of 
evil ones to be spoiled by your fearfulness,” which is to say that what others (most 
notably the “good and just” and “wise and knowing” ones as Nietzsche refers to them) 
call and fear as “evil” or the “devil” are essentially small and petty things. “In you,” says 
Zarathustra “there is much to laugh at [zum Lachen] and especially your fear [Furcht] of 
what up till now has been called ‘devil!’”303 Nietzsche’s claim is that Zarathustra and his 
message, although wise to ears that are prepared to hear his message, would nonetheless 
appear as frightful to the supposed good, just, and knowing. Nietzsche says their 
judgments about what is evil or demonic are small and petty compared to the profound, 
honest but unsettling message of Zarathustra: 
 So estranged from greatness are you in your souls that the overman would seem 
 terrible [furchtbar] to you in his kindness! And you wise and knowing ones, you 
 would flee [flüchten] from the sunburn of wisdom in which the overman joyfully 
 bathes his nakedness! You highest human beings whom I have ever laid eyes 
 on—this is my doubt in you [Zweifel an euch] and my secret laughter [mein 
 heimliches Lachen]: I suspect you would call my overman—devil!304 
The reason that Zarathustra’s laughter is secretive is precisely because he harbors the 
kind of tragic knowledge that the “highest human beings” do not yet understand, have 
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failed to recognize or, and this is a generous “or,” have failed to own up to if in fact they 
are conscious of such knowledge. This is why Zarathustra’s pronouncement of the 
overman, although an act of extreme kindness from the perspective of Zarathustra 
because it is a gift to humankind, nonetheless would strike terror into the hearts of the 
highest human beings who are the recipients of this gift thinking him a devil of some 
sorts. “[A]ll great things, in order to inscribe eternal demands [ewigen Forderungen] in 
the heart of humanity, must first wander the earth under monstrous and terrifying masks 
[ungeheure und furchteinflössende Fratzen],”305 Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and 
Evil. In this sense, Zarathustra, who is at play with appearance, is much like Dionysus 
who wears the mask of both comedy and tragedy that conceals the monstrousness behind 
it—the monstrousness as the death of god and the resulting nihilism in the West. For 
Zarathustra to be prudent, so that he is able to disclose what many will take as a 
monstrous message, he must practice imprudence, that is, he must engage in a careful 
play of concealment/unconcealment of the truth he himself is aware of amongst the 
many: 
 But I want to see you costumed [verkleidet], you neighbors and fellow human 
 beings, and well groomed, and vain, and dignified, as “the good and the just”—
 And costumed I myself want to sit among you—so that I might not recognize 
 [verkenne] you and myself; for that is my final human prudence. Thus spoke 
 Zarathustra.306 
                                                 
305 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 3/Preface. 
306 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 115/“On Human Prudence.” 
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This costumed drama with its many players—those who still hold to the old valuations of 
good and evil as well as Zarathustra who is a harbinger of the overman—is in part what 
constitutes this secret and knowing laughter. 
 By casting this in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblages we can 
begin to see how far reaching Nietzsche’s thought is in this crucial work. To reiterate, 
Nietzsche’s literary figure is a parody of the historical Zarathustra of ancient Persia. The 
historical Zarathustra, (as well as Zoroastrianism) is the assemblage that, through its 
expression and content, brought the notions of good and evil onto the world stage. Or one 
might say that because the notions of good and evil are so pervasive in our morality, the 
historical name “Zarathustra” really just suffices for Western morality and ethics in 
general. Likewise, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is also an assemblage. It is one that utilizes the 
comic device of parody in order to bring a new perspective to morality. One might say 
that Zarathustra is bringing perspective itself, or an assemblage of perspective. And 
because the position of perspectival thought says that it is not possible to know “the 
whole” from a single perspective, the hegemony of this whole—call it God, the One, 
Spirit et al—begins to strain and crack under the pressure of infinite multiplicities and 
perspectives that have always been at play in history, even though not always apparent. 
But how exactly is this so? 
 The arborescent assemblage “Western morality,”307 if we may call it that, always 
had as its final, teleological signifier something transcendent. It was the phenomenon that 
stood outside of the sensible world. In ontological terms this signifier always possessed 
unity as part of its Being in that it is always the self-same and unchanging as opposed to 
                                                 
307 I define this arborescent assemblage as the totality of ways in which human beings in the West have 
comported themselves to nature, to each other and which required a teleological signifier to which this 
totality was subordinate. 
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the world of becoming in which chance and change are at play within pure immanence. 
Throughout history becoming and the beings in it have always been constituted as 
something derivative of Being, such as “the intelligible realm” or “the watchful eye of 
God.” If Nietzsche’s thinking has shown us anything, it is that he wants to invert the 
Being/becoming paradigm. He wants to twist free from it altogether in a grand aesthetic 
turn to the shining sensible. Because we are here as beings in the world of becoming, 
then any attempt to transcend this, any attempts to posit supersensible criteria such as 
“otherworldly hopes” constitutes a nihilistic impulse. 
 When we consider Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which is to say when we think of the 
character of the text but also when we consider the text “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” itself 
as an assemblage, what we have is a rhizomatic assemblage in an agōn with an 
arborescent assemblage.308 The assemblage “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” has arrived on the 
world-historical stage to confront and hopefully diminish the influence of the historical 
assemblage “Western morality” (the historical Zarathustra), and what Nietzsche sees as 
its corrosive influence as nihilism. In other words, through mimetic parody there is 
Zarathustra vs. Zarathustra, with the stakes being either the continued dominance of the 
prevailing tendencies of the West or, if Nietzsche is successful, allowing chaos, the 
indefinite, the Dionysian a presence through their own expression and content to be a 
recognized part of shining reality. The comic device of parody is supremely important 
because it presents us with images, in this case comic, laughter provoking images. 
 The idea that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra must provoke his audience through laughter 
is important. Nietzsche is well aware that if he is to present a remedy to Western nihilism, 
                                                 
308 Deleuze and Guattari are clear that, far from being isolated entities, assemblages not only interact 
dynamically with one another but that, “There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic 
offshoots in roots.” (A Thousand Plateaus, 21) Hence they are shot through and through with one another. 
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then he cannot do so by simply positing his own “meta” criteria, that is, a transcendent 
reference that stands outside the aesthetic forms of space and time. He would be violating 
his own “rules” by replacing one meta position with another, thus keeping him engaged 
in the overly simplistic binary thinking that he wants to avoid altogether. If Zarathustra is 
to succeed he must, appropriating Otto Neurath’s metaphor of a sinking boat at sea, repair 
the “sinking ship” only using other parts of the ship as material to fix it. By using parody 
he is able (hopefully) to turn Western thinking in a new direction because parody shows 
ourselves to us. We can behold ourselves in our folly so that we (“we” as individuals and 
as parts of groups) may undergo our own organic transfiguration so that amidst the tragic 
knowledge, indeed because of it, we can become a “laughing animal” once again. 
 We can focus even more in terms of Deleuze and Guattari and say that because 
the planes of consistency and organization are always engaged in a dynamic interaction, 
then the rhizomatic assemblage “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” is attempting, through means 
that include parody and provocative laughter, to disrupt or dismantle the already situated 
arborescent assemblage “Western morality” within the striated space of the plane of 
organization. According to the function of the plane of consistency, Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra is a pure intensity, which is to say, it is either at rest or in motion in relative 
proximity amongst other elements. Moreover, Zarathustra as a pure intensity and a 
haecceity309 will, in the manner of a palimpsest, begin to inscribed or code itself by way 
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as for recognizing life as will to power. 
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of absolute deterritorialization onto the plane of organization and this deterritorialization 
often times erupts as provocative laughter that says, “we are no longer impressed!” 
 As we just noted Nietzsche is well aware of two critical things. First is the danger 
his Zarathustra possesses to those who hear his message because many will believe it to 
be a grave transgression against what the people that make up the arborescent assemblage 
“Western morality” see as their permanent values. Second is the time it may take for the 
kind of paradigm shift he desires to take full effect. The kind of inversion that 
promulgates a turn to the aesthetic will not happen rapidly although the speed of which it 
will happen is an unknown. With these two critical things in mind, we can say that 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is, in Deleuzian language, a “pure intensity” who must carefully 
navigate the striated space of the plane of organization. His tact must include knowing 
not only when to appear and to whom, but also the mode in which to appear to others. 
This is why many of Zarathustra’s interactions with other human beings are done under 
the guise of a “costume drama” in which he is at play with appearance, that is, at play 
with how he appears to others and how others appear to him. It is as if both of these pure 
intensities—Nietzsche himself in his particular time and place and his Zarathustra—are 
on a reconnaissance mission with their own modes of expression and content which often 
includes provocative laughter to seek out and find cracks, to find fatigue in the 
assemblage “Western morality.” Hence their prudence consists in not being exposed or 
caught by the totalizing elements that would in turn de-mask them.310 
                                                 
310 To be sure Nietzsche titles one of his sections in Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an Untimely 
Man.” Moreover many of the friends he corresponded with warned Nietzsche of a possible backlash 
because of the transgressions inherent in his writings, reminding me of atheist David Hume who also 
received similar counsel from many of his friends. 
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 It is also precisely the reason Zarathustra refers at times to his laughter as “secret 
laughter” as opposed to simply just laughing at others who reject his overman. When we 
say that the assemblage “Western morality,” with all of the characteristics Nietzsche 
attributes to it, has dominated the world historical-philosophical stage, what we are 
saying is that this assemblage exists on the actual plane of organization, that is, it has 
already undergone its own absolute deterritorialization from the virtual state on the plane 
of consistency. But because the two planes are constantly interacting, what exists on the 
plane of organization is never rendered permanent. Its existence means that it is always 
already undergoing its own reterritorialization, the speed of which is variable—its 
reterritorialization can happen quickly or it may take millennia.311 The secret laughter of 
Zarathustra is thus a cautious laughter. Because Zarathustra cannot outright offend, lest 
he lose the humanity he wishes to save, he must temper his message according to the 
particular milieu he is in at any given time. Thus his interaction with the saint will be 
different than his speeches to the human beings he has descended to. 
 At this point in Nietzsche’s work, Zarathustra’s laughter is secretive for the 
reasons just mentioned. However, there was initially an opposite phenomena that 
occurred in which Zarathustra was the target of derisive laughter. This occurs in 
“Zarathustra’s Prologue.” Normally being the object of derisive or scornful laughter is 
hardly a pleasant experience, however for Zarathustra, it is an essential moment in his 
own awakening in terms of the project that he has readied for humankind, which he hopes 
to bring the eternal comedy of existence in its full shining to the world. 
                                                 
311 For example the scientific theory “phrenology” was relatively short lived, existing from the late 1700’s 
until the mid-19th century. Nietzsche believes “Western morality” has a much longer history dating before 
even the pre-Socratics hence his judgment in The Gay Science; “After Buddha was dead, they still showed 
his shadow in a cave for centuries,...God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for millennia 
be caves in which they show his shadow...” (109/Aphorism 108) 
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 Nietzsche is clear in the prologue the necessity of folly and laughter. Human 
beings need to recognize that many of their endeavors contain an element of folly at their 
heart because we are human and as such we are always given over to a measure of 
opacity in our affairs, even the most serious affairs. This is also true for Zarathustra who 
desires to leave his cave in order to “go under” (untergehen), that is, initiate the 
movement from man to overman. Thus one of the first things Zarathustra utters is 
wanting “to bestow and distribute [verschenken und austheilen] until the wise among 
human beings have once again enjoyed their folly [Thorheit].”312 We see that Zarathustra 
stresses the connection of folly to wisdom as opposed to a disassociation between the two 
which Nietzsche believes has gripped ethics, morality, and philosophy in general. 
 The gravity of Zarathustra’s project becomes evident in the second section of the 
prologue. As Zarathustra is descending from his cave to make what will be three 
speeches to the people, he meets the saint. This meeting of the saint and Zarathustra is 
symbolic of the deepest parting. For even though there is a coming together of these two 
wise human beings it essentially marks that transition in history that Nietzsche desires: 
the kind of transition that we saw with “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” 
in which the sun that has reached its zenith is beginning to descend and bring light where 
there is darkness. 
 To the saint Zarathustra appears transformed, like a child ready to begin a new 
playfulness with humankind (this image of a child and the innocence of child’s play will 
reoccur again, most notably in “On the Three Metamorphoses”). The saint is skeptical of 
Zarathustra and his project, believing human beings “too imperfect.” This is why the 
saint has chosen to lead a cloistered life in the forest because he has grown weary of 
                                                 
312 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 3/“Zarathustra’s Prologue.” 
 208
human beings and thus only wants to revere God. “With singing, weeping, laughing and 
growling I praise the god who is my god,”313 says the saint. The saint laughs at 
Zarathustra who is descending to human beings whom the saint believes are no longer 
worthy even of the kind of going under Zarathustra is attempting. 
 For Zarathustra, however, the saint has failed to grasp a crucial event, perhaps the 
crucial event of the time—the death of God. “Could it be possible! This old saint in his 
woods has not yet heard the news that God is dead!”314 exclaims Zarathustra to himself. 
This meeting of the saint and Zarathustra, is a meeting of the untimely. Nietzsche had 
previously characterized his thinking in Untimely Meditations as untimely, that is, his 
thought was ahead of its time and without ears ready to hear what he had to say. By the 
time he has completed Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it appears as though he thinks that there 
might now be ears for Zarathustra’s message or that human beings at this time in history 
are on the cusp of hearing, or possibly embracing such a message. Hence Nietzsche 
believes that his Thus Spoke Zarathustra is that critical eruption in history balanced on 
the fulcrum between past and future. And speaking more narrowly in terms of 
Zarathustra’s own voice, he “goes down” because he believes there might finally be ears 
for what were his previous untimely thoughts. 
 On the other hand, the saint is also untimely but in a critically different manner. 
One might say that the saint’s time has come or come to pass. Through his own 
admission, the saint says there is no longer an audience for his teachings and more 
importantly that the saint has not yet recognized let alone come to grips with the fact of 
the death of God, which represents Nietzsche’s point of departure in Thus Spoke 
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Zarathustra. Thus the saint is untimely in the opposite sense of Nietzsche’s untimeliness 
in that the saint’s allegiance is or was to the past and not towards the future. These two 
notions of the untimely mark the critical intersection of past morality and Zarathustra’s 
project of the future that along with the eternal return, places the most emphasis on the 
future. 
 But something additional marks this critical divergence of the saint and 
Zarathustra and the two notions of untimeliness. It is laughter that marks the very 
departure between man and god. For after the saint asks Zarathustra what gifts he bears, 
he tells Zarathustra that he praises God even by way of laughter. But Zarathustra shortly 
thereafter parts from the saint with these words: 
 When Zarathustra had heard these words [diese Worte gehört] he took his leave of 
 the saint and spoke: “What would I have to give you! But let me leave quickly 
 before I take something from you!”—And so they parted [trennten], the oldster 
 and the man, laughing [lachend] like two boys laugh.315 
This laughter is a laughter that separates. It is the laughter of a schism, laughter that in 
and through its very eruption is that schism. The saint’s laughter arises from his belief 
that human beings are no longer worthy of god nor any teaching that Zarathustra might 
bring to them. Zarathustra’s laughter is, again, a laughter of the secret knowledge of the 
death of god—a terrible knowledge the saint is not yet aware of—as well as the 
knowledge of the overman and the eternal return that he will attempt to reveal to 
humankind. We might say that laughter is the symbolic phenomenon that clears the space 
of all older values based on good and evil so that human beings can once again create life 
affirming values. To be sure, Zarathustra’s laughter at this point is not one of disrespect 
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or scorn aimed at the saint himself. We must bear in mind the saint is laughing as well 
although from the perspective of not yet being conscious of what Zarathustra is aware of. 
Zarathustra’s laughter simply signifies that in he is no longer impressed with morality 
based upon the distinction of good and evil.316 
 In postmodern thinking, Michel Foucault best encapsulates this kind of moment: a 
disquieting moment that severs us from our supposed familiarity of things in the stream 
of time so that we are immersed again in chaos: 
 [T]he death of God—or, rather, in the wake of that death and in a profound 
 correlation with it—what Nietzsche’s thought heralds is the end of his murderer; 
 it is the explosion of man’s face in laughter, and the return of masks; it is the 
 scattering of the pro-found stream of time by which he felt himself carried along 
 and whose pressure he suspected in the very being of things; it is the identity of 
 the Return of the Same with the absolute dispersion of man.317 
Foucault’s point is that “the explosion of man’s face in laughter” is intimately tied to the 
death of god as well as those responsible for his murder, namely us. It is as if Foucault is 
saying that the game and the time needed to play it is up and now the once “pro-found 
stream of time,” which is to say the understanding of time as a linear directed flow that 
supposedly carried us all along to our otherworldly ends, has now exploded. Man is laid 
bare or, as Foucault says above, “dispersed” and left without essence except for his own 
freedom...and many masks. 
 Foucault does not refer to it here, but there seems to be at least some parallel 
between the death of god, at the hands of his murderers, and Dionysus who was, 
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317 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Routledge, 2001), 420. 
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according to the myth, chased down in ancient forests and torn to pieces. But Dionysus, 
as Nietzsche states, “will eternally be reborn and come home out of destruction,”318 
which is a way of saying that what will return is the same, the same being chaos. In 
addition, if we consider Foucault’s remark about “the return of masks” along the same 
Dionysian lines, then one of these masks is certainly the mask of comedy worn by 
Dionysus in order to conceal his monstrousness. What we have then in this crucial 
section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is nothing less than a comedy of grand proportions. It 
is the simultaneity of order and destruction at the moment of their divergence, a 
divergence that is marked by nothing other than the laughter of the saint and Zarathustra. 
If one were to characterize this simultaneity of order and destruction along the lines of 
the social body it might best be expressed as chaosmos, the term Evans uses to describe 
the agonistic but creative interplay of the many voices within a society that are, on the 
one hand, their own singular voice, yet on the other hand are shot through with all of the 
other voices as well. Chaosmos then is a hybrid of both chaos and cosmos and because of 
its perpetual production of difference is never reducible to either term.319 
 In accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking, the meeting of Zarathustra 
and the saint causes absolute divergence with laughter as the phenomenon that best traces 
out this critical departure. As we saw earlier the rhizomatic assemblage that I referred to 
as “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” is in a struggle with the arborescent assemblage “Western 
morality.” Nothing captures this divergence of Zarathustra and the saint more aptly than 
Zarathustra’s surreptitious laughter, in the sense that Zarathustra possesses his “secret 
knowledge” and also because he is aware of the tragic knowledge that is only beginning 
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to dawn on the rest of humankind. However, we must take into account this notion of 
divergence and convergence and ask, “Is Nietzsche’s philosophy one of absolute 
divergence at the expense of convergence?” If not then, “How is this divergence marked 
by the simultaneous laughter of the saint and Zarathustra to be understood?” 
 On the one hand Nietzsche, the philosopher who “philosophizes with a hammer,” 
wants to deconstruct if not destruct those philosophical systems he deems unworthy. If 
we retrieve the kind of Dionysian terminology that he is fond of, it might appear as if 
Nietzsche’s goal is absolute divergence as that which undermines the established order of 
things. And because Nietzsche’s thought and language is so abrasive to many, it appears 
as if divergence is posited as a goal in itself in which convergence is absolutely excluded. 
 On the other hand, we must also keep a few things in mind for balance. While I 
argue that Nietzsche wants what we can call absolute divergence from hostile systems 
and their propagators—systems that through dissimilation seek to protect the kind of life 
descending values he wants to reverse—nonetheless the goal is always to maintain a 
healthy tension that, by definition, requires philosophical adversaries. This we saw above 
in the first chapter with his agōn with Socrates. 
 Moreover philosophical systems rarely, if ever, appear as if they arose from a 
vacuum, that is, detached from a specific historical place and time. Philosophical systems 
can either build upon previous thought or challenge previous thought but they all, in one 
way or another, must recognize previous thought. Nietzsche’s philosophy, as untimely 
and radical as it is, is no different. This becomes most evident when we consider the very 
nature of language itself, especially as it relates to the particular way in which he uses 
language (in all of its forms, including parody and laughter) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
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 With this said, convergence rests on a much deeper premise than the simple need 
for philosophical adversaries or as a response to the philosophical tradition. It rests on the 
very foundation of consciousness and its nexus to language. Language is what binds all 
of us, delivering us by default to the intersection of communication with others. 
Nietzsche himself is clear about the link between language, consciousness and 
communication when he insists in The Gay Science, “consciousness in general has 
developed only under the pressure of the need to communicate;....[It] is really just a net 
connecting one person with another,”320 Convergence, then, is inevitable. To demonstrate 
this, we can take a fruitful detour to Mikhail Bakhtin’s account of language in terms of 
dialogic relationships. This detour will allow us to see how language not only binds us to 
one another in the present but also to the past and future. Moreover Bakhtin, much in the 
manner of Nietzsche, is keenly aware of language’s power as a legislating, value creating 
force. 
 Bakhtin’s major premise is that all language acts possess a vivacity and force, a 
perpetual kinetic function as opposed to being a stagnant, closed system of signs and 
signifiers that never change. As such, there is always an inherent tension within any 
particular socio-linguistic community (as well as a tension between socio-linguistic 
communities) because of the multitude of heterogeneous forces that interact within it. In 
Bakhtin’s words, this tension results from, “the co-existence of socio-ideological 
contradiction between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, 
between socio-ideological different groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, 
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circles, and so forth, all given bodily form.”321 In other words, language, performatively 
speaking,322 is never a complete unchanging universal phenomenon but a hybridization of 
“two semantic and axiological belief systems” competing within it, and it is always 
predisposed toward the production of difference.323 
 In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin elaborates on this hybridization of language 
that explores these tensions. With hybridization, we see how language constantly changes 
due to its inherent make-up of multiple impulses and perspectives (what Bakhtin calls 
“‘languages’ of heteroglossia”) that take up a particular “understanding” of the world. As 
a particular perspective, a tension is inherent in that this perspective is almost always 
competing against other perspectives. Moreover, hybridization entails the very notion of 
the other’s language already appropriated in our own voice and vice versa, even if we 
may think that we are the exclusive executors of that language and value system.324 
 One of the many manifestations of hybridization that Bakhtin examines is 
comedic parody. Parody, says Bakhtin, allows an author to speak “in someone else’s 
discourse” and “parody introduces into that discourse a semantic intention that is directly 
opposed to the original one.” Moreover, the voice “having made its home in the other’s 
discourse, clashes hostilely with its primordial host and forces him to serve directly 
opposing aims.”325 The thrust of Bakhtin’s point is that parody, as an example of 
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intentional hybridization, has within it a tension between two viewpoints: one of which 
seeks to usurp the other. 
 What begins to emerge is a close kinship between Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
language—its evaluative function, its designating quality, its “truth” function—and the 
competing elements within Bakhtin’s hybridization of language. And thus far we have 
seen that comedy, in the form of parody,326 is one of the ways Nietzsche challenges other 
philosophers and philosophical history. For example, Nietzsche is clear, in “On Truth and 
Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” that dissimulation through language is nothing but the 
attempted preservation of the individual who tries to evaluate and signify the world so as 
to claim the mantle of fixed truth. In Nietzsche’s words: 
 For that which is to count as ‘truth’ [Wahrheit] from this point onwards now 
 becomes fixed [fixirt], i.e., a way of designating things is invented which has the 
 same validity and force everywhere, and the legislation of language 
 [Gesetzgebung der Sprache] also produces the first laws of truth [Gesetze der 
 Wahrheit], for the contrast between truth and lying comes into existence here for 
 the first time.327 
Nietzsche is clear; language is used by individuals as a legislating force that attempts to 
designate truth. However, this drive towards universal truth is always only a particular 
perspective on the world, one that always plays the role of preserving the individual that 
uses it. Moreover, this impulse of preservation found in discursive practices has already 
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appropriated within it the linguistic referential intentions of others.328 As such, language 
overflows its intended semantic boundaries. The result, similar to Bakhtin’s “languages 
of heteroglossia,” is often a crossing of, or a struggle among, competing value systems or, 
to use Deleuzian language, antagonistic assemblages. 
 In terms of philosophy, Nietzsche’s point is that this same dynamic of the 
legislative quality of language is also at work especially as it relates to our 
epistemological constructs. In the following example Nietzsche doesn’t explicitly 
reference Kant and the schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason but the schematism’s 
function in this work bears at least some similarities: 
 Everything which distinguishes human beings from animals depends on this 
 ability to sublimate [verflüchtigen] sensuous metaphors into a schema [Schema], 
 in other words, to dissolve an image into a concept [ein Bild in einen Begriff 
 aufzulösen]. This is because something becomes possible in the realm of these 
 schemata [Schemata] which could never be achieved in the realm of those 
 sensuous first impressions, namely the construction of a pyramidal order based on 
 castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, 
 subordinations, definitions of borders, which now confronts the other, sensuously 
 perceived world as something firmer, more general, more familiar, more human, 
 and hence as something regulatory and imperative [das Regulirende und 
 Imperativische].329 
In other words, the immediate, rich, individual sensual metaphors (what would be 
appearances conditioned by the intuitions of space and time) become sublimated to more 
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and more universal designations in and through language. This is because the schematism 
works as a homogenizing procedure that is able to link the first sensual impressions of a 
given object to what are otherwise heterogeneous categories radically cut off from objects 
in intuition. The process of the schematism, then, which itself is powered by the force of 
imagination330 come to “shape” objects of intuition so that judgments are possible (one of 
Kant’s examples is the concept “dog” or the rule by which the schematism powered by 
imagination can “trace the shape of such a four-footed animal in a general way.”331) In 
turn, these judgments in the form of universal designations take on a legislative, juridical 
force as they are appropriated consciously or not by subjects and their use within the 
intersubjective social body. In the wider scope of philosophy, these universal forms might 
be Plato’s eidē (forms), the God of some scholastics, or Kant’s categorical imperative 
based in pure reason. But it is these “sensuous first impressions” and appearances within 
becoming that Nietzsche wants to stress as being more fundamental and important. As 
Babich succinctly has it: 
 Apart from Nietzsche’s epistemologically bold style, he merely reminds us that 
 empirical reality (i.e., “nature”) ought never be identified with the ideal or 
 metaphysical world of Platonic truth. The real world has its closest family 
 resemblance to the world of becoming or change first recognized by the Ionian 
 philosophers. This empirical reality remains incommensurable with the Eleatic or 
 Platonic ideal of truth.332 
For Babich (and myself), Nietzsche recognizes the fact that science is unable adequately 
to bridge the divide between the intelligible, that is, Being and the sensual world of 
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becoming. A satisfactory ground can never truly be established to include language in its 
attempt to reconcile these two realms. Again as Babich has it: 
 Because reality is in flux away from what has been and toward what is not yet, 
 reality—that is: empirical nature—is always change. It is, like ourselves, part of 
 that species of being hostage in time to the immutable reality of the dynamic 
 mode of becoming—as both what is and what is not. Because of the “stone” fact 
 that no fact is stone, the supreme law of philosophic knowledge lacks any 
 purchase on the empirical world because what is is never beyond change or 
 time.333 
This cleft between Being and becoming is a schism that Nietzsche often exploits and he 
does so on in terms of honesty (Redlichkeit) and its transgression. And this transgression 
often takes the form of provocative laughter. 
 Returning to parody, we see that Nietzsche utilizes this comic device to call into 
question those philosophical systems that attempt to signify the whole, that is, to 
homogenize heterogeneity. This surely has parallels to Bakhtin’s understanding of parody 
and its far reaching power when he asserts, “one can parody superficial verbal forms, but 
one can also parody the very deepest principles governing another’s discourse.”334 
 Laughter, too, is also a form of communication, albeit in a much different mode 
than language, possessing its own intrinsic pragmatic function that allow for a diversity 
of expression. Most notable about laughter, though, is that when we consider 
Zarathustra’s pervasive use of this phenomenon coupled with Nietzsche’s turn to the 
shining aesthetic, it seems faithfully to fulfill its function as something that moves 
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beyond the usually privileged modes of conventional, logical, or philosophical discourse 
such as dialectic. Bakhtin too is clear on laughter’s relationship to reality: 
 Laughter is a specific aesthetic relationship to reality, but not one that can be 
 translated into logical language; that is, it is a specific means for artistically 
 visualizing and comprehending reality and, consequently, a specific means for 
 structuring an artistic image, plot, or genre. Enormous creative, and therefore 
 genre-shaping, power was possessed by ambivalent carnivalistic laughter. This 
 laughter could grasp and comprehend a phenomenon in the process of change and 
 transition, it could fix in a phenomenon both poles of its evolution in their 
 uninterrupted and creative renewing changeability: in death birth is foreseen and 
 in birth death, in victory defeat and in defeat victory, in crowning a decrowning. 
 Carnival laughter does not permit a single one of these aspects of change to be 
 absolutized or to congeal in one-sided seriousness.335 
Bakhtin presents us with an apt image and one that resonates with what is perhaps 
Nietzsche’s goal (Deleuze and Guattari’s as well). The “goal” is, in a sense, an anti-goal 
in that no single phenomenon ought to exist that ossifies itself above all others for all 
time. In other words, the goal is the acknowledgement of multiplicity and becoming. The 
carnival, and its attendant “carnivalistic laughter,” is in a sense a microcosm of the world 
of becoming with all of its settings, characters, beauty and absurdity. In Rabelais and His 
World Bakhtin speaks of laughter’s transformative power in terms of multiplicity, what 
he calls “ambivalent wholeness,” when he asserts: 
 Laughter purifies from dogmatism, from the intolerant and the petrified; it 
 liberates from fanaticism and pedantry, from fear and imitation, from didacticism, 
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 naiveté and illusion, from the single meaning, the single level, from 
 sentimentality. Laughter does not permit seriousness to atrophy and to be torn 
 away from the one being, forever incomplete. It restores this ambivalent 
 wholeness.”336 
 A brief detour to Beyond Good and Evil sheds light on Nietzsche’s insight that the 
present age is an age of costumes and concealment but one that is ripe for the kind of 
parody and laughter that frees. The same carnival laughter that Bakhtin maintains affirms 
our becoming in time is used by Nietzsche as a platform from which to project a parody 
of world history which is to say, a parody of transcendent Being dressed in a multiplicity 
of costumes: 
 We are the first age to be educated in puncto [with respect to] “costumes,” I mean 
 of morals, articles of faith, artistic tastes, and religions, and prepared as no age has 
 ever been for a carnival in the grand style (zum Karneval grossen Stils), for the 
 most spiritually carnivalesque laughter (Fasching-Gelächter) and high spirits, for 
 the transcendental heights of the highest inanity and Aristophanean world 
 mockery. Perhaps it’s that we still discover a realm of our invention here, a realm 
 where we can still be original too, as parodists of world history (Parodisten der 
 Weltgeschichte) or buffoons of God, or something like that,—perhaps it’s that, 
 when nothing else from today has a future, our laughter (unser Lachen) is the one 
 thing that does!337 
Written in 1886, this aphorism encapsulates Nietzsche’s project of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra is the costumed one among the people who may not yet be ready 
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to hear his message. Amidst this costumed age of tragedy and morality, Zarathustra 
enacts his parody ensuring that if anything has a certain future in this time of nihilism that 
he alone discerns it is laughter. 
 Zarathustra’s setting also takes place among many characters and places. 
Zarathustra’s laughter, like carnivalistic laughter, finds itself in the in-between of the past 
with its absolutist moral dictums of good and evil, and a future free of such 
pronouncements. Because Zarathustra refuses to replace one moral system with another 
(Zarathustra never demands obedience to a moral system) his laughter is that aesthetic 
phenomenon that clears the space of all absolutes so that all can laugh once again. Thus 
carnivalistic laughter is an image of humanity free of the weight of moral heaviness. It is 
a humanity that finds itself in a new aesthetic reattunement to existence—it is humanity 
at play. Given all that we have seen thus far, there is hardly a philosopher who fulfils the 
potential to communicate the most serious issues in and through the use of comedy and 
laughter than Nietzsche. 
 What we can conclude, then, about the relationship Nietzsche’s thought has to 
divergence and convergence is that on the one hand, he wants to contribute to the 
absolute divergence away from those thinkers who promote what he views as life 
descending values. In this sense, all forms of Nietzsche’s language—poetry, the 
aphoristic style, provocative laughter—act as subversive agents, as pure intensities ready 
to act within the philosophical tradition in order to destabilize and topple it so that chaos 
can be recognized. 
 But the divergence from such (totalizing) systems is one that returns the 
philosophical project back to the freedom that is unleashed from their collapse. When we 
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recognize and come to grips with tragic knowledge and nihilism, a knowledge that is 
surely frightening, we can in turn embrace the resulting freedom. And this freedom by its 
very nature is one that engenders multiplicity as opposed to totality. Unlike domination, 
multiplicity restores a healthy tension that perpetuates many genetic lines of 
communication and development that occur on the margins of any assemblage—even 
those that appear to be permanent. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is at war with the arborescent 
assemblages that have held sway for so long on their nomadic edges, where the 
expression and content, that is far from its center, starts to dissolve, lose force, and meet 
the laughter that eventually deterritorializes it. But before this grand usurpation by 
Zarathustra, he must first overcome a species of laughter itself. It is one that is directed at 
him as it has been directed at many philosophers for millennia. 
 The difficulties that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra faces are no different. Zarathustra’s 
secret laughter is countered with laughter of a very different sort when he initially 
descends to the people to make his three speeches on the overman, going under, and the 
last man. If the shared laughter of him and the saint signaled the kind of radical 
divergence explored above, then the laughter of the people whom he has descended to is 
uni-directional—it is directed at him. The cause for Zarathustra’s need of three speeches 
instead of one is that he is misunderstood in his first two speeches (although 
misunderstood is once again a very generous appraisal). His first attempt to explain the 
overman as the meaning of the earth appear not to be understood at all. Even at the close 
of Zarathustra’s second speech the human beings laugh, demanding to see the tightrope 
walker, failing to grasp his deeper significance as that which hovers between man and 
superman. For them, he is only a performer to provide a spectacle for their comfortable 
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lives. Hence at the beginning of his third speech Nietzsche states, “When Zarathustra had 
spoken these words [heralding the overman] he looked again at the people and fell silent. 
‘There they stand,’ he said to his heart, ‘they laugh [lachen sie], they do not understand 
me, I am not the mouth for these ears.’”338 Zarathustra and his message have now become 
the object of scornful laughter that presents a challenging hurdle to him and his teaching. 
But before broaching this particular episode in Zarathustra’s going under, a detour by 
way of the ancients will help shed light on this particular phenomenon of scornful 
laughter. 
 To be sure, this notion of scornful laughter had its comedic and philosophical 
precedent long before Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. We can look to the ancients 
to see this particular phenomenon on display in the works of Plato and Aristophanes. In 
both Lysistrata and The Assemblywomen we see this phenomena of scornful laughter 
directed at the women of these two inspired comedies. 
 Both Lysistrata and Praxagora represent a threat to the normative conventions of 
ancient Athens, especially patriarchal power. Lysistrata is motivated by a noble endeavor, 
which is to end the Peloponnesian War and bring peace. To achieve this she and the other 
women agree to withhold all sexual intercourse with their lovers and husbands. Of course 
the men returning from war are looking forward to the “release” of their sexual energy 
only to realize that the painful abstinence they are being subject to is due to Lysistrata 
and her condition that peace be restored. The men are flabbergasted (to say the least!) but 
we as comic spectators revel in this laughter provoking scheme and the scorn and 
contempt the men have, at least initially, for this ploy against them. 
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 Praxagora, too, seeks change. In The Assemblywomen, the change she seeks is a 
new form of justice in the Athenian polis. Justice here, though, is of a very different and 
comedic kind than the men of Athens are accustomed to. Believing that she and her 
followers can administer justice much better than the men, Praxagora initiates changes 
that are more socially distributive. For example, before a man can sleep with an attractive 
young woman, he must first have intercourse with an older, less attractive woman. Once 
again we as spectators of Aristophanes’ genius find these situations laughter provoking 
even though many of the characters within the comedy, most notably the men, can 
respond only with scornful laughter at the attempt by the women to usurp their social 
privileges. 
 These images are certainly absurd, which is to say that as paralogos they are set 
apart from formal logos. No such ploy by the women of ancient Athens ever happened—
let alone succeeded—in ending a war. Nor did the political apparatus ever fall into the 
hands of women, facilitating a change or inversion of social norms deeply entrenched in 
this ancient society. Yet, in the very absurdity of these comic images lies the deepest and 
most profound philosophical import. In fact, because of the scornful laughter they 
produce amongst the characters—the Magistrates and Blepyrus’ of Aristophanes’ 
imagination—we are brought face to face with the seriousness of the issues themselves. 
Indeed, the shining appearance of this comedy is a testament to the philosophical issues 
and not an escape from them providing us with vicarious images of ourselves. 
 Philosophy, too, harbors its own comedic value. Generally speaking, laughter and 
playfulness abound in Plato’s Republic. The particular type of scornful laughter we are 
examining here plays a key role at multiple points in the Republic. But there is one 
 225
example from this particular work that presents itself as a supreme example of this type 
of laughter and its implication for the philosopher’s endeavor. Just as Zarathustra has to 
surmount the scorn of the human beings he has descended to, in the Republic it is 
Socrates who has to grapple with the scornful laughter of the overbearing Thrasymachus. 
 When Thrasymachus appears in the dialogue, he responds to Socrates’ supposed 
inability or reluctance to answer the question about what the just is. Thrasymachus, who 
surely represents an instinctual Dionysian type that Nietzsche admires, demands the 
question to be answered by Socrates; “answer yourself and say what you assert the just to 
be.”339 Socrates responds that if he and Polemarchus have made any mistakes in the 
consideration of the arguments, they are unintentional. Exasperated by the nuance that 
dialectic often requires, Thrasymachus responds in the following way: 
 He listened, burst out laughing very scornfully [anekanchase te mala sardanion], 
 and said, “Heracles! Here is that habitual irony of Socrates. I knew it, and I 
 predicted to these fellows that you wouldn’t be willing to answer, that you  would 
 be ironic and do anything rather than answer if someone asked you something.340 
Thrasymachus’s scornful laughter is indicative of two major things. First, the usual Greek 
word for laughter is gelōs, the infinitive verb being gelaō “to laugh.” Here, however, 
Plato uses sardanion which, as a species of laughter, partakes in its own precise meaning 
according to the particular social milieu in which it is expressed. The word sardanion, 
meaning “scornful laughter,” is derived from a type of plant from Sardinia that when 
eaten “caused facial convulsions resembling those of sardonic laughter, usually followed 
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by death.”341 This kind of scornful laughter, then, is allied with Thrasymachus’s contempt 
for Socrates and the dialectical method. Thrasymachus wants a direct answer to the 
question about what is the just. He becomes exasperated at Socrates who refutes the 
answers only of those who have proffered a response to the question. Thrasymachus’s 
exasperation, then, is aimed at the very dialectic that will, if one comports oneself 
properly to its questioning, disclose the truth or at least bring one closer to it through its 
essential questioning. We can say then that his scornful laughter is an attempt to rout 
philosophical logos from the space being created for it by Socrates. It is not letting 
philosophical logos clear the space for truth or its search. In this sense Plato’s 
appropriation of this particular kind of scornful laughter (sardanion) originating from a 
far away land is indicative of the kind of foreignness that Thrasymachus’s exhibits as an 
interlocutor in the dialectical exchange of the Republic. Thrasymachus’s logos is alien to 
the true sense of justice that Socrates is attempting to disclose. This notion of scornful 
laughter will gain more significance momentarily at the conclusion of Socrates’ dialogue 
with Thrasymachus. 
 The second significance revolves around irony. Thrasymachus asserts that 
Socrates is being “habitually ironic.” But Thrasymachus’s understanding of irony 
represents a marked difference from true Socratic irony. For Thrasymachus, irony means 
that Socrates is unwilling to answer when asked by another interlocutor even though he 
could answer. In other words he believes Socrates to be deceptive. Socratic irony 
however, like dialectic, partakes in much finer distinctions. Socratic irony is saying one 
thing although meaning another but always for the sake of moving the dialogue forward 
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as well as providing a “cushion” to those who offer accounts of their own that ultimately 
fail. Socratic irony then is used with other interlocutors so that they will hopefully follow 
the lead of dialectic to a more enlightened account. Thrasymachus, however, believes he 
has exposed Socrates’ motivations and therefore will not succumb to his cross 
examination. But Thrasymachus ends up unknowingly investing himself in the very 
dialectic he seeks to avoid, thus succumbing in the end to true, Socratic irony. 
 Although here is not the place to litigate the twists and turns of Socrates’ 
interaction with Thrasymachus concerning justice, nonetheless recall that Thrasymachus 
is advocating that the just is “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger”342 so that 
the laws governing a city will inevitably favor the rulers. Socrates, however, 
demonstrates that surely those who rule will on occasion make laws or rules that are not 
to their advantage so that when the ruled obey them the rulers will have acted against 
their own self-interests. Moreover, Thrasymachus believes that the teaching of rhetoric to 
those who are to rule should be the norm. Thrasymachus is more interested in what 
sounds good than Socrates’ pursuit of what is the good. This presents its own level of 
irony in that Thrasymachus is used to teaching and giving long persuasive speeches (for 
large sums of money) in order to persuade the audience and potential rulers. But here 
Thrasymachus, first, is unable to give a sustained account of justice to even one person, 
or to Socrates himself and, second, he has made it clear to Socrates that he wants Socrates 
to answer not only quickly but decisively—as if the question of justice in the polis were 
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trivial enough to be answered in such a way. When Socrates repeatedly counters 
Thrasymachus’s definitions of justice, it is Thrasymachus who attempts to flee.343 
 Socrates inevitably shows why Thrasymachus’s definition of justice falls short. 
He is merely prescribing justice (that the strong should rule) and not providing the 
essence or form of justice. But in terms of the scornful laughter that Thrasymachus 
directed at Socrates (keeping in mind the etymology of sardanion) a poignant event 
transpires after Socrates shows how “the just man is like the wise and good, but the 
unjust man like the bad and unlearned.”344 An inversion happens in which Trasymachus 
appears to undergo the symptoms of the scornful laughter he impulsively directed at 
Socrates moments before; “Now, Thrasymachus did not agree to all of this so easily as I 
tell it now, but he dragged his feet and resisted, and he produced a wonderful quantity of 
sweat, for it was summer. And then I saw what I had not yet seen before—Thrasymachus 
blushing.”345 To be sure, it is at this moment that Thrasymachus senses fear although the 
source of this fear is far from any brute, physical threat. It is from Socrates’ logos whose 
strength simply lies in the truth that it discloses. 
 Just as Socrates demonstrates that the just are happier and stronger than the 
unjust, we see that the very scornful laughter directed at Socrates in order to mock him 
has now reversed and found its target in the one doing the mocking. The blood rushing to 
the face when blushing is similar to a wound. In this sense then it mimics scornful 
laughter and the symptoms of the one who ingests the poisonous plant from Sardinia. 
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Moreover, when we attend closely to the layered definition of elenchus and its verbal 
forms we come to see that this Socratic way of questioning means, among other things, 
“to disgrace, put to shame”346 exactly the way Thrasymachus’s blushing from shame 
indicates. As we saw in the Introduction, Aquinas will describe centuries after the ancient 
Greeks that sardonic laughter or scornful laughter, is a physiological phenomenon, its 
locus the face. Even the throat from which it erupts—the throat functioning as the 
physiological manifestation of language—is the cause of something pre-linguistic and 
antecedent to true philosophical dialectic. Just as death results from the ingestion of the 
Sardonian plant, Thrasymachus’s scornful laughter initially directed at Socrates in order 
to make him blush ends up signaling his own defeat. Like Plato’s use of the foreign 
sardanion as opposed to the more well known and conventional gelōs, Thrasymachus and 
his account of justice is itself foreign to a truly just polis. Indeed, Thrasymachus’s 
account presents a real danger to the polis and the subjects who would constitute it. As 
one of the strong and unjust Thrasymachus’s “death” occurs because of the very Socratic 
dialectic he sought to avoid and quell. In the long quest for justice that the Republic 
pursues, Thrasymachus’s red faced scornful laughter becomes indistinguishable from his 
red faced blushing signaling his own undoing. 
 What all of these examples of scornful laughter demonstrate (and there are many 
more), is that the philosopher more often times than not will experience his or her own 
aporia in terms of his teaching. Scornful laughter then is indicative of dangerousness and 
transgression. For the many (hoi polloi), the philosopher often times appears threatening, 
even contemptible because he usually attempts to introduce new teachings or different 
perspectives to others who are comfortable with a given tradition and its attendant power 
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structure derived from the discursive practices of that age (or any other practice). Or, if 
they are in positions of power the philosopher may appear as a danger to that power 
because he facilitates a new consciousness of the human situation. Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra is no different. So it is his task to navigate the opposition he faces in the form 
of scornful laughter in order to convey his wisdom. 
 The similarities between the kind of scornful laughter directed at Zarathustra and 
the scornful laughter directed at Socrates ends here. Socrates is engaged in dialectic, that 
is, he is engaged with those who are willing to participate honestly in its mechanics. 
Dialectic, in its broadest sense, is that which is made manifest through logos, thus 
seeking the best account through question and answer.347 In the Republic the question is, 
“What is justice?” Socrates and his interlocutors explore this question. Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra, on the other hand, at least in terms of the people he descends to, is not 
engaged in dialectic. Zarathustra does not seek the kind of back and forth in logos that 
dialectic requires. He is there as a herald in order to proclaim the overman as the meaning 
of the earth. The pertinent question for Zarathustra, his audience, and as us readers of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, “Are we ready to hear and accept his teaching?” 
 But what if we were to examine this phenomenon of scornful laughter from the 
opposite direction? Instead of looking at instances taken from the ancients, instances that 
no doubt disclose their own particular wisdom, what if we pivoted towards the future 
where the signs and symbols of dialectical thinking, which have shaped philosophy for so 
long, have come under scrutiny? This is relevant especially in our present era where 
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something manifest (from dia- “through” and legein “speak”). 
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dialectical thinking, at best, is seen as only one type of discourse among the supposed 
throng of endless discourse that characterizes postmodernism. 
 As we saw with Deleuze and Guattari, Nietzsche’s thinking is given a voice 
through Zarathustra. This voice constitutes a rhizomatic assemblage that attempts to 
deterritorialize the kind of philosophical thinking best characterized as arborescent and 
whose assemblage attempts to assimilate, to make “the same,” what is other. Zarathustra 
is a voice, but it is one voice among many. Zarathustra’s voice is attempting to emphasize 
a perspective that calls into question all previous, totalizing systems that imposed, in 
either a direct or indirect way, a compulsory allegiance to or tacit recognition of their 
supremacy. Previously attempted divergence from these assemblages could bring 
rejection, ostracism, and even death (for example, the supposed apostates of natural 
science whose work and discoveries challenged the authority of their day). When we look 
at the scornful laughter directed at Zarathustra many things begin to emerge in terms of 
expression and content on the plane of organization. Zarathustra begins to emerge as an 
abstract machine seeking to disrupt these supposed ossified edifices through the 
deterritorializing effects of laughter. Evans describes Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of 
expression and content this way: 
 The form of expression is a semiotic system, whether we are talking about the 
 genetic code on the level of genes or the language and coded practices of a group. 
 The form of content is that to which the form of expression is related, whether we 
 are speaking of genetic material, or the members and surroundings of a group.348 
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The laughter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, including the scornful laughter of the 
townspeople to whom Zarathustra descends, also finds its place among the expression 
and content of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. 
 First, the scornful laughter of the people already exists on the plane of 
organization in that it has its origin in the people who direct it at Zarathustra’s speeches. 
Thus in terms of content (which itself is made up of form and substance), the people who 
laugh, which is to say those embodied subjects who gesture at Zarathustra with their 
laughter, compose the substance part of content. The form is composed of the multitude 
of these bodies that coalesce in Zarathustra’s particular time to form a particular 
community. Nietzsche writes, “When Zarathustra came into the nearest town lying on the 
edge of the forest, he found many people gathered in the marketplace, for it had been 
promised that a tightrope walker would perform.”349 However, what we must always 
keep in mind is that for Nietzsche community here would not mean a singular, topical 
place, a “town on the edge of a forest,” but would entail humankind itself, that is, the 
community that is the world. Metaphorically speaking it is a town as a microcosm of the 
world on the edge of a forest, the forest being symbolic of the unknown and what is alien. 
Nietzsche believes human beings exist on the edge of this wilderness of the unknown or 
what was described above as an inversion of all that is familiar and its attendant loss of 
all previously ascribed values. 
 Second, expression that also has the division of form and substance constitutes the 
“semiotic systems” of the human beings as they respond to Zarathustra. In other words, 
the form that expression takes is the language that they employ in response to 
Zarathustra’s provocative message such as their calling out for the tightrope walker, that 
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is, to witness his danger as opposed to “living dangerously” themselves. The substance of 
Zarathustra’s audience (again, the town and townspeople are a metaphor for humankind) 
would be all of the symbols and icons that the people employ in terms of their discursive 
practices (religious symbols, signs, logos and so forth). In light of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
system of absolute deterritorialization, how ought laughter be understood? In this 
particular case what role does the scornful laughter of the townspeople play? The 
question is pertinent because it calls into question laughter itself. 
 The enactment of laughter appears not to be language proper. It is not a word 
among words in a discourse, thus it seems as though the laughter of the townspeople does 
not quite fit within the semiotic systems of expression. However laughter, as we have 
seen, does communicate. It is on the one hand a physiological phenomenon of our body 
(face, throat, larynx, diaphragm etc.) and as a gesture, a physiological gesture, it is 
closely allied with the content that is the body. But even though the act of laughter itself 
is not a word, it is an expression nonetheless, even though it appears to lie in the in-
between area between actual content (an embodied person) and expression (language). As 
communication, it does signify many things. Perhaps Nietzsche is communicating to us 
that, at this point in history, the townspeople and potential “last men” either refuse to 
respond or unable to respond in the kind of elaborate linguistic, philosophical discourse 
to Zarathustra’s message of the Übermensch as the meaning of the earth. They can only 
offer their scornful laughter and we can see that it indicates two main things. 
 First, the scornful laughter of the people signifies that they either do not 
understand Zarathustra’s message, or that they understand it but are not willing to accept 
it, or a combination of both. Zarathustra seems to suggest the later, saying of the people, 
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“they do not understand me, I am not the mouth for these ears.”350 The advent of 
Zarathustra on the philosophical scene, whether within the drama of the text or outward 
as a herald of a return to the earth and its fundamental meaning of the Übermensch, is 
going to meet with resistance, although a resistance that makes up much of the kind of 
tension Nietzsche approves of. 
 Second, the scornful laughter of the people expresses their comfort with the kind 
of assemblage which protects a way of life they have become accustomed to. We can say 
that the expression of this assemblage is the kind of language that evolves along with its 
institutions. For example, there is the Judeo-Christian language of the church, such as the 
Ten Commandments, or Immanuel Kant’s language of duty in the form of the categorical 
imperative that “sublimates sensuous metaphors into a schema”351 of pure reason of 
which we are to be irrevocably bound. The human beings that constitute Zarathustra’s 
audience (which in essence are we who are Nietzsche’s actual heirs and readers), are not 
willing to surrender their semiotic systems that protect a certain way of life they have 
become accustomed to. 
 This is why laughter, whether the people’s or Zarathustra’s, signify a fault line 
that runs along the expression of both assemblages as they come into contact. The 
assemblage of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is novel compared to the entrenched assemblage 
of Western morality. It is just coming into its own being. This is why Nietzsche, as well 
as his Zarathustra, must temper his powerful message to the people who, as he quickly 
learns, are unassailable in the beginning. Thus Zarathustra needs to first find companions. 
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This is also why Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the kind of work that it is, namely an inspired 
dramatic work as opposed to the kind of philosophical “position paper” one might expect 
from a philosopher. Poetry, especially the kind that flows from the pen of Nietzsche and 
the mouth of Zarathustra, allows for a playfulness that in the end will hopefully help 
undermine the rigid, arborescent assemblage known here as “Western morality.” And we 
can also see that Nietzsche’s own lived bodily experience with its pervasive pain, his 
nomadic wanderings, his devotion to close friends—in essence what would be the content 
in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought in A Thousand Plateaus—have allowed his 
expression to take this experience and poeticize it into the form that it is. Evans, in 
accordance with Deleuze and Guattari, refers to this interaction of content and expression 
as “reciprocal presupposition,” stating: 
 [P]erceiving (as content) can move ahead of saying (as expression) in what it 
 reveals of our surroundings—even disrupting or transforming the particular 
 discourse in play at the time; discourse can affect what we do and are able to 
 perceive, often opening up a space for new perceptions. An experience, for 
 example, twists the poet’s idiom into a new expressions; a new way of speaking 
 about things reveals dimensions of reality we had not previously noted.352 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in general and his Zarathustra, in particular through their 
provocative laughter and poetic style, attune us to just these new ways of thinking and 
perceiving. 
 Returning to Zarathustra’s third speech to the human beings he has descended to, 
he realizes that he must somehow address the scornful laughter that is targeted at him, a 
laughter that betrays the unwillingness of humankind to accept his teaching if in fact they 
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even understand his message. In order to do this he gives a speech on the last man. 
Zarathustra says that the last man is the one who is truly contemptible; “Thus I shall 
speak to them of the most contemptible person: but he is the last human being.”353 
 Why, though, is the last man contemptible? Zarathustra says it is because the last 
man has pride. This pride however is not contemptible in the normal moral sense, such 
that it is an over-abundance of hubris. It is contemptible because they possess pride 
without reason to be prideful. Rejecting the overman and using language proper to the 
kind of messenger that he is, Zarathustra reveals that they are essentially content living 
according to the conventions of the past, of what has been prescribed for them in their 
education. The language that Nietzsche uses here denotes a sort of unhealthy contentment 
in which the last men no longer possess the kind of chaos that would stir their souls into 
going under to something more human than human, namely the overman. Hence 
Zarathustra says of them: 
 Beware! The time approaches when human beings no longer launch the arrow of 
 their longing beyond the human [über den Menschen], and the string of their bow 
 will have forgotten how to whir! I say to you: one must still have chaos in oneself 
 [Chaos in sich haben] in order to give birth to a dancing star.354 
 In essence Zarathustra is trying to convey that the last men are those who are 
contemptible and thus should be the object of scornful laughter. But this epiphany can not 
happen unless the last men recognize it, which is to say that they have to image 
themselves, that is, see themselves as the last human beings otherwise change is 
impossible. This is why the image of the tightrope walker is of great significance to 
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Nietzsche. The tightrope walker is not only a profound symbol of that which hovers 
between man and superman, he also symbolizes in his very deed the need to live 
dangerously in order to tread this path. And the dangerousness here is precisely the 
message Zarathustra hopes to convey in terms of a new founding. However, this 
dangerousness is lost on the people. They do not yet understand his message of nihilism 
and the need for the overman and moreover the last men equate comfort with happiness 
and not danger; “‘We invented happiness’—say the last human beings, blinking.”355 
 At the end of Zarathustra’s final speech an aporia is reached. Zarathustra realizes 
that he has failed to persuade humankind of the need for the overman. If he is to succeed, 
he must first find the ears for his message not in the great mass of people but in a few 
creative companions like himself.356 The scornful laughter directed at him by the people 
is indeed the symbol of this aporia. In other words, the aporia is marked by their scornful 
laughter. Just as we saw at the beginning of his third speech when the people laugh at him 
and fail to understand him, the same occurs at the end of this speech ensuring the need to 
continue “going under.” Zarathustra whispers to himself, “And now they look at me and 
laugh, and in laughing they hate me too. There is ice in their laughter.”357 To be sure this 
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III. Lions, Laughter, Affirmation. 
 
 Perhaps the greatest image of laughter that Nietzsche presents to us in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is not Zarathustra but instead the lion. The roaring laughter of the lion is 
emblematic of noble instincts and life affirmation. As such, it stands in stark contrast to 
the leveling kind of scornful laughter that was directed at Zarathustra by humankind in 
the prologue. Instead of laughter of contempt aimed at his teaching, the laughter of the 
lion symbolizes first and foremost a response to Western reason and morality. It says, 
better yet, it roars “I am no longer impressed!” 
 The image of the lion is first introduced in the prologue as part of Zarathustra’s 
first speech to humankind where he implores them to accept the overman as the meaning 
of the earth and forego “otherworldly” hopes. At this early stage Zarathustra is trying to 
convey the contempt they should hold for the things they have held in the highest esteem, 
such as their moral systems or epistemological pursuits based in reason. For example he 
says, “What matters my reason? Does it crave knowledge like the lion its food? It is 
poverty and filth and a pitiful contentment!”358 Zarathustra says that reason craves 
knowledge the way the lion craves food. I interpret this to mean that if reason is to be of 
any value then it must be a reason that works towards new knowledge as that which 
affirms life as opposed to a return to an origin such as a Platonic original, or more 
generally anything that is posited as essential but lies outside the scope of life itself. In 
other words, reason ought to devour the old the way the lion devours its prey. In order to 
demolish reason as it has been understood and used until now requires courage and the 
ability to laugh at what formerly was held in the highest esteem. 
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 This requires a deep scrutiny of reason itself, raising serious questions about its 
use and purpose. Does Nietzsche call for the abandonment of reason in life or is reason 
simply to refocus itself and crave something new? As I maintained in the first chapter, 
Nietzsche does not embrace the abandonment of the Apollonian in favor of the 
Dionysian. And in the second chapter it became clear that he doesn’t want to disavow 
science and logic either. The same is true here. It is less an “either/or” proposition—
either reason or not—but more of the proper role of reason. Mindful of the notion of limit 
and transgression, Nietzsche wants to say of reason that what began as an unbounded 
optimism has now not only run its course, but has delimited its own limits and thus led to 
the kind of pessimism and resignation that is fatal to life. For Nietzsche, the history of 
philosophy from Plato onwards has been the hegemony of reason and as such has worked 
against life. This culminated in the thought of Schopenhauer who professed, like Kant, 
that the thing-in-itself was unknowable and that life as will in-itself can only be 
unsatisfied desire.359 In turn this lack of certain knowledge that ensures a constant 
desiring could only relegate life to despondency, even suffering. For Nietzsche, the blind 
adherence to reason can only by its very nature, lead to pessimism and skepticism, unlike 
his eternal return that says “yes” to life and wills it “once again.” Laurence Lampert 
writes of reason’s decline at its own hands: 
 In this symbolic way, the old tradition slays itself: the tradition that has mastered 
 the world with its rational gravity in search of eternal security and that now lies in 
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 the ruins of its necessary pessimism, is finally “stoned” to death by the thought 
 that life as it is emerges eternally out of the enigmatic whole.360 
What Nietzsche wants to call attention to actually preserves a good measure of reason by 
showing that if it is understood as not supported by “the webs of any cosmic spider,” that 
is, if it is understood to have limits “then reason itself can be reasonably employed to 
support the ideal that is the opposite of world denial.”361 The key once again is twofold: 
first, to recognize what Nietzsche sees as the fundamental irrational genesis of the 
rational impulse and two, to exercise the kind of intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) that 
allows for this recognition. As he puts it in Daybreak, “How did rationality arrive in the 
world? Irrationality, as might be expected: by a chance accident. If we want to know 
what that chance accident was we shall have to guess it, as one guesses the answer to a 
riddle.”362 Nietzsche’s phrasing, his use of guessing the “chance accident,” suggests that 
in guessing we assume a similar stance as if one were answering “a riddle.” This alludes 
to tragedy and tragic knowledge itself, similar to Oedipus’s guessing of the riddle of the 
Sphinx which led to his demise. So in essence, it is not the vanquishing of science or 
logic that Nietzsche prescribes but, as Babich maintains, “Since science cannot critique 
itself, since the problem of science cannot be posed on the ground of science, Nietzsche 
proposes the perspective of the healing power of art.”363 If science is to be of any value 
then it must serve life and to do so it must be seen, as he asserts in The Birth of Tragedy, 
“through the prism of the artist.”364 
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 If we understand this in a historical context, Nietzsche might also have in mind 
that if our reason is in service to life, then the knowledge it ought to pursue should find 
its impetus in that which is unhistorical. History should be used only as a springboard 
forward and not something to be simply revered and ossified into facts, events, and rituals 
or as something we blindly copy. Thus it appears that we need to unlearn much if we are 
to acquire the kind of knowledge that serves life and the future. The image of the lion 
works in favor of this unlearning, in that as an image of consumption, it devours its prey 
just as Zarathustra wants to unlearn much that has been handed down from history to the 
present. 
 One of the most notable images of the lion occurs in the first part of the section 
titled, “On the Three Metamorphoses.” Nietzsche uses the lion image once again to 
illustrate the kind of spirit needed to throw off the old values of good and evil. Coming 
after the camel, who is a “carrying spirit” since it has bore the weight of the past, the lion 
for Nietzsche is more a metaphor for freedom than anything else. For this reason he says, 
“To create new values—not even the lion is capable of that: but to create freedom for 
itself for new creation—that is within the power of the lion. To create freedom for oneself 
and also a sacred ‘No’ to duty: for that, my brothers, the lion is required.”365 The lion, 
whose nature is predatory and prideful, is the kind of spirit that clears the space for the 
formation of new values. The values created in this novel space of the freely open happen 
through the spirit of the child—an innocence that plays freely because as new it has no 
memory and can affirm only its creations in a “sacred yes-saying.”366 
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 The freedom of the lion can also be understood in terms of time. For Nietzsche, 
time is not to be understood as simply linear. Instead, time marks out the space of that 
which returns eternally and what always returns is chaos and the moment that continually 
needs to be refined, overcome, and affirmed. Thus the space-clearing freedom of the 
laughing lion is akin to the Dionysus myth. Like Dionysus, who was pursued, tracked 
down, and torn to pieces only to be eternally reborn, the laughter of the lion is one that 
affirms the eternal return of chaos, that is, the eternal return of the same so that within 
this space of freedom chaos will be given form and then perish. 
 In the second part in the section, titled “On the Famous Wise Men,” the lion 
image reappears. Here Nietzsche is deconstructing what is taken for wisdom and the 
supposed wise who wield it. He asserts that the famous wise men are famous only 
because they cater to the herd who, in turn, justify them as rulers: “The people you have 
served and the people’s superstition, all you famous wise men!—and not the truth! And 
precisely on that account you were accorded respect.”367 Normally the wise are those who 
create values in the manner and spirit of the lion and child as understood in “On the 
Three Metamorphoses,” which is to say out of freedom and necessity. But here Nietzsche 
calls their bluff by exposing their motivations, which are linked to the plebian masses or 
what Nietzsche often refers to as the herd or herd mentality. How exactly does he do this? 
By inverting the image of the lion. A few stanzas later his Zarathustra states, “And now 
you famous wise men, I wish you would finally throw off the lion skin completely!”368 In 
essence Nietzsche is exposing a comedy and one that is much in line with the kind of 
comedy of appearance we saw earlier with the famous men (most notably politicians) in 
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The Gay Science. The lion skin understood here presents an image. But unlike the image 
of an actual lion, this image, like a mask, is an image of concealment. It conceals the true 
motives of the famous wise people who are not truly wise because, according to 
Nietzsche, their “wisdom” is validated through the revering masses who are reflected in 
them. Keeping with the image of the lion Nietzsche says the truly wise want the “godless 
desert” which is to say, “Hungry, violent, lonely, godless; thus the lion-will wants 
itself.”369 
 Moreover Nietzsche believes he is also exposing something fraudulent. By 
wishing for the lion skin to be pulled away thus exposing the fact that the supposed wise 
do not really seek the truth in the manner of his Zarathustra, this constitutes another 
laughter provoking moment that is coupled with the highest seriousness. Just as we laugh 
at Aristophanes’ Praxagora and her cohorts who masquerade as men in order to trick 
them and bring about a more equitable change in the polis, we also laugh at Nietzsche’s 
comic view of the philosopher presented here. Keeping in mind that regardless of what 
method philosophers may utilize, they all in the end hope to unconceal the truth or 
something essential. For this they may gain a following and are often times revered. 
However, when Nietzsche’s hammer finds its target in these famous wise men the result 
is both shocking and comic. It is shocking because if we accept Nietzsche’s major 
premise of the tragic view of life, which calls on us to recognize ourselves as finite, 
earthbound beings, then we may come to realize that all of the “wise men,” whose 
thinking we held in the highest esteem, whose commandments and prohibitions for so 
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long helped shape the arc of history, are only “asses” that pulled “the people’s cart.”370 It 
is shocking because this unconcealing reveals to us the nothingness, the nihilism that both 
philosophical and moral systems concealed. Yet, the image that Nietzsche paints here, of 
wise men, lions, lion skins, asses, and humankind, erupts amidst this tragedy as if it were 
a comedic cushion to help soften the blows of this hard truth. This is precisely why (as 
Higgins has shown) Nietzsche’s use of Zarathustra is done in parody. If the old, historical 
Zarathustra was responsible for introducing good and evil into human consciousness, 
then Nietzsche’s Zarathustra by parodying this historical figure heralds a new beginning, 
one that affirms our earthbound life here with its many perspectives. 
 Nietzsche’s use of the lion image reaches its fruition at two other critical moments 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the section titled “On Old and New Tablets” of the third 
part, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has reached a crucial moment in his journey. It is crucial 
because he finds himself in the time between the old and new, which is to say between 
the collapse of valuations based on good and evil and the potentiality for the will to new 
knowledge and the overman as the meaning of the earth: “Here I sit and wait, old broken 
tablets around me and also new tablets only partially written upon. When will my hour 
come?”371 Although the “old broken tablets” could refer to any number of codified laws 
that helped shape past civilizations—Sumerian tablets, Egyptian tablets, the Code of 
Hammurabi—given Nietzsche’s antagonism to Christianity in general it is most likely 
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that he has in mind the tablets of the Ten Commandments, commandments that were 
supposedly “written in stone” for eternity. 
 But Zarathustra’s question, “When will my hour come?,” affirms his locus in this 
crucial in-between time where he yearns to “go under” to mankind once more. In order to 
discern the right moment of time, that is, the moment when Zarathustra’s going under tips 
the scale towards the future, Zarathustra says he needs a sign. And this sign is the 
laughing lion; “This is what I wait for now; signs must come to me first that it is my 
hour—namely the laughing lion with a swarm of doves.”372 Again, the lion is 
representative of pride and freedom. The lion itself does not create, which is left to the 
creative innocence of the child bound to nothing other than its own play. The laughing 
lion then is the cue Zarathustra is waiting for, a sign that mankind is prepared to hear his 
message and take up the freedom that is necessary if one is to live as an authentic, value 
creating voice. The laughing lion is also an affirmation of the tragic view of life. This is 
why the laughing lion is accompanied by doves. The doves are a symbol of lightness and 
the willingness to own up to tragic view so that one does not flee in the face of nihilism 
but affirms oneself as a value creator in the very midst of nihilism’s greatest and only 
gift—freedom. Thus, it is only when the lion roars with laughter that the pendulum 
swings and the time is ripe for the overman. In essence we may say that the laughing lion 
signals this very usurpation. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says a few lines later when he came 
to mankind: 
 I told them to overthrow [umwerfen] their old professional chairs wherever that 
 old conceit had sat; I told them to laugh [lachen] at their great masters of virtue 
 and their saints and poets and world redeemers. I told them to laugh [lachen] at 
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 their gloomy wise men and at any who ever perched in warning, like black 
 scarecrows, in the tree of life. I sat down alongside their great road of graves and 
 even among carrion and vultures—and I laughed [lachte] at all their yesteryear 
 and its rotting, decaying glory. Indeed, like preachers of repentance and fools I 
 screamed bloody murder about all their great and small—that their best is so very 
 small! that their most evil is so very small!—I had to laugh [lachte]. Thus my 
 wild longing cried and laughed out of me [lachte also aus mir], born in the 
 mountains, a wild wisdom surely!—my great, winging, roaring longing. And 
 often it swept me off my feet and up and away, in the midst of my laughter 
 [Lachen]...373 
It is evident the way in which laughter plays a pivotal role for Nietzsche. Zarathustra does 
not say to “engage in dialectics” with the old masters or even try and refute the old 
masters. Zarathustra’s call is not about creating a teaching that is logically sound, or 
about positing additional, supersensible criteria that all ought to be bound. Zarathustra’s 
call is to laugh because the audible explosion of laughter is the first act of a will that says, 
“No!” to what has held sway for so long. The laugh is a “No!” that shatters the same in 
order that chaos returns. The laughter of the lion and the laughter that Zarathustra 
implores us as potential Übermenschen to initiate is a laughter of disruption, even of 
transgression. It is laughter that says one is no longer impressed by previously ascribed 
beliefs and that one is taking up their freedom and authentic possibilities in the laughing 
moment of inspiration. 
 In the fourth and final part the laughing lion appears again. When Zarathustra 
returns to his cave in the section titled, “The Welcome,” he finds all of those he 
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encountered in his going under gathered together at his cave. Although he addresses them 
as higher men and accepts their company, he tells them that they are not those he has 
been waiting for in the mountains. For Zarathustra the higher men are “mere bridges” that 
still higher people will “stride across.”374 Once again Zarathustra affirms that what he 
waits for is that human being that will affirm its mortal ties to the earth and the joy that 
the moment has as if it were eternity, that is, as if it were to eternally return. This human 
being is, above all, characterized as laughing and cheerful: 
 Not for you do I wait here in these mountains, not with you shall I go down 
 [niedersteigen] for the last time. You came to me only as an omen that higher 
 ones are on their way to me—not the people of great longing, of great nausea, of 
 great surfeit and that which you called the remnant of God.—No! No! Three times 
 no! I wait for others here in these mountains and will not lift a foot from here 
 without them,—for higher, stronger, more victorious, more cheerful ones 
 [Wohlgemutere], those who are built right-angled in body and soul: laughing 
 lions [lachende Löwen] must come!375 
For Nietzsche and his Zarathustra the crucial element missing from the authentic higher 
man, who has yet to appear or in other words who is a “not yet,” is cheerfulness and 
laughter. Although those gathered at Zarathustra’s cave have heard his teaching, 
nonetheless the way to the overman is not a simple matter of executing some instruction, 
if indeed Zarathustra’s teaching can be called “instruction” at all. Zarathustra’s appeal 
aims more at a change of perspective, that is, a turning of thought from the way one is 
oriented in the world as a product of what has come before to seeing the human being as 
                                                 
374 Ibid., 229/“The Welcome.” 
375 Ibid. 
 248
a bridge forward and the vehicle for the will (to new knowledge). This turning of 
consciousness that Zarathustra hopes will occur is facilitated by the very act of laughter 
itself. For Zarathustra laughter is the linchpin that tips the scales in favor of the future, in 
favor of the overman to come. But how exactly is this so? 
 Consider laughter itself as a phenomenon. Laughter is a phenomenon of the face 
or head. Unlike language that is tied to thought it originates in the body, more specifically 
the throat thus it is to a large extent a physiological phenomenon. Whereas language’s 
physical manifestation is the tongue, mouth, lips, and lungs that articulate a particular 
voice or thought, and so is already on the way to representing something in concreto. 
Laughter, on the other hand, is not a representation. It is an act that affirms, denies or, in 
the case of Nietzsche’s laughing lions, achieves both at the same time. The eruption of 
laughter from the prideful lion at once says “yes!,” which is an affirmation of the human 
being as a bridge to the overman. At the same time this laughter says “no!,” aiming itself 
at mediocrity, at ressentiment, at “thou shalts,” at that which has held sway and 
commanded dutiful action. It is the “no” in “no longer impressed.” In a word, it is a “no!” 
to nihilism. As a “no” to nihilism the eruption of laughter affirms chaos as our amor fati 
(love of fate) so that duty’s only command now is to celebrate—a negative becomes a 
positive. Thus the use of laughter by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a 
phenomenon that often times encompasses opposites; “yes” saying and “no” saying, past 
and future. Many of Nietzsche’s pronouncements in this work surely transgress the rules 
of argumentation such as the principle of non-contradiction as we saw above. But 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra revels in the inconsistencies and contradictions of life and these 
are always best expressed in laughter, his and others. Its plentiful occurrence is, in a very 
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ironic sense, of the utmost seriousness that marks out the intersection of the past and the 
future. 
 This plea for laughter is given in an admonition a few sections later when 
Zarathustra says to the higher men: 
 How much is still possible! So learn to laugh over and past yourselves [lernt doch 
 über euch hinweg lachen]! Lift up your hearts, you good dancers, high! Higher! 
 And don’t forget good laughter [Lachen] either. This crown of the laughing one 
 [Krone des Lachenden], this rose-wreathed crown: to you, my brothers, I throw 
 this crown! I pronounced laughter [Lachen] holy; you higher men, learn—to 
 laugh! [lernt mire—lachen].376 
Thus it is clear that Nietzsche sees laughter and its role of affirmation as the critical 
element that, in a word, lightens the mood, and the body in order to prepare it for dancing 
and graceful movement. Just as great comedy harbors its own serious, philosophical 
moments, Nietzsche with his Zarathustra is attempting to retrieve the lost playfulness he 
believes ought to be intrinsic to life. Thus his Zarathustra helps link philosophy and the 
philosopher back to buffoonery and laughter. Parody itself helps achieve a cheerfulness 
that erupts from the text into life so as to bring back gaiety to the brooding thus helping to 
pave the way for the overman. 
 The passage above from “On the Higher Man” is also echoed in the second 
edition of The Birth of Tragedy (1886). The preface utilizes a long quote from this same 
section in which laughter abounds. But for Nietzsche, laughter in the mouth of 
Zarathustra is no ordinary laughter. It takes on the overtones of one who prepares the 
way, giving hints of what is to come: “Zarathustra who speaks the truth [Zarathustra der 
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Wahrsager], who laughs the truth [Zarathustra der Wahrlacher], not impatient, not 
unconditional, one who loves leaps and deviations: I myself set this crown on my 
head!”377 As the translator (Ronald Speirs) makes clear, Nietzsche is playing on the 
German word wahrsagen which means “to prophesy” by creating neologisms such as 
Wahrlacher or one who “laugh’s the truth.” Hence the will of Nietzsche’s “Dionysiac 
monster”378 is always future directed, as opposed to a return to an origin, and is 
manifested as such by laughter. In the last analysis laughter essentially acts as the force of 
a new beginning. 
 The gravity and weight that Nietzsche lends to laughter and cheerfulness is 
perhaps best illustrated in the very last section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. “The Sign” 
occurs after the Roundelay refrain and, much in the manner of a musical score, is itself a 
refrain of the beginning of the work where we find Zarathustra high up in his cave, to 
which the sun must climb. While the higher men are asleep in Zarathustra’s cave he is 
awake with his eagle and snake above. But he muses, “I still lack the proper human 
beings!” It is at this point that a sign is revealed to him in the form of being descended 
upon and surrounded by countless doves. As he reaches around him to ward away “the 
affectionate birds” he also “reached unwittingly into a thick, warm tangle of hair, and at 
the same time a roar sounded around him—a soft, long lion’s roar.”379 
 The laughing lion is not only a sign, that is its own semiotic play of signs, but also 
an indicator of things to come. As the lion lies at Zarathustra’s feet Zarathustra declares, 
“The sign is coming” and “My children are near, my children.” Akin to the lion and child 
in “The Three Metamorphoses,” this last section links the lion and his pivotal laughter—a 
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laughter that frees thinking for the future—to the child-philosopher who commences his 
play. 
 But Nietzsche also links this final image of Zarathustra and the laughing lion with 
the elemental earth and the vaulting trajectory of the sun. In the final lines of the work 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says: 
 Well then! The lion came, my children are near, Zarathustra became ripe 
 [Zarathustra ward reif], my hour came—‘This is my morning, my day is 
 beginning: up now, up, you great noon! [herauf nun, herauf, du grosser 
 Mittag]’—Thus spoke Zarathustra and he left his cave, glowing and strong, like a 
 morning sun that emerges from dark mountains.380 
Just as the last section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a refrain of the first section with 
Zarathustra back at his cave and the sun rising to him, it is also a foreshadowing of one of 
the most well known passages Nietzsche will use later in 1888 in “How the ‘True World’ 
Finally Became a Fable” in Twilight of the Idols. When we put this crucial piece of 
Nietzsche’s thinking in its perspective we can begin to see that “How the ‘True World’ 
Finally Became a Fable” is being enacted by Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Because this enigmatic work by Nietzsche is itself an eruption into history, a laughing 
eruption into history, attuned ears that hear its message can turn out of the text into their 
time and hopefully to a new beginning, just as Zarathustra is poised to do with his lion at 
the close of the text. 
 The laughing lion is Zarathustra’s sign that his teaching is ripe and that his 
morning and day are just beginning. He exclaims, “up now, up, you great noon!” But this 
is more than an exclamation, it is an affirmation that looks towards the future, that is, 
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towards the overman to come. It is also an affirmation that even the future type 
“overman” will itself sink into the horizon from its great noon when and if it has 
exhausted its greatness. Thus it is an affirmation of a new time—one of the eternal return. 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and lion are there, as laughing witnesses to the irreducibility of 
the world and life to any system or synthesis. They are there as witnesses to the tragic 
view of the world, to the aesthetic shining of appearance and the elemental earth assisting 
in the transition from nihilism to the overman—INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: Resenting Seriousness, Laughing at Ressentiment 
 
 What does laughter disclose in this most enigmatic work of Nietzsche’s? Why is 
laughter for Nietzsche so significant? Laughter abounds so much in this work that to 
address its every occurrence would be a work in its own right. This chapter however 
distills a few crucial insights. 
 The first is that when reading Thus Spoke Zarathustra we must be vigilant about 
who is laughing and why they are laughing. This is because Zarathustra is not the only 
character who wields the power of laughter. As we saw, laughter is even directed at him. 
We saw this phenomenon in Zarathustra’s initial descent from his cave when the people 
focused their laughter on him, thus presenting Zarathustra with his first obstacle to the 
overman. Moreover, we saw the many forms that laughter takes in this work as well. 
Thus the laughter of the townspeople is best characterized as scornful laughter that at one 
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time wills the last man and at the same time resists Zarathustra’s call to overcome 
themselves and move from human to the overman. 
 In addition to the many forms of laughter, we saw how laughter intersected with 
the eternal return and the will to power, the two overarching themes of this work. For 
Nietzsche, the will to power’s importance is always connected to the enhancement or 
furtherance of the subject’s affirmation of life. Thus the will to power serves the subject 
by enhancing the feeling of power it feels in its creative deeds. Hence, the poet’s will to 
power is enhanced by creatively disclosing the world through his or her particular voice. 
The phenomenon of laughter as well can act as an enhancement of one’s will to power 
through its simultaneous “yes saying” and “no saying.” Zarathustra knows his task is an 
arduous one. He is asking people to reorient themselves with the world that they think 
they know; a world whose values have been handed down to them for millennia. Better 
still, we might say that Zarathustra is asking them to reorient themselves in the world of 
becoming as opposed to some posited, supersensible criteria. However, freeing others (as 
well as himself) from illusions and falsehoods is no easy task. Thus he is often times told, 
for example by the saint in the first part, that his task is a hopeless one. Yet Zarathustra 
sees this task as the very enhancement of his will to power and so he laughs, affirming it. 
 Another key issue is that Nietzsche must not allow his Zarathustra to fall prey to 
the kind of ressentiment he conceived in On the Genealogy of Morality. Ressentiment is a 
reactive, value creating force that says “No!” to everything that is outside and different 
from it. Instead of affirming multiplicity, ressentiment wants the same, that is, it wants 
assimilation. Although in On the Genealogy of Morality it was the priestly class who 
Nietzsche characterized as the prime example of ressentiment, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 254
the last human being appears faithfully to fulfill this less than honorable role. Rejecting 
Zarathustra’s call that the “overman is the meaning of the earth,” the last human being 
desires comfort and the will to nothingness and so it is an image of homogeneity, 
dilution, and leveling down. Zarathustra implores them that the chaos of a dancing star is 
much more preferable than the so-called happiness of the last human being. But 
Zarathustra’s admonition to the people goes unheeded. 
 Yet, Zarathustra refused to succumb to ressentiment, that is, he refuses to blame 
the blamers as seen in the phenomena of scornful laughter expressed by the people who 
cried out for the last human being and happiness. In essence, this laughter, although an 
obstacle that Zarathustra subsequently strove to overcome throughout the rest of his 
journey, also played the role of a provocation in the deepest sense of the word. Laughter, 
as we have seen, is a physiological phenomenon and a gesture. The provocative laughter 
of the people who prefer the last human being is surely one that “calls forth” and 
“challenges” Zarathustra. 
 Zarathustra’s refusal of the model of ressentiment showcases itself through the 
fact that he never once refers to the townspeople as “evil,” as the priestly class did to 
those not in their image in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality. Whereas the 
priestly class sought a target outward, turning good and bad to good and evil, Zarathustra 
sees his goal as a herald to a new way of life that is oriented to value creating as well as 
the gathering of the earth and its people. It is a noble goal and to work toward it requires 
an effort that sees all others as potentially worthy of its message. Zarathustra’s goal of a 
reevaluation of all values is not easily achievable because ears are still lacking to hear it. 
Still, for Zarathustra their skepticism is not a substitute for evil. Furthermore laughter, 
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whether directed at him or from him (and on occasion Zarathustra even laughs at 
himself), plays a significant role. Nietzsche knows that his Zarathustra attempts to 
disclose the “eternal comedy of existence” to those who do not yet recognize that they are 
its leading players. In this sense, Zarathustra like Nietzsche, is an untimely figure not just 
as he appears to others within the text itself, but as an eruption within the history of 
philosophy. It is from this perch in his thinking that he finds humor and laughter to play a 
significant role, one that keeps him from reacting towards others in the form of 
ressentiment. 
 With all of this said, especially concerning the post-reception of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is precisely the lack of 
conclusion that Nietzsche’s work in general, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra in particular, 
engenders. This was shown in the way that Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking is born out in 
large part by Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Whether it is the meeting of the arborescent 
assemblage of the people with the rhizomatic assemblage of Zarathustra and his teaching, 
or the power of dispersion found in the laugh of the lion, in the end the heterogenetic 
elements of multiplicity—the infinite masks and drives that are us—are always affirmed. 
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with its dramatic structure, poetic texture, and 
provocative laughter at its core, is a work that exists on the periphery of the dominant 
arborescent structures that have constituted philosophy for so long. It is a work that, like 
guerilla fighters who are always outnumbered and under-resourced, raids these structures. 
Zarathustra’s weapons are neither conventional, in the sense that he uses their same 
modes of expression and content, nor unconventional as to not be recognizable that he 
would be rendered a recluse only at home within his cave. Zarathustra, through his 
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laughter and comedic parody, reflects the expression and content of the arborescent 
structures back at it so that we can begin to laugh at ourselves. Instead of appearing 
before a transcendent God or appearing as a dim copy compared to a perfect original, we 





















CONCLUSION: The Eternal Return of the Eternal Comedy of Existence 
 
“The day we can say, with conviction: ‘Forwards! Even our old morality would make a 
comedy!’ we shall have discovered a new twist and possible outcome for the Dionysian 
drama of the ‘fate of the soul’—: and he’ll make good use of it, we can bet, he, the grand 
old eternal writer of the comedy of our existence!...” 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality~ 
 
 
 A conclusion is a time to reflect on what has been said. What can be said about 
Nietzsche, comedy and laughter? Foremost is the close kinship that Nietzsche’s thought 
has to these phenomena. Whether one agrees or disagrees about any particular point that 
has been made, I hope above all that the reader is able to see, as I do, the levity that 
resonates in Nietzsche’s work. If for no other reason, the levity inherent in his thought is 
there to help compensate for the tragic knowledge that is unfolding. This notion of the 
tragic as it relates to comedy and laughter have been paramount in this study. The tragic 
limit of our knowledge and the resulting tragic wisdom are the necessary backdrop to the 
eruption of comedy and laughter in Nietzsche’s thought, otherwise a study of these 
phenomena would be merely anecdotal or incidental and thus never point to anything 
deeper outside of the aphorism or section of Nietzsche’s work that contained them. The 
importance of this cannot be overstated because if his thinking aims to achieve anything, 
then it is to peel back, layer by layer, the motivation and illusions that human beings 
employ in their existence. Illusions that are no doubt necessary although we have 
forgotten that they are, indeed, fictions. And his sights are set on all of the areas that 
provide the breath and scope of our being here—epistemology, morality, science, 
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religion, culture are just a few of his philosophical targets. The exposing of illusions at 
the heart of the most vital spheres that tell us who we are is, to many, unbearable let alone 
never a reason to be even remotely cheerful. Yet, this is how Nietzsche, contra 
Schopenhauer, asks us to comport ourselves in the face of this “knowledge” as we pursue 
a meaningful existence justified “only as an aesthetic phenomenon.” The limits that we 
are all given over to by virtue of the fact that we are only human, all too human are not 
reasons for despair but present to us opportunities of affirmation that allow us to say 
“yes” to life so that we may transfigure our state into joy. 
 Moreover we saw that for Nietzsche if truth means anything in the philosopher’s 
quest one of its greatest allies is honesty (Redlichkeit). A young Nietzsche says as much 
in a letter to his sister in 1865: 
 Is it then a matter of acquiring the view of God, world, and atonement in which 
 one can feel most comfortable? Is it not, rather, true that for the true researcher 
 the result of his research is of no account at all? Do we, in our investigations, 
 search for tranquility, peace, happiness? No—only for the truth, even if it were to 
 be frightening and ugly.381 
He goes on to say that his quest, regardless if the outcome is monstrous, will nonetheless 
be cheerful: “On this earnest foundation I shall now build—and the building will be all 
the jollier.”382 Nietzsche’s foundation is not a set of metaphysical principles, at least not 
the kind of principles he inherited in his time from the Western philosophical tradition. It 
is honesty in terms of how we understand metaphysical principles. Is this not exactly 
what the philosophical enterprise demands of us? And more often than not for Nietzsche, 
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honesty and dishonesty are the coordinates from which his provocative laughter erupts. 
Those philosophers who fail to exercise intellectual honesty are guilty of the deepest 
transgression and Nietzsche singles them out for ridicule and playacting in a comedy. 
 Further reflection hopefully yields for the reader of Nietzsche the insight that 
laughter is not something frivolous or superficial. Whether it be his use of the laughing 
wood god Silenus (a profound symbol of pessimism) in The Birth of Tragedy or the 
laughing Zarathustra (a profound symbol of affirmation) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
when laughter occurs it is almost always done under the pretext of illuminating a crucial 
philosophical point. Hence one should not conclude that the levity found in Nietzsche’s 
writings and thought efface all of the serious issues he tackles. Indeed comedy and 
laughter are coupled with the most serious issues in a way that disclose these issues so 
that the urgency that calls for their thinking is not diminished but enhanced. It is our task 
to think them in their coupling, that is, in their play. 
 Additionally we have seen that laughter works bi-directionally in his works. It is 
easy to simply focus one’s laughter on others, that is, to make a spectacle of the other. 
But to be honest, indeed to be authentic, one must also focus it on oneself and Nietzsche 
does just that. As well as targeting others for laughter, Nietzsche often has laughter 
directed at him. Perhaps best expressed in his character Zarathustra, the laughter directed 
at him is something that illuminates a shortfall in his teaching and thus requires a “going 
under” and an overcoming, a signal to take up a new perspective. What we find then 
under this rubric is that Nietzsche never advocates that we act out of ressentiment, that is, 
act in a way that simply gathers ourselves into the flip-side of the same coin in terms of 
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those we disagree with. To be sure, laughter helps ensure that we never deny our own 
action through the inaction of others. 
 There is a second reason Nietzsche levels laughter at himself. Nietzsche is keenly 
aware that those “who have ears for his writings” are, for the most part, of the future and 
not his contemporaries. In other words he is aware of his untimeliness. Thus he thinks 
and writes in his time for the future, that is, for us today at this crucial time in history as 
heirs of a modern-technical-scientific nihilism which he discerns, quite correctly, is 
dawning on humankind.383 Nietzsche is aware that much of his thought, because it is 
“dynamite,”384 will incite the sort of derisive laughter that one might resent to the point of 
inaction, which is the same kind of ridicule leveled at Zarathustra who transfigures it into 
his own laughing affirmation. Hence the laughter that resonates in his texts provokes us 
to forego ressentiment and its crippling internalization. Indeed laughter can be seen as the 
lion-willed gesture that says, “I am no longer impressed!” This shifting of perspective 
often results in gaiety, allowing us to constantly refamiliarize ourselves—vis-à-vis the 
footwork of dancing—within the great stream of becoming instead of the immobilization 
that occurs within the rigidity of a singular stance, anchored in an unchanging, 
transcendent principle that demands our allegiance. 
 There is also the constellation of the three characteristics that help define comedy 
and its attendant laughter: measure, transgression, and self-forgetting. These three criteria 
that more often than not work in tandem are always at work providing the threads that 
weave an image of who we are not only within the domain of comedy but also within the 
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philosophical enterprise. This is why comedy and laughter present such a potent and 
disclosive force in Nietzsche’s thought. In terms of measure, no one has emphasized its 
role more than Bernard Freydberg who states in the conclusion to Philosophy and 
Comedy, “In their own ways, the comedies, tragedies, and dialogues serve to draw human 
beings vicariously into the most human of endeavors, namely raising the question of 
measure, making the attempt to determine proper measure.”385 Measure invokes limit. A 
limit provides a horizon in which things stand in relation to that horizon as well as to 
each other. In all inspired comedy the generation of laughter almost always involves the 
transgression of limit so that measure is exceeded. This is often done through the self-
forgetting of great comic characters whether it be Aristophanes’ Strepsiades seeking the 
“wisdom” of Socrates in order to shirk his debts in Clouds or Woody Allen’s Alvy 
(played by Allen himself) in Annie Hall in which Alvy attempts to find love’s measure as 
if love of all phenomena could ever be measured. Whatever the attempt, nothing but the 
absurd was disclosed but an absurdity that profoundly shows us who we are. These same 
themes are at play in Nietzsche’s thought as well, although here these elements occur at 
the intersection of philosophy and philosophers and not necessarily on a formal stage or 
screen unless one considers life itself a stage with us as characters as Nietzsche often 
does. 
 Furthermore, Nietzsche shows the exceeding of measure most often happens in 
light of the very phenomenon that is supposed to give to thinking the very measure for its 
practice— ground. Nietzsche argues that the ground we often suppose our knowledge 
rests on is less a firm metaphysical foundation and more of a “metaphysical faith” built 
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on the constructs of grammar (“metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms” as he says 
in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”), which when employed have always 
already become distanced from any essence. The very enacting of ground as a measure, 
as limit, as that which would supply a firm foundation ends up exceeding its own 
function in its very positing. Nietzsche does not point this out because he is against 
philosophy, science and logic and their practice, nor because he wants to eliminate those 
endeavors but conversely; if science is to be viable it must recognize its limits, which is 
to say that science must recognize the fact that the regulative fictions it employs are just 
that, fictions. Science must come to grips with science. 
 Additionally, we must also content ourselves with the fact that science and 
knowledge as a product of human beings can only work within the framework in which 
they are situated, namely history and the stream of becoming. They must perpetually 
reacquaint themselves within becoming using only what is manifest in this world, much 
in the spirit of Otto Neurath’s boat metaphor where he asserts, “We are like sailors who 
have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-
dock and reconstruct it from its best components.”386 If the philosopher’s epistemology or 
the scientist’s method (and the two should not be separable) are to serve life nobly, they 
ought never to forget the world to which they belong—that of change and becoming—
lest they become actors in the greatest of comedic transgressions. Nietzsche argues that 
denying or ignoring these elements is not only a philosophical faux pas concerning the 
most serious issues, it is also the justification for the kind of provocative laughter he 
hopes will “reground” this sort of hubris or thinking run amok. It is the definitive kind of 
comic self-forgetting. Nietzsche, the philosopher of Dionysian wisdom, invites us to shift 
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our perspective away from supposed eternal, unchanging principles and instead celebrate 
our bodies, sensate experience, chaos, art, madness, the earth, and all of the things that 
constitute our being here. 
 For fear of pessimism, science post-Heraclitus has had the opiate-like effect of all 
but vanquishing the chaos from which it arises. Philosophers and scientists have either 
forgotten this chaos or, if they have not, have used illusions to protect a certain kind of 
life, one of life descending values Nietzsche believes are the genesis of nihilism. In light 
of this, Nietzsche’s provocative laughter is first directed at the knowers, that is, the ones 
who ought to know better. Hence he wants to educate the educators first, showing them 
that science and knowledge not only arise out of this chaotic element—often referred to 
as the Dionysian abgrund—but that science itself cannot account for this element because 
what is abysmal exceeds all measure. But Nietzsche’s claim reaches even farther. Not 
only is science incapable of fully accounting for the chaos of becoming, direct 
apprehension of its own ground remains veiled, even though it privileges this supposed 
ground as the Archimedean point of all knowledge. This is precisely why, in the spirit of 
the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason, Nietzsche asserts that science can never get to 
the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich); ground always betrays something unaccounted for, 
something that cannot be delimited and something requiring the palliative affects of art to 
which we can say “yes!” 
 In an ironic sense then, this is what measure, transgression and self-forgetting 
mean in Nietzsche’s thought. On one hand, proper measure demands that science and 
philosophy think their own ground—even if that “ground” be abysmal—and be mindful 
of it in terms of truth claims. Anything in excess of this ground can only be dogma. On 
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the other hand, Nietzsche is claiming that science, similar to the Ouroboros image in The 
Birth of Tragedy,387 in its attempts to establish a foundation, reaches its own limit and can 
go no farther. Scientific truth in search of measure can, in the end, only meet the 
measureless. The “knowledge” that manifests itself, at the limit where measure and the 
measureless appear to mix as opposites, is not the kind of proper knowledge grounded in 
metaphysical principles, it is tragic knowledge. It is here, at the limit, that tragic wisdom 
and art are necessary so that we can behold ourselves before ourselves in our true depth. 
And this is exactly Nietzsche’s project, to reintroduce this depth that only the early 
Greeks knew: “Nobody had ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: 
tragic wisdom was missing.”388 
 Only with the recognition, indeed celebration, of tragic wisdom can we practice 
what Nietzsche means by fröhlich Wissenschaft or “La gaya scienza,” that is, cheerful 
science that does not seek to betray its abysmal origins. This is precisely why he seeks an 
“alliance” between tragic wisdom and laughter: 
 Perhaps even laughter still has a future....Perhaps laughter will then form an 
 alliance with wisdom; perhaps only ‘gay science’ will remain. At present, things 
 are still quite different; at present, the comedy of existence has not yet ‘become 
 conscious’ of itself; at present we still live in an age of tragedy, in the age of 
 moralities and religions.389 
 This point provides an apt time to conclude our reflection. We have seen comedy 
and laughter’s relevance embedded deep within Nietzsche’s thought in light of the three 
                                                 
387 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 75/Section 15. 
388 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, 110/Section 3 of The Birth of Tragedy in 
Ecce Homo. 
389 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 27-28/Aphorism 1. 
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texts I examined. In addition to tragedy, The Birth of Tragedy clearly delineated the role 
that comedy can play as a counterforce to pessimism. Indeed comedy must be included 
within the very art that Nietzsche proclaims is “the highest task and the true metaphysical 
activity of this life.”390 The aim of The Gay Science was to introduce the kind of levity 
into the search for knowledge in all the fields that constitute Wissenschaft. The 
fruitfulness or not of levity for Nietzsche is always coupled to Redlichkeit (intellectual 
honesty). Thus Spoke Zarathustra showcased comedy and laughter’s apex in Nietzsche’s 
thought. These phenomena exhibited through Nietzsche’s Zarathustra are the fulcrum 
between past and future. They provided a provocative challenge to all absolute “meta” 
positions and the chance instead to tip the balance towards the kind of laughter and 
affirmation that reorients us back to the earth. 
 In the last analysis the comedy and laughter in Nietzsche’s writings and thought 
are there as provocations to rethink our relationship to each other and the philosophical 
endeavors that bestow value and meaning to existence that is, at times, both tragic and 
absurd. Until we come to grips with our science, moralities, and religion in terms of their 
reach and measure, we will remain mired in the eternal comedy of existence, and the 
joyful laughter of affirmation will remain a “not yet” and only a hope for the future. In 
this scenario where the “comedy of existence has not yet ‘become conscious’ of itself,” 
there is a one-sided spectacle391 in which Nietzsche and other free spirits observe the 
appearances of humankind at play in their own unconscious comedy rooted in nihilistic 
                                                 
390 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 14/Preface to the first edition. 
391 Although coming from the perspective of Marxist critique, Guy Debord in The Society of the Spectacle 
examines this kind of spectacle in which we have become alienated from one another, and from an 
authentic existence, through commoditization and the modern means of production: “The spectacle’s 
function in society is the concrete manufacture of alienation.” The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald 
Nicholson (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 23/Thesis 32.  
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practices. Yet this one-sided spectacle is exactly what Nietzsche hopes to overcome, what 
Zarathustra in his “going under” hopes to transfigure with his bestowing virtue: “You 
compel all things to and into yourselves,” says Zarathustra “so that they may gush back 
from your well as the gifts of your love.”392 If, as Nietzsche says in The Birth of Tragedy, 
life is justified “only as an aesthetic phenomenon” with art as humankind’s “highest 
metaphysical activity” then we, one and all, are subject to and held forth into this 
abysmal “ground” but one that also constitutes the very space where our inspired artistic 
creations avow saying “yes!” to it. And in this space all voices may bestow their “own 
gifts of love” as the “sparks of images” that burst forth from it. In this sense then the 
aesthetic phenomenon that is now a one-sided spectacle has the potential to gather all of 
us into this “highest metaphysical activity” where each unique voice that resonates with 
all others can then constitute a great carnival of laughter where we become artworks and 
each another’s audience. Art then, at the limit, calls us to witness. And what we witness 
in all of our tragedy and comic absurdity is the sum of our shining—we are witnesses of 
ourselves. Only when we learn the lion-willed laughter that affirms being here will we 







                                                 
392 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 56/“On the Bestowing Virtue.” Fred Evans also cites this passage in 
The Multivoiced Body to convey the dynamic hearing of other voices that in part constitutes our own voice 
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